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Kahler v. Kansas
Ruling Below: State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018).
Overview: Kahler was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He argued that the
prosecution violated his right to a fair trial. He also argued that Kansas law violated his
constitutional rights of claiming insanity under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue: Whether the Eighth and 14th Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.
STATE of Kansas, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
James K. KAHLER, Defendant- Appellant
Supreme Court of Kansas
Decided on February 9, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted James Kraig Kahler of
aggravated burglary and capital murder
under K.S.A.
21-3439(a)(6) for
fatally
shooting his wife, his wife's grandmother,
and his two daughters. Kahler appeals the
capital murder conviction and the ensuing
sentence of death; our review is automatic
under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6619.

sentence. We summarize
holdings as follows:

our

specific

• The State did not commit
prosecutorial error by objecting
during Kahler's closing argument.
• The district court judge engaged in
one incident of judicial misconduct
that does not require reversal.

Kahler raises 10 issues on appeal. Some of
the raised issues present questions decided
unfavorably to Kahler in prior cases, and
Kahler presents no new argument or
authority that would persuade us to change
our holdings on those issues. Likewise,
Kahler fails to convince us that his other
challenges warrant a reversal of his capital
murder conviction or a vacation of his death

• The district court judge erred in
refusing to give a requested expert
witness instruction, but the error was
harmless.
• K.S.A. 22-3220, which adopted the
mental disease or defect defense, did
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not
unconstitutionally
abrogate
Kansas' former insanity defense.

A recitation of some family history preceding
the murders is necessary to put Kahler's
crimes in context. In 2008, the
Kahler family—husband, Kahler; wife,
Karen; teenage daughters, Emily and Lauren;
and 9-year-old son, Sean—was living in
Weatherford, Texas. Kahler was the director
of the public utilities department, and Karen
was a personal trainer. Both adults had
successful careers. Acquaintances described
the Kahlers as a perfect family. Kahler was
extremely proud of his family; it was his top
priority.

• Because felony murder is not a
lesser included offense of capital
murder, the district court judge did
not err in failing to give a lesser
included instruction on felony
murder.
• The district court judge did not
prohibit defense counsel from
questioning prospective jurors during
voir dire about their views on the
death penalty.

That summer, Kahler took a new job as the
director of water and light for the city of
Columbia, Missouri. He moved to Columbia,
while Karen and the children stayed in Texas,
planning to follow him in the fall. Before
Kahler left for Columbia, Karen told him she
was interested in experimenting by engaging
in a sexual relationship with a female trainer
with whom she worked. Kahler assented to
the sexual relationship.

• The cumulative effect of trial errors
did not substantially prejudice Kahler
so as to deny him a fair trial.
• The Kansas death penalty is not a
categorically
disproportionate
punishment for offenders who are
severely mentally ill at the time they
commit their crimes.

Kahler thought the affair would end when
Karen and the children moved to Missouri;
however, it did not. At a New Year's Eve
party in Weatherford, Kahler was
embarrassed by Karen and her lover's
behavior, and the evening resulted in a
shoving match between the Kahlers. The pair
attempted marriage counseling, but by midJanuary 2009, Karen filed for divorce. In
mid-March, Karen made a battery complaint
against Kahler, which resulted in an arrest
warrant being served on Kahler at a city
council meeting. Because Kahler held public
office, his arrest was widely publicized.
Shortly thereafter, Karen took the children
and moved out of Kahler's residence.

• The two aggravating factors relied
upon by the State to support the death
penalty are not unconstitutionally
vague or duplicative.
• There was sufficient evidence
presented by the State to establish that
the killings in this case were
committed in a heinous, atrocious, or
cruel manner.
Consequently, we affirm Kahler's capital
murder conviction and his sentence of death.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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The disintegration of his marriage and family
relationships affected Kahler's conduct, both
personally and professionally. Kahler's
supervisor and another colleague both noted
Kahler's increasing preoccupation with his
personal problems and decreasing attention
to his job. By August 2009, the city had fired
Kahler. Concerned about Kahler's wellbeing, his parents traveled to Columbia and
moved Kahler back to their ranch near
Meriden, Kansas.

the back door, into the kitchen, and started
shooting. He shot Karen twice but did not
attempt to harm Sean. After Kahler moved
through the kitchen to shoot the other
victims, Sean ran out the back door and to a
neighbor's home where the police were
called.
About the same time, Wight's Life Alert
system activated a call for emergency
assistance and that in turn resulted in a 911
call to law enforcement. The system also
created a recording of the events in the house.

Later that year, at Thanksgiving, Sean joined
Kahler at the family ranch in Meriden, while
Karen and the girls went to Karen's sister's
home in Derby. The family had a longstanding tradition of spending the weekend
after Thanksgiving at the home of Karen's
grandmother, Dorothy Wight, in Burlingame,
Kansas. Arrangements had been made for
Karen to pick up Sean in Topeka
on Saturday, November 28, and take him to
Wight's residence in Burlingame. That
morning, Sean, who had been enjoying his
time at the Meriden ranch, fishing and
hunting with his father, called Karen to ask if
he could stay at the ranch. Karen denied
permission, and while Kahler was out
running an errand, Kahler's mother took Sean
to meet Karen in Topeka.

When officers arrived, Karen was lying on
the kitchen floor, unconscious and barely
breathing. Emily, who had also been shot
twice, was dead on the living room floor.
Wight was sitting in a chair in the living
room, suffering from a single gunshot wound
to the abdomen, but conscious. Lauren, who
had been shot twice, was found upstairs,
conscious but having trouble breathing.
Kahler was no longer in the house, but both
Wight and Lauren told the first responders
that Kahler was the person who had shot
them. Karen and Lauren died from their
wounds later that evening. Wight survived a
few days but ultimately succumbed to her
wounds as well.
Kahler managed to elude law enforcement
that evening but was found walking down a
country road the next morning. He
surrendered without incident. The State
charged Kahler with one count of capital
murder, or, in the alternative, four counts of
premeditated first-degree murder, as well as
one count of aggravated burglary for the
unauthorized entry into Wight's house.

Between 5:30 and 6 that evening, in
Burlingame, a neighbor of Wight's called
police about a man in a red Ford Explorer
near her home whom she suspected of
criminal activity. The Explorer was later
determined to be Kahler's vehicle. Around 6
p.m., Sean and Karen were standing in the
kitchen of Wight's home, while Emily,
Lauren, and Wight were elsewhere in the
house. Kahler entered Wight's house through
149

At trial, the defense did not dispute that it was
Kahler who shot the victims. Rather, the
defense attempted to establish that severe
depression had rendered Kahler incapable of
forming the intent and premeditation required
to establish the crime of capital murder. The
defense presented testimony from Dr.
Stephen Peterson, a forensic psychiatrist,
who testified that Kahler was suffering from
severe major depression at the time of the
crime and that "his capacity to manage his
own behavior had been severely degraded so
that he couldn't refrain from doing what he
did." Defense counsel, however, did not
specifically ask Dr. Peterson whether Kahler
had the capacity to premeditate or to form the
requisite intent to commit the crimes. The
State countered with the expert testimony of
Dr. William Logan, also a forensic
psychiatrist, who opined that Kahler was
capable of forming the requisite intent and
premeditation.

capital murder conviction and the ensuing
death sentence. Consequently, we will review
only that conviction and sentence and will
address each issue in the order presented.

I. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR
In his first issue, Kahler alleges that the
prosecutor
engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct when she objected during
defense counsel's closing argument. Defense
counsel
was
discussing
the
recording produced during the commission
of the crime by the Life Alert system. A male
voice, presumably Kahler's, had been
captured on the recording. Defense counsel
was about to state the words spoken by that
male voice, when the prosecutor interrupted,
objecting that defense counsel's argument
constituted improper unsworn testimony
based on what defense counsel thought the
voice had said. The district court sustained
the objection.

During closing arguments, defense counsel
asserted that Kahler was incapable of
forming the requisite premeditation or intent
at the time of the killings. In return, the State
argued that the defense expert had failed to
specifically address that point, while the
State's expert had directly stated that
Kahler was capable of premeditating the
murder and forming the requisite intent to
kill.

Standard of Review/Error Analysis
At oral argument, both parties acknowledged
that this court's decision in State v. Sherman,
although decided after the briefs in this case
were filed, now controls the analysis of this
issue. Sherman ended the practice followed
by State v. Tosh, overruled by Sherman, of
attempting to factor a prosecutor's ill will and
gross misconduct into the prejudice step of
the two step error/prejudice analysis when
reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal. Sherman substituted
an analysis that is focused on the defendant's
due process right to receive a fair trial.

The jury convicted Kahler of capital murder.
After hearing additional evidence in the
penalty phase, the same jury recommended
the death sentence.
As noted, Kahler raised 10 issues on appeal,
all of which are argued in the context of the
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Sherman continues to utilize a two-step
error/prejudice framework and the first
step—the error analysis—remains the same.
"Under the first step, we will continue to
analyze whether the prosecutor's statements
'fall outside the wide latitude afforded
prosecutors to conduct the State's case and
attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner
that does not offend the defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial.'" If error
occurred, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that "'the error complained
of will not or did not affect the outcome of
the trial in light of the entire record, i.e.,
where there is no reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to the verdict.'"

in the past and is no longer appropriate to our
analysis of prosecutorial error within a
criminal appeal. Thus, the question before the
court under Sherman, as it was under
previous caselaw, is simply whether making
an objection, even one based on an erroneous
application of law, was outside the wide
latitude afforded the prosecutor in making
her case to the jury.
We conclude that it is within the prosecutor's
permissible latitude to object that the defense
is about to go beyond the admitted evidence
in its summation to the jury. As we discuss
below, the district court's ruling on the
prosecutor's objection may have been
erroneous. But this fact has no bearing on the
determination of whether the objection itself
was prosecutorial error.

Analysis
Kahler maintains that his right to a fair trial
was violated when the prosecutor objected to
defense counsel's attempt in closing
argument to repeat what was said by the male
voice on the Life Alert recording. The
prosecutor's objection was based on the
assertion that defense counsel was not
allowed to state his opinion of the content of
the tape and doing so amounted to improper
testimony.

II. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
Kahler alleges that the district court judge
engaged in misconduct throughout the trial,
which cast his defense in a bad light, favored
the State's case, and denied him his right to a
fair trial. Kahler points to six specific
instances to illustrate his argument.
At trial, defense counsel failed to object to
any of the claimed misconduct. But an
appellate court will review allegations of
judicial misconduct that were not preserved
at trial when the defendant's right to a fair
trial is implicated. In addition, we are
statutorily obligated to review this issue
because of the death sentence imposed.

At oral argument, Kahler argued that the
objection was error because it was motivated
by bad faith and attempted to liken it to a
misstatement of law. In other words, Kahler
attempts to move the bad faith analysis
previously conducted under the prejudice
step to the error step. But ill will has never
been part of the error determination.
And Sherman is clear that measuring
prejudice by attempting to discern the
prosecutor's motivation has been problematic

Standard of Review
Our standard of review on claims of judicial
misconduct is unlimited. We examine the
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particular facts and circumstances of the case
to determine whether judicial conduct
including comments, other than jury
instructions, rise to the level of judicial
misconduct.

addition to asking the panel members to
speak clearly for the court reporter and to pay
attention to all the questions asked whether
directed specifically to them or not, the
district judge added the following caution:

Analysis

"It's also important that you be
careful. We want you to talk frankly,
we want you to answer questions and
speak from your heart, but we don't
want any outbursts of opinions that
might prejudice the rest of this panel
so before you speak in any manner
like that, think twice. And I warned
you, anyway, regarding that,
regarding your personal opinions."

The Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct
(KCJC) requires a judge to act in a
manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
An erroneous ruling by a judge, standing
alone, will not establish judicial misconduct.
Rather, the reviewing court will look for
conduct that manifests bias, prejudice, or
partiality, or otherwise significantly
undermines the fairness or reliability of the
proceedings. The complaining party has the
burden to establish that judicial misconduct
occurred and that the misconduct prejudiced
the party's substantial rights. "'If a proper and
reasonable construction will render the
remark unobjectionable, the remark is not
prejudicial.'"

Kahler argues these remarks to the third panel
dissuaded the panel members from
expressing their opinions and inhibited the
voir dire process. The State counters that, put
in context, the district judge's remarks were
nothing more than a reasonable admonition
to prevent one of the potential jurors from
tainting the rest of the panel and were well
within the district judge's responsibility to
control the courtroom. We agree with the
State.

With those ground rules to guide us, we turn
to the individual instances alleged by Kahler
to be judicial misconduct, followed by a
consideration of their cumulative effect.

A district judge is charged with preserving
order in the courtroom and with the duty to
see that justice is not obstructed by any
person. The record establishes that
throughout the voir dire of the first two
panels, the district judge had expressed
concern about questioning by the defense that
might elicit panel members' views on the
death penalty. We have approved of similar
remarks in other cases where the district
judge sought to prevent contamination of the
jury pool.

A. Warning a voir dire panel against
outbursts of opinion
Kahler first complains of remarks the district
judge made to a panel of the jury pool during
voir dire. Four panels of venire members
were questioned. The remarks Kahler finds
objectionable were made to the third panel
and were part of the district judge's
preliminary remarks explaining voir dire. In
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We note, however, that the better practice
would have included a clarification by the
district judge that panel members would
have an opportunity to raise any personal
concerns outside the presence of the other
venire members. But it is clear that the
district judge's failure to include such a
clarification to the third panel was an
oversight, as his comments to the fourth
panel included just such a statement.

of the trial; and refrain from unnecessarily
disparaging persons or issues."
Kahler argues that his counsel took no more
time for voir dire than the prosecution had
taken. For support, Kahler compares the
number of transcript pages that contain voir
dire questioning by the prosecutor to the
number taken by defense counsel's
questioning. This method of quantifying time
is inherently unreliable. More to the point,
however, there is nothing in the district
judge's comments that reflects negatively on
defense counsel's conduct. The statement
concerned the orderly progress of the trial,
and nothing suggests that the statement was
delivered in anything less than a dignified
and restrained manner. The statement was a
request, not an order, and clearly recognized
that defense counsel was entitled to ask his
questions.

In sum, we find no misconduct in the district
judge's comments to the third panel.

B. Asking defense counsel to move along
Kahler complains that the district judge
committed misconduct when he asked
defense counsel to speed up his voir dire
questioning. During the defense voir dire of
the third panel on the second morning of jury
selection, the district judge told defense
counsel, "we need to move through this a
little faster if we can. I realize you have a
right to all your questions but we're running
behind now." Kahler argues this shows bias
because the judge did not make a similar
request of the State and the defense
questioning had not exceeded the time
afforded the prosecutor.

We once again note the better practice, which
would have the district judge make such
administrative requests out of the presence of
the venire panel. Nonetheless, merely
requesting trial counsel to move a little faster,
if possible, does not amount to judicial
misconduct.

C. Comments on instructing
following opening statements

The trial judge has broad discretion in
controlling the courtroom proceedings.
"When it is necessary to comment on
counsel's conduct, especially in the jury's
presence, the trial court should do so in a
dignified, restrained manner; avoid repartee;
limit comments and rulings to those
reasonably required for the orderly progress

the

jury

Both parties gave relatively straightforward
opening statements. The prosecutor gave a
brief overview of the shootings and then
summarized testimony he expected to elicit
from each of the State's witnesses about the
crime and the crime scene. The defense
focused on painting a picture of the events
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that led up to the crime: Kahler's professional
success, the many happy years of the Kahlers'
marriage and family life, the breakdown of
the marriage, and Kahler's obsession with
saving it.

normally don't do this, but I am going
to ask that you listen carefully. This is
one of the instructions that will be
given to you later but I wish to give it
to you now also. That statement is:
Statements, arguments, and remarks
of counsel are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and in
applying the law, but they are not
evidence. If any statements are made
that are not supported by evidence,
they should be disregarded."
(Emphasis added.)

There were no objections during the State's
opening; however, the State objected three
times during Kahler's opening. After defense
counsel had attributed statements to Karen,
the prosecutor asked to approach the bench.
At the bench, the prosecutor lodged an
objection based on hearsay. The district judge
sustained the objection and instructed
Kahler's counsel to set out the expected
evidence and not to testify. The objection and
discussion were had out of hearing of the
jury.

Kahler argues the district judge's comments
prior to the actual instruction showed bias—
particularly the comment that the judge did
not normally give the instruction but wished
to do so this time. Kahler argues that it
amounted to a negative comment on defense
counsel's credibility.

Almost immediately after the bench
conference, the prosecutor objected a second
time, saying only "same objection" when
counsel for Kahler again attributed
statements to Karen. This time the district
judge responded within hearing of the jury:
"All right. [Defense counsel], we talked.
Unless you intend to call witnesses to support
what you're saying, they're not allowed."

The State focuses only on the instruction and
ignores the judge's comments preceding the
instruction. It argues the instruction itself was
a fair and accurate statement of the law. It
also points to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3414(3),
which provides "the judge, in the judge's
discretion, after the opening statements, may
instruct the jury on such matters as in the
judge's opinion will assist the jury in
considering the evidence as it is presented."
But the State fails to acknowledge that the
district judge gave the jury a set of
instructions prior to opening statements,
which included an instruction on considering
only testimony and exhibits admitted into
evidence and an instruction that it is up to the
jury to determine the weight and credit to be
given the testimony of each witness.

Later, the prosecutor requested to approach
the bench again to lodge an objection to
defense counsel using the word "crazy" to
describe Kahler's behavior. The discussion
and the judge's admonition not to use the
word were outside the jury's hearing.
Immediately following Kahler's opening
statement, the district judge said:
"All right. Ladies and gentlemen of
the jury, I'm going to read an
instruction to you at this time. I
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Given the context of the prosecution's
objections during the defense's opening
statement, the judge's comment undoubtedly
brought special attention to the instruction.
Moreover, given the timing of the district
court's comment, the jury's attention would
undoubtedly have been directed to the
defense's opening argument. The jury had
just heard the district judge admonish defense
counsel by saying, "Unless you intend to call
witnesses to support what you're saying,
they're not allowed." When the district judge
commented immediately on the heels of the
opening statements, he underscored his
suspicion that the defense would not be able
to introduce evidence that would allow the
jury to attribute certain statements to Karen.
This belief should not have been revealed to
the jury.

instruct the jury, as the judge did in this case,
that "I have not meant to indicate any opinion
as to what your verdict should be by any
ruling that I have made or anything that I
have said or done." Nothing suggests the
judge's isolated comment here influenced the
jury's consideration or misdirected the jury's
focus.
Indeed, the instruction given after the judge's
ill-advised comment pointed the jury exactly
where it needed to go: The instruction
focused the jury on the evidence. That is the
point of the instruction, which is often given
repeatedly through a trial. Consequently, we
hold the judge's comment to be harmless
error under either the constitutional or
nonconstitutional harmless error standard.
D. Personally questioning a witness

This court has previously warned district
judges to "limit[] comments and rulings to
what is reasonably required for the orderly
progress of the trial, and refrain[] from
unnecessary disparagement of persons or
issues." Here, the comment added nothing to
the orderly progress of the trial—the
instruction could have been given without
editorial comment or explanation. The
district judge erred in making the comment.

The prosecution's theory at trial was that
Kahler shot the victims with a .223 caliber
rifle or "long gun." Shell casings found at the
scene and bullets found in a clip near where
Kahler was arrested were .223 caliber. The
gun used in the murders, however, was never
found. During testimony, a Shawnee County
deputy testified that she was asked to look for
a "long gun" in Kahler's impounded vehicle
as part of the investigation. She testified that
she was unable to find a gun but did find an
empty box for a Remington .223. She
testified she left the box in the car. The
district judge apparently did not think this
testimony was clear, and at the end of the
prosecutor's questioning, questioned the
witness himself:

Error alone does not require reversal,
however. "'The question is whether [the
defendant]'s substantial rights to a fair trial
were
prejudiced
by
the
court's
statements.'" Here, the district judge's
isolated comment did not show the type of
judicial bias that denies a fair trial. On
occasion, district judges reveal, usually
unintentionally, a bias on an issue.
Consequently, district judges routinely

"BY THE COURT: Q. And I will ask
this just as a matter of clarification
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before the break; you mentioned an
empty box Remington .223 caliber, is
that correct, caliber?

"A. It would have been .223.
"Q. And REM, is that reference to the
caliber or the brand of gun?

"A. It was told to me that it was a
Remington .223.

"A. The brand of gun."
Later testimony clarified that the box was for
a long gun and the serial number of the gun
that would have come in that box was
registered to Kahler. Kahler maintains the
district judge aided the State in proving its
theory that a long gun was used in the crime
and the assistance had the effect of bolstering
the State's case and credibility.

"Q. All right. Now when you said
that, are you talking about a gun itself,
or the bullet, or caliber of gun?
"A. It was the box for a gun.
"Q. Okay. You don't know whether it
was a Remington brand gun or some
other brand?

This court has allowed questioning of
witnesses from the bench "based upon the
premise that one of the functions of a trial
judge is to accomplish the full development
of the truth." But we have cautioned that the
practice must not result in the slightest
suggestion of partiality or bias. For decades,
we have expressed our view that the better
practice is for the district judge to discuss the
matter with counsel outside the presence of
the jury and ask counsel to pose the questions
necessary to clarify the matter.

"A. I was told that it was a Remington
.223.
"THE COURT: Counsel, you want to
try [***30] to clarify that with her?
"[Prosecutor]: Sure.
....
"[Prosecutor]: Q. You didn't find a
weapon in the vehicle, did you?
"A. No.

Although the better practice would have been
for the district judge to follow the procedure
set out in Boyd, we see no misconduct here
because there was no suggestion of partiality.
Although Kahler contends that the judge's
questioning aided and bolstered the State's
case, it is just as probable that by stepping in
to clarify and suggesting to the prosecutor
that he follow up with additional questions,
the district judge's comments reflected
negatively on the State's presentation. Kahler
does not argue that the questions asked were
improper, and they drew no objection from

"Q. You found a box that appeared to
be a gun box?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And it listed a caliber of the
weapon at the end of it?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And what was the caliber of the
gun?
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defense counsel at the time. We also note that
the importance to the State's case regarding
the type of gun used was nearly nonexistent
given Kahler's defense was not based on
denying the shootings. Ultimately, the judge
did not assume the role of an advocate; he
merely attempted to clarify a point he
apparently felt was unclear—a point that
was of virtually no importance to the trial.
Consequently, we find no misconduct.

"THE COURT: I think it's improper.
You cannot say what you think is on
the tape.

E. Sustaining objection to closing comments
about voice on tape

Kahler argues the district judge committed
misconduct in two ways: first, by erroneously
sustaining the objection and, second, by
labeling
defense
counsel's
conduct
"improper."

"[Defense Counsel]: Well, can I say
what is on the tape, Your Honor?
"THE COURT: They can listen for
themselves.
"[Defense Counsel]: All right."

We rejected Kahler's argument above that the
prosecutor committed prosecutorial error by
objecting to defense counsel's attempt to
quote the male voice on the Life Alert
recording. Here we address his argument that
the district judge committed misconduct by
sustaining the objection.

The State maintains that counsel for Kahler
was about to misrepresent the evidence. It
argues there was no testimony as to what the
male voice on the tape specifically said. And
noting that the voice itself is barely
discernible, the State argues anything counsel
would have said in regard to content would
not have been based on the evidence.
Accordingly, the State contends the district
court was correct to sustain the objection.

The transcript reflects the following:
"[By Defense Counsel]: . . . you're
going to hear a male voice during this
absolute chaos say . . .
"[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I'm going
to object. The tape's in evidence. And
counsel's not allowed to testify and
tell the jury what he thinks is on that
tape.

We disagree. The district court sustained the
objection in error, if for no other reason than
because it was premature. The record does
not contain a proffer of the words that defense
counsel thought were on the tape, so we
cannot know for sure whether they
comported with the admitted evidence. But
we do know there was more evidence than the
State acknowledges. In addition to
the original recording itself, the record
includes Dr. Peterson's report and the
transcript contained on the enhanced CD,
which indicate that the voice said, "I am

"[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I
can say what I think's on that tape.
They've got the tape and if it doesn't
say it—counsel just said what all
these witnesses said. I'm certainly
allowed to say what the tape says.
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going to kill her." So, if defense counsel was
going to state that the male voice on the tape
said "I am going to kill her," it would have
been entirely proper for defense counsel to
discuss that statement and any reasonable
inferences to be drawn from it.

F. Discouraging the jury from
questions during deliberations

asking

For his final allegation of judicial
misconduct, Kahler alleges that, before
sending the jurors to deliberate at the end of
the guilt phase, the district judge discouraged
them from asking any questions they might
have during deliberations. The particular
remarks Kahler complains of concerned what
the jurors should do in the event they had
questions. The judge stated:

But an erroneous ruling by the district judge,
standing alone, is not grounds for finding
judicial misconduct. Something more is
required. Here, Kahler argues that the words
the district judge used in ruling on the
objection denigrated the defense. But the
words used to sustain the objection did not
denigrate counsel personally. The phrase "it's
improper" appears to be a reference to the
form of the argument counsel was attempting
to use. These are the words our opinions
frequently use to characterize argument or
conduct of counsel as impermissible.

"The bailiff will be outside the door
here and if you have any questions
you can knock on the door and
communicate with her.
"Now I have given you the
instructions[,] that's the law of the
case. Counsel has presented the
evidence, the facts of the case. You
should apply the law to the facts. You
have everything you need to decide
this case. You should review the
instructions for the answers to any
questions you might have. You should
not have to ask any questions.
However, if you have a question there
is a process that we must go through
and you should be aware of that
process. You can't just ask the bailiff
to tell me your question so that I can
run back there and give you an
answer.

Granted, when we issue an opinion we are not
speaking within earshot of the jury. But we
believe juries can be expected to understand
that objections will be made and ruled upon
in terms of what is proper and what is or is
not allowed without assuming nefarious
purposes by counsel, at least not those
beyond normal trial advocacy. We cannot
fault the district judge for framing his
ruling—although erroneous—in commonly
used terms.
Accordingly, we find no judicial misconduct.
We do, however, find that the district court's
sustaining of the State's objection was an
unassigned trial error. Given the record and
the arguments before us, we do not find this
error requires reversal standing alone.

"The process that we must follow
requires that any question that you
might ask be in writing. And the
presiding juror must prepare that
question in writing, hand it to the
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bailiff, and I must then assemble
counsel and the defendant and we
must discuss the question to decide
whether we are able to give you an
answer and, if so, what that answer
should be. My experience as a Judge
has been that although sometimes we
are able to give jurors answers, for
the most part the answer you're
going to receive to most questions
will be refer to your instructions for
advice." (Emphasis added.)

not have to ask any questions, in context,
appears to be a statement that the jury had the
necessary information to reach a decision.
The statement was an encouragement to the
jurors to review the instructions before
asking a question rather than a
discouragement from asking any questions at
all. The statement informed the jurors that
most questions would likely be answered by
referring the jury back to the instructions.
Nothing in the comments demonstrated bias,
prejudice, or partiality toward either party.
We find no misconduct.

Kahler focuses on the italicized comments
and argues they demonstrated impatience
with the steps necessary to meet the due
process
and
Eighth
Amendment
requirements of a capital case. He points
to K.S.A. 22-3420(3) to argue the jury had a
right to ask questions. At the time of
trial, K.S.A. 22-3420(3) provided:

G. No cumulative prejudicial effect
As noted above, we have typically required
the party asserting judicial misconduct to
show that any misconduct found to exist
actually prejudiced that party's substantial
rights. Kahler urges us to apply the
constitutional harmless error test set out
in Ward. But having found only one instance
of misconduct that was not reversible
standing alone, the cumulative error rule is
inapplicable here.

"After the jury has retired for
deliberation, if they desire to be
informed as to any part of the law or
evidence arising in the case, they may
request the officer to conduct them to
the court, where the information on
the point of the law shall be given, or
the evidence shall be read or
exhibited to them in the presence of
the defendant, unless he voluntarily
absents himself, and his counsel and
after notice to the prosecuting
attorney."

In the process of reviewing the judicial
misconduct claims, we noted some instances
in which the district judge could have applied
a better practice to the situation at hand.
Nonetheless, we discern no pattern of
conduct that manifested bias, prejudice, or
partiality against the defendant, and Kahler's
claim of judicial misconduct fails.
III. EXPERT WITNESS INSTRUCTION

The remarks in this case were both legally
and factually accurate; the jury was informed
that questions could be asked; and the process
that would be used to answer them was
explained. The comment that the jury should

Prior to trial, Kahler requested that the
district court give the jury an instruction on
how it may consider the opinion testimony of
experts. The State objected and the district
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court declined to give the proffered
instruction
because
expert
opinion
instructions are not recommended by the
criminal Pattern Instructions for Kansas
(PIK). Kahler claims that the district court's
ruling was erroneous.

who has knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education, may testify and
state an opinion concerning such
matters.
"You are not required to accept such
an opinion. You should consider
opinion testimony just as you
consider other testimony in this trial.
Give opinion testimony as much
weight as you think it deserves,
considering the education and
experience of the witness, the
soundness of the reasons given for the
opinion, and other evidence in the
trial."

Standard of Review
"For jury instruction issues, the progression
of analysis and corresponding standards of
review on appeal are: (1) First, the appellate
court should consider the reviewability of the
issue from both jurisdiction and preservation
viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard
of review; (2) next, the court should use an
unlimited review to determinewhether the
instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then,
the court should determine whether there was
sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the defendant or the requesting
party, that would have supported the
instruction; and (4) finally, if the district
court erred, the appellate court must
determine whether the error was harmless,
utilizing the test and degree of certainty set
forth in State v. Ward."

Although the State objected to the instruction
at trial, it concedes on appeal that the
instruction accurately states the law. The PIK
Committee,
however,
continues
to
recommend that a separate instruction on
expert opinion testimony not be given.
The district judge did give the standard
instruction on witness testimony, which
states: "It is for you to determine the weight
and credit to be given the testimony of each
witness. You have a right to use common
knowledge and experience in regard to the
matter about which a witness has testified."
Neither party objected to this instruction. The
State contends that this instruction
adequately covers the substance of the
requested instruction.

Analysis
The requested instruction, based on the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals Pattern Criminal
Jury Instruction 1.17, reads as follows:
"During the trial you heard the
testimony
of who
expressed
opinions concerning . In some
cases, such as this one, scientific,
technical, or other specialized
knowledge may assist the jury in
understanding the evidence or in
determining a fact in issue. A witness

This court has frequently emphasized the
wisdom of following the PIK Committee
recommendations. On the other hand, we
have also said that the failure to use the exact
language of a PIK instruction is not fatal.
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Moreover, a district court should not hesitate
to modify or add to pattern instructions where
appropriate in a particular case.

"The instruction accurately stated the
law as it stands in Kansas. The jury
should weigh expert witness
testimony in the same manner it
weighs all testimony. . . .

In State v. Willis, this court considered the
giving of an expanded instruction on witness
credibility. The Willis court concluded there
was no clear error in the giving of the
expanded instruction but noted "it would
certainly have been the better practice to give
an instruction along the lines of PIK Crim. 2d
52.09." The expert witness instruction
requested here, although contained in a
separate instruction, was, in effect, an
expanded version of the witness credibility
instruction.

"In addition, Adams' jury would not
reasonably have been misled by the
instruction. Had the first paragraph of
the hybrid stood alone, the jury still
would have been instructed as to how
to assess credibility of all witnesses,
regardless of expertise."
But this case highlights that there is a
fundamental difference between an ordinary
witness' testimony as to the facts of a case and
an expert's opinion testimony as to what those
facts mean. Indeed, opinion evidence from
experts is admissible precisely because the
jurors' common knowledge and experience
would not permit them to properly
understand the circumstances of the case.
"Where the normal experience and
qualifications of jurors permit them to
draw proper conclusions from given facts
and circumstances, expert conclusions or
opinions are not necessary." Yet, the general
instruction in PIK Crim. 3d 52.09 recites, in
part: "You have the right to use common
knowledge and experience in regard to the
matter about which a witness has testified." If
a witness has been permitted to give an expert
opinion because the subject matter is beyond
the common knowledge and experience of
the jurors, how does a juror use his or her
nonexistent common knowledge and
experience to assess the expert's testimony?

Then, in State v. Hunt, this court stated that it
"has continually disapproved the giving of an
expanded version of the credibility
instruction," although it had also continually
held that to do so was not clearly erroneous.
Later, in State v. Adams, the district judge
provided a witness credibility instruction
based on PIK Crim. 3d 52.09 that also
included wording from a civil pattern jury
instruction regarding expert witnesses. The
added language, like the language in the
federal instruction Kahler requested,
instructed the jury that testimony of experts
was to be considered like any other testimony
and should receive the same weight and
credit as the jury deemed it entitled to when
viewed in connection with all the other facts
and circumstances. The defendant alleged the
instruction was erroneous because the district
court did not follow the PIK Committee's
recommendation not to give an expert
witness instruction in criminal trials.
The Adams court observed:

Moreover, an expert witness is permitted to
share his or her opinion with the jury only
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after the trial judge has reached the legal
conclusion that the witness is, indeed, an
expert on the topic about which he or she is
going to opine. The regular witness
credibility instruction does not clarify for the
jurors that they may reject the expert opinion
even though it has been stamped with the
judge's imprimatur. In short, there is nothing
generic about opinion testimony from expert
witnesses, and the jury's assessment of the
credibility of that testimony should not be left
to the insufficient direction contained in the
generic PIK instruction.

Mental disease or defect is not
otherwise a defense."
At trial, Kahler based his defense on mental
disease or defect. He filed a motion alleging
that the statute unconstitutionally deprived
him of the ability to assert a defense based on
insanity. The district court denied the motion,
and the jury was instructed in accord with the
statute. On appeal, Kahler continues to assert
his constitutional challenge.
Standard of Review
Whether a statute is constitutional raises a
question of law over which this court
exercises
unlimited
review.

Consequently, the district court erred when it
refused to give the defense's requested
instruction on expert witness credibility
because the instruction was legally
appropriate and factually supported. But that
does not end the discussion; the error is
subject to a harmlessness analysis. In that
regard, notwithstanding that the legal
substance of the requested instruction was
not adequately covered by the general
instructions that were given, there is no
reasonable possibility that the error affected
the jury's guilty verdict. In other words, the
error was harmless.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY
3220

OF

Analysis
Before the enactment of K.S.A. 22-3220,
the M'Naghten rule was the proper test for the
defense
of
insanity
in
Kansas.
The M'Naghten rule provided that
"the defendant is to be held not
criminally responsible (1) where he
does not know the nature and quality
of his act, or, in the alternative, (2)
where he does not know right from
wrong with respect to that act. Under
the 'right and wrong' test of criminal
insanity, it must be proved that at the
material time the accused did not
know that what he was doing was
contrary to law."

K.S.A. 22-

For his fourth issue, Kahler contests the
constitutionality of K.S.A. 22-3220. The
statute provides:
"It is a defense to a prosecution under
any statute that the defendant, as a
result of mental disease or defect,
lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged.

But the Kansas legislature abandoned
the M'Naghten rule
through
enactment
of K.S.A. 22-3220, which became effective
January 1, 1996. The statute adopted what is

162

known as the "mens rea approach." The
mens rea approach allows evidence of mental
disease or defect as it bears on the mental
element of a crime but abandons lack of
ability to know right from wrong as a
defense. Kahler argues that by doing so the
statute
violates
the Due
Process
Clause because it offends a principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.

whether Idaho's modification of the insanity
defense is consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. As part of
its discussion, the dissent cited Bethel and
noted that Kansas is one of only four states
that have adopted the mens rea approach.
While we are cognizant of the three justices'
position, the Delling dissent has no effect on
our Bethel decision.
The parties have thoroughly set out the
arguments and cases in their briefs.
Nonetheless, Kahler has offered no new
reason to reconsider the arguments
previously and thoughtfully rejected by this
court. Thus a review of those arguments or
of Bethel is
not
warranted.

The same arguments made by Kahler were
considered and rejected by this court in State
v. Bethel. The Bethel court conducted a
thorough review of the pertinent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and other
states that had considered the issue.
Ultimately,
the Bethel court
concluded
that "K.S.A. 22-3220 does not violate the
defendant's right to due process under the
United
States
or
Kansas
Constitutions." Kahler relies on Finger v.
State, in which the Nevada Supreme Court
held legal insanity is a fundamental principle
of the criminal law of this country. But
the Bethel court considered and rejected the
reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court
in Finger,
and
we
adhere
to
our Bethel decision.

V.
LESSER
INCLUDED
OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION ON FELONY MURDER
Kahler did not request an instruction that
would have permitted the jury to convict him
of felony murder, as a lesser included offense
of capital murder. He claims on appeal that it
was clearly erroneous for the district court to
fail to give that lesser included offense
instruction on its own.
Standard of Review

Although Kahler has added no new
arguments to those this court considered and
rejected in Bethel, he directs our attention to
a written dissent from a denial of certiorari by
three justices in Delling v. Idaho. The dissent
was critical of the mens rea approach because
it allows conviction of an individual who had
no capacity to know that what he or she was
doing was wrong. The dissent would have
granted the petition for certiorari to consider

To determine whether the district court's
failure to sua sponte give an unrequested jury
instruction was clearly erroneous, the
reviewing court must first determine whether
there was any error at all. "To make that
determination, the appellate court must
consider whether the subject instruction was
legally and factually appropriate, employing
an unlimited review of the entire record."
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Analysis

retroactively, foreclosing Gleason's
claim that the district court erred in
refusing Gleason's request for a
felony-murder instruction. Further,
the 2013 amendments do not violate
Gleason's constitutional right to due
process, as interpreted in Beck, nor
does retroactive application violate
the prohibition against ex post facto
laws."

Kahler's brief was filed after this court's
decision in State v. Cheever, held that felony
murder was a lesser included offense of
capital murder and, consequently, that an
instruction to that effect should be given in a
capital case where warranted by the evidence.
Although no felony murder instruction was
requested or given in Kahler's case, he argued
in his opening brief, pursuant to Cheever, that
one was warranted and that it was clear error
not to give it.

In State v. Carr, this court held the ruling
in Gleason eliminated any need to address
the argument that a lesser included offense
instruction for felony murder was supported
by the evidence admitted at trial. And,
subsequently in Cheever, again considering
the same arguments, this court held "[t]he
reasoning of the Gleason and Carr cases
applies with equal force and effect to this case
and requires us to conclude that Cheever was
not entitled to a felony-murder lesser
included offense instruction. The trial judge
did not err when he did not give one."

By the time the State filed its responsive
brief, the legislature had amended K.S.A.
2012 Supp. 21-5402, in response to Cheever,
to specifically provide that felony murder
was not a lesser included offense of capital
murder. While the State raised a number of
arguments, it primarily argued that K.S.A.
2016 Supp. 21-5402(d) applied retroactively
by its specific terms to overcome Kahler's
argument. Anticipating Kahler's reply, the
State also argued that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 215402(d) was neither unconstitutional under
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution nor precluded by due process
under Beck v. Alabama.

Gleason controls this case and dictates the
conclusion that the district judge did not err
by failing to give a felony-murder lesser
included offense instruction because such an
instruction was not legally appropriate.

As anticipated, Kahler's reply brief focused
on arguments against the constitutionality
of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5402(d) based
on Beck and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Two
months after the reply brief was filed, this
court considered and decided the same
arguments in State v. Gleason.

VI. LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSE VOIR DIRE
Kahler alleges the district court denied him a
fair trial by prohibiting his counsel from
questioning prospective jurors during voir
dire about their views on the death penalty.

Gleason concluded:

Standard of Review/Analytical Framework

"K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(d), by
its express language, applies
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The purpose of voir dire is to enable the
parties to select jurors who are competent and
without bias, prejudice, or partiality. The
nature and scope of voir dire examination is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
court; however, appellate tribunals have the
duty to make an independent evaluation of
the circumstances of voir dire in determining
whether the district court has taken sufficient
measures to ensure the accused is tried by an
impartial
jury
free
from
outside
influences. An adequate voir dire is essential
to protect a defendant's right to an impartial
jury guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States
Constitution.

question venire members individually when
their in-court answers indicated a need to
delve into matters outside the hearing of the
rest of the panel. At oral argument, counsel
for Kahler acknowledged that Kahler's trial
counsel was not prevented from making an
individual inquiry of each venire person's
death penalty views. In fact, trial counsel
never made a request to question any of the
venire members individually. Consequently,
while an absolute prohibition against inquiry
in front of the rest of the venire panel might
be an unnecessary precaution against the risk
of tainting the entire panel, it was not error
here.
VII. CUMULATIVE ERROR DURING
GUILT PHASE

We will find an abuse of discretion if the trial
court has unconstitutionally restricted a
capital defendant's questioning during voir
dire. Mindful that this is a capital case in
which the jury has imposed the death penalty,
we have carefully examined the record of the
district court's conduct of voir dire. Simply
put, we find no support for Kahler's argument
in the record.

THE

Kahler claims that his guilt phase convictions
must be reversed because cumulative trial
errors
denied
him
a
fair
trial.
Standard of Review/Analytical Framework
"'Cumulative trial errors, when considered
collectively, may require reversal of the
defendant's conviction when the totality of
circumstances substantially prejudiced the
defendant and denied the defendant a fair
trial.'" No prejudicial error may be found
under the cumulative error doctrine if the
evidence against the defendant is
overwhelming.

The district judge consistently took the
position that Kahler's counsel could not
question prospective jurors about their views
on the death penalty in the presence of other
venire members. Clearly, the district judge
was concerned that an individual panel
member's comments could prejudice other
members and wished to avoid a situation in
which it might become necessary to
disqualify an entire panel. But discussions
between counsel and the district judge prior
to commencement of trial, along with the
written order covering the conduct of voir
dire, made clear that counsel were entitled to

"For errors to have a cumulative effect that
transcends the effect of the individual errors,
there must have been more than one
individual error. [Citation omitted]." We
have agreed with Kahler that the trial judge
should not have told the jury, "I normally
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don't do this," before giving PIK Crim. 4th
50.070 after opening statements and that the
trial judge erred in refusing to give the expert
witness instruction requested by the
defense. In the process of our review, we also
noted an erroneous ruling by the district court
on an objection the State lodged during
defense counsel's closing argument. In short,
there was more than one trial error.

below, that motion did not set out a
categorical proportionality argument based
on mental illness. Nevertheless, this court has
held that a categorical proportionality
challenge under the Eighth Amendment may
be raised for the first time on appeal.

Standard of Review/Types of Categorical
Challenges

But the touchstone is whether the defendant
received a fair trial, not whether he received
a perfect trial. Moreover, we have declined to
find reversible error under the cumulative
error rule where "'the evidence is
overwhelming against the defendant.'" On
the record before us, we are firmly convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilty
verdict would not have changed if the errors
had not been committed.

"A categorical proportionality challenge
under the Eighth Amendment implicates
questions of law, and this court has unlimited
review."
"The United States Supreme Court
identifies three subcategories of
categorical
proportionality
challenges. The first considers the
nature of the offense, such as a
prohibition on capital punishment for
nonhomicide
crimes
against
individuals. The second considers the
characteristics of the offender, such
as a categorical rule prohibiting the
death penalty for juveniles. The third,
which
was
first
recognized
in [***57] Graham, combines the
two because it 'implicates a particular
type of sentence as it applies to an
entire class of offenders who have
committed a range of crimes.' 560
U.S. at 61."

We also note that the errors identified during
the guilt-phase proceeding are not the type
that we would expect to impact
the sentencing determination when the same
jury decides both guilt and sentence.
Accordingly, we do not revisit this error in
our
penalty-phase
discussion.
VIII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CATEGORICAL
CHALLENGE TO DEATH PENALTY
The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits the infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishments." Kahler claims
that a sentence of death violates that
constitutional right when it is imposed upon
a severely mentally ill person.

Analysis
Kahler's claim fits within the second
subcategory of offender characteristics. He
proposes a categorical rule prohibiting
the death penalty for offenders who were

Although Kahler relies on a motion he filed
in the district court as having raised this issue
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severely mentally ill at the time of their
crimes.

determinative.' And
in State
Mossman, we observed:

In analyzing claims under this second
category, the United States Supreme Court
employs a two-part test:

v.

"'In accordance with the
constitutional design, "the
task of interpreting the Eighth
Amendment remains
[the
Court's]
responsibility."
[Citation
omitted.]
The
judicial
exercise
of
independent
judgment
requires consideration of the
culpability of the offenders at
issue in light of their crimes
and characteristics, along with
the severity of the punishment
in
question. [Citations
omitted.] In this inquiry the
Court also considers whether
the challenged sentencing
practice serves legitimate
penological goals.'

"The Court first considers 'objective
indicia of society's standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments
and state practice' to determine
whether there is a national consensus
against the sentencing practice at
issue. Next, guided by 'the standards
elaborated by controlling precedents
and by the Court's own understanding
and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning,
and purpose,' the Court must
determine in the exercise of its own
independent judgment whether the
punishment in question violates the
Constitution.

"Atkins and Roper both
identify
retribution and deterrence as the
'legitimate penological goals' served
by the imposition of the death penalty
on those who commit the worst
crimes. Both conclude that the
characteristics of juveniles and the
mentally retarded,
respectively,
make offenders in those categories
less culpable than the 'average
murderer.' And being less culpable
and less amenable to deterrence, the
death penalty is inappropriate for
their crimes.

We recently considered and rejected a nearly
identical argument in Kleypas. In fact,
Kahler's brief is, with the exception of those
portions pertaining directly to Kahler
himself, nearly word for word the same brief
that was submitted on this issue in Kleypas.
In Kleypas, we said that the defendant had
not shown the kind of legislative consensus
that the Supreme Court relies upon in the first
part of its test. Then, in exercising our
independent judgment under the second part
of the test, we opined as follows:
"As to the second-prong of the test,
we
explained
in Williams that
'community consensus is entitled to
great weight but it is not

"In support of his argument, Kleypas
simply states '[t]he culpability of the
severely mentally ill is diminished in
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the same manner as juveniles and the
mentally retarded.' He cites language
quoted
from
the
ABA
recommendation report to illustrate
that some severe disorders result in
hallucinations or delusions. But the
ABA report itself recognizes that
diagnosis alone is not a sensible basis
for the exemption and, consequently,
a case-by-case determination will be
required. The report recognizes
that Atkins left the definition of
'mental retardation' to the states. The
report continues:

penalty
despite
insufficient
culpability.’ And in Atkins, the Court
noted that clinical definitions of
mental retardation shared common
features which ultimately bore on the
determination of culpability.
"Mental illnesses present less
discernable common characteristics
than age or mental retardation.
Caselaw
relating
to
the
implementation
of Ford
v.
Wainwright,
and Panetti
v.
Quarterman, illustrates the difficulty
in defining a discernable standard
relating to mental illness. As the
ABA standard recognizes, case-bycase evaluations would be necessary;
it follows that the level of culpability
will vary on a case-by-case
basis. While we recognize that some
mental illnesses may make a
defendant less culpable and less likely
to be deterred by the death penalty,
often such illnesses can be treated and
may not manifest in criminal
behavior.

"'Atkins held the death penalty
excessive
for every person
with mental retardation, and
the Supreme Court therefore
dispensed with a case-by-case
assessment of responsibility.
However, for the disorders
covered by this . . . part of the
Recommendation, preclusion
of a death sentence based on
diagnosis alone would not be
sensible,
because
the
symptoms of these disorders
are much more variable than
those
associated
with
retardation or the other
disabilities covered by the
Recommendation's
first
paragraph.'

"We also note the protections already
in place, which protect the
incompetent from trial and the
'insane' from execution. In addition, a
defendant may present a defense to
the crimes based on a lack of
capacity. Finally, as Kleypas did
here, mental illness can be asserted as
a mitigator. While we recognize a
distinction between disqualification
and mitigation, we also recognize that
presenting mental illness as a

"In contrast, in Roper, the United
States Supreme Court noted that '[t]he
differences between juvenile and
adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a
youthful person to receive the death
168

mitigator allows the jury to consider
culpability.

channel the jury's discretion as required by
the federal and state constitutions. He argues
that the "killing or creating a great risk of
death to more than one person" factor is
duplicative of the elements needed to prove
capital murder. He argues that the "heinous,
atrocious, and cruel" factor is vague and
duplicative.

"Given
these
variables
and
considerations, in the exercise of our
independent judgment, we reject a
categorical prohibition based on the
broad classification of mental illness,
even as defined by the ABA standard,
in
favor
of
individualized
assessments through the sentencing
proceeding. We have confidence that
Kansas juries can weigh a defendant's
mental state at the time of the crime
as
a
mitigating
factor
for
consideration in the decision of
whether to return a death penalty
verdict.

Standard of Review
The constitutionality of a statutory
aggravating circumstance is a question of law
subject to unlimited review.

Analysis
Kahler acknowledges in his brief that this
court has decided the questions raised in this
issue against him. Kahler has raised no new
arguments nor pointed to any caselaw which
would provide a basis for reconsideration of
those decisions, and we decline to do so.

"We conclude that Kleypas fails to
make the showing necessary under
either prong of the two-part
categorical proportionality analysis.
We, therefore, deny his Eighth
Amendment categorical
proportionality
challenge
and
conclude the Eighth Amendmentdoes
not categorically prohibit the
execution of offenders who are
severely mentally ill at the time of
their crimes."

X. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

For his final issue, Kahler argues there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding of the second aggravating factor
argued by the State, i.e., that the crime was
committed in an especially heinous,
atrocious,
or
cruel
manner.

We find this issue controlled by our decision
in Kleypas and see no reason to revisit that
holding.
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

OF AN

Standard of Review

THE

The standard of review of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support an aggravating
circumstance was set out by this court
in Kleypas, to-wit:

Kahler argues the two aggravating
circumstances relied upon by the State to
justify the death penalty failed to properly
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“The standard of review on appeal as
to the sufficiency of evidence
regarding
an
aggravating
circumstance is whether, after review
of all the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, the
appellate court is convinced that a
rational factfinder could have found
the existence of the aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt."

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner. As used in this instruction,
the following definitions apply:
• 'heinous' means extremely wicked
or shockingly evil;
• 'atrocious' means outrageously
wicked and vile; and
• 'cruel' means pitiless or designed to
inflict a high degree of pain, utter
indifference to, or enjoyment of the
sufferings of others.

Analysis
At the penalty hearing, the State relied in part
on the evidence it had presented at the guilt
phase trial. The State also put the coroner, Dr.
Erik Mitchell, back on the stand to largely
repeat his testimony from the guilt phase
concerning the bullet wounds suffered by
each of the victims. With respect to each
victim, Mitchell described where each bullet
entered the body, how the wound or wounds
would have affected the victim's awareness
and her ability to feel pain, and, ultimately,
how they would have brought about her
death. He testified that all of the women
would have suffered the severe pain of being
shot. He also concluded that all of them
retained awareness long enough to know of
the other shootings going on around them and
to be cognizant of their own possible
impending death.

"In order to find that the crime of
capital murder is committed in an
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
manner, the jury must find that the
perpetrator inflicted serious mental
anguish or serious physical abuse
before the victim['s] death. Mental
anguish
includes
a
victim's
uncertainty as to her ultimate fate."
We have often held that shooting deaths are
not inherently heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
We compiled a number of those cases
in State v. Baker.

The jury was instructed in accord with PIK
Crim..),
on
the
heinous,
atrocious, [***65] or cruel aggravating
circumstance:

In Baker, we also reviewed a number of cases
in which this court had found shooting deaths
to be especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. We concluded
in Baker that
the
"common thread" running between those
cases in which we held a shooting death had
been especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
was evidence of the infliction of mental
anguish upon the victim prior to death.

"That the defendant committed the
crime of capital murder in an

A more recent case is factually similar to this
case. In State v. Hayes, defendant Terry Ray
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Hayes was married to Tiffani Hayes for a
little over a year. In April 2010, Tiffani
moved out, and shortly afterward, Hayes
filed for a divorce. He experienced
depression and suicidal ideations following
the breakup. There was evidence that Hayes
continually contacted Tiffani electronically,
at work and elsewhere, that he accused her of
infidelity, and that he had told others he
would kill her. On the day of the murder,
Hayes lured Tiffani to his home by telling her
he had some of her property that she needed
to pick up. Tiffani arrived with a friend and
approached Hayes who was in the
driveway. The friend witnessed Hayes
confront Tiffani, heard Tiffani scream, and
then saw Tiffani being chased down as she
tried to escape from Hayes who had a gun.
Hayes shot Tiffani in the back of the head
when he caught up to her. In summing up the
evidence supporting the aggravator, this
court said there was "evidence that Hayes had
threatened Tiffani in the past, that he lured
her to his residence in order to kill her, and
that he killed Tiffani as she tried to run away
from him."

conclude that Kahler's prior behavior
contributed to Karen's mental anguish when
he walked into Wight's kitchen with a gun
and shot her.
In addition to the evidence above, there is
clear evidence from the Life Alert recording
that Kahler methodically went through the
house shooting each of the women in turn.
The coroner's testimony established that the
bullet wounds to each of the victims were not
immediately fatal and would have left each
victim conscious long enough to suffer the
physical pain of her injuries in addition to the
mental anguish of her impending death. The
evidence clearly established that Wight and
Lauren were aware of others being shot
before them and lived long enough to suffer
seriously from their own wounds and to fear
for their own lives. The Life Alert recording
established beyond question that Lauren
suffered severe mental anguish as her father
went through the house shooting her family
members as she lay mortally wounded
fearing for her own life. Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we easily conclude that a
rational factfinder could have found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Kahler committed the
murders in an especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel manner.

Here, there was evidence that Kahler engaged
in similar electronic stalking in which he sent
emails to Karen, to Karen's lover, and to
others. There was evidence Kahler was
severely depressed and was obsessed with
Karen's leaving. There was also evidence of
a prior physical threat to Karen. Karen had
previously had Kahler arrested for battering
her, and she was aware of his obsessive
behavior. In Hayes, the district court relied
on similar evidence to establish that Tiffani
had reason to fear Hayes and, as a result,
suffered mental anguish at the time of her
death. As in Hayes, it is reasonable to

We applied the same standard of review
in Gleason, where we recognized our
"independent duty to consider the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the jury's findings
on aggravating circumstances."
Kahler does not contest the jury's finding that
Kahler killed or created a great risk of death
to more than one person. But under our
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independent duty to determine "whether
the evidence supports the findings that an
aggravating circumstance or circumstances
existed," we have no problem determining
that the evidence was sufficient to support
this aggravating circumstance. With our
determination above that sufficient evidence
supported the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravating circumstance, we now must
determine whether the evidence supports the
finding that "mitigating circumstances were
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances." Again, we have no difficulty
in determining that the jury's weighing
determination and sentencing verdict were
supported by the evidence.

The comment in question came after defense
counsel's opening statement. Recall there
were three objections to defense counsel's
opening statement with one admonition to
defense counsel being overheard by the jury.
And after counsel finished, the district judge
gave an admittedly proper preliminary jury
instruction, saying:
"All right. Ladies and gentlemen of
the jury, I'm going to read an
instruction to you at this time. I
normally don't do this, but I am going
to ask that you listen carefully. This is
one of the instructions that will be
given to you later but I wish to give it
to you now also. That statement is:
Statements, arguments, and remarks
of counsel are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and in
applying the law, but they are not
evidence. If any statements are made
that are not supported by evidence,
they should be disregarded."
(Emphasis added.)

CONCLUSION
Kahler's conviction of capital murder
under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) and his sentence
of death are affirmed.

BILES, Senior Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:

Kahler argues this passing comment about
what normally occurs in a typical trial, along
with its proximity to his counsel's opening
statement and the State's objections, shows
judicial bias requiring reversal of Kahler's
convictions. The majority does not go that
far, but it tags the comment as judicial
misconduct. I disagree.

I agree with the majority's decision to affirm
James K. Kahler's convictions and sentences
but disagree with one conclusion reached by
the majority. I would not characterize as
misconduct the trial judge's aside that "I
normally don't do this" before giving the
pattern jury instruction about remarks of
counsel. I think the majority reaches the
wrong conclusion and in the process does a
disservice to the trial bench. It slaps a
"judicial misconduct" label on what, at worst,
should be an opportunity for a simple
"teaching moment" to caution judges about
their banter with juries.

When addressing the merits of this alleged
judicial misconduct—"I normally don't do
this"—this court must consider the facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged
misconduct to decide whether the remark
manifested bias that impaired the trial's
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fairness. In this case, the trial judge had a
tough job. He was coping with a particularly
heinous, high-profile death penalty case
involving a quadruple homicide. Two
victims were young girls.

Indulging the majority's willingness to
speculate, one obvious answer arises because
these jurors knew they were hearing an
abnormal, highly charged, multiple murder
case in which an individual's life hung in the
balance. And given that, they would have far
more readily associated the judge's comment
that he did not "normally" give a particular
instruction with the serious business at hand
and what was most assuredly on everyone's
minds, i.e., the grisly case being heard.
Instead, the majority steadfastly conjectures
that jurors "would" see the remarks
"undoubtedly" as targeting the defense in
some critical way. That conclusion is too
farfetched under the facts and circumstances
presented.

In what was obviously an effort to maintain
focus and order, the trial judge sandwiched
both counsel's opening statements between
appropriate preliminary pattern jury
instructions. Immediately before the State's
opening remarks, the trial judge instructed
jurors to consider only the testimony and
exhibits admitted into evidence. Immediately
after the defense's remarks, the trial judge
cautioned the jury as recited above.
It is impossible for me to understand how the
defense can cry foul when what the trial judge
advised the jury about included a comment
that explained the State and defense counsel's
purpose in giving their openings was to help
jurors understand the evidence and
application of the law. Surely, no one would
take the State seriously if it objected that its
opening statement was diminished because it
was preceded by the judge telling the jury to
consider only the testimony and exhibits—
effectively inviting the jury to disregard what
it was about to hear. And the instruction that
followed the opening statements here can
objectively be seen as validating the purpose
of opening statements, rather than degrading
a particular speaker's integrity.

I disagree with the majority's characterization
of this remark as judicial misconduct and
error. But I agree if the comment was error, it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
JOHNSON, Judge, dissenting:
I dissent. To effect synergy with the majority,
I will address each of its issues in turn,
including those with which I agree, followed
by the unassigned error of unconstitutionally
inflicting the cruel and/or unusual
punishment
of
death.

ISSUE #1: PROSECUTORIAL ERROR
I agree with the majority's holding that it is
within the prosecutor's permissible latitude to
object on the ground that the defense's
closing argument is about to go beyond the
admitted evidence, even where the objection
is based on the prosecutor's erroneous
understanding of the law. I disagree,

What we are left with is the trial judge's aside
that he "normally" did not give the later
instruction, but wanted the jury to hear it
then, and would give it again later. What
would a reasonable person take from this?
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however, with the majority's suggestion that
bad faith or ill will can never play any role in
the error analysis. I would submit that a
prosecutor does not have the wide latitude to
intentionally seek to lure the trial court into
erroneously excluding permissible defense
arguments. Such bad faith conduct,
manifesting ill will, does, indeed, constitute
prosecutorial error. But I do not discern that
the prosecutor in this case crossed that line.

instruction was specifically aimed at the
credibility of the defense opening statement.
With respect to the judge's questioning of the
deputy, I would concur with the majority's
determination that, although the better
practice would have been for the district
judge to ask the prosecutor to seek
clarification of the testimony, there was no
misconduct here. The judge's questions did
not suggest partiality toward the State.
Indeed, the questioning could be viewed as
having cast some doubt on the deputy's
thoroughness or expertise.

ISSUE #2: JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
I agree with the majority on its assessment of
the judge's remarks to the third panel of
venire persons warning against blurting out
personal opinions. Although a more
articulate admonition would have included
the clarification that panel members could
individually advise the court of their
respective personal concerns about the death
penalty outside the presence of the others that
omission in this context did not rise to the
level of misconduct.

The alleged judicial misconduct set forth in
II.E. is a corollary to the alleged prosecutorial
error in the first issue. To reiterate, after the
prosecutor objected to defense counsel's
stating what the male voice was saying on the
Life Alert tape, the district judge ruled: "I
think it's improper. You cannot say what you
think is on the tape." Kahler contends that it
was misconduct for the judge to sustain the
objection and it was also misconduct for the
judge to state in front of the jury that the
defense argument was improper.

Likewise, I agree with the majority that it
would have been better if the venire panel had
not heard the trial judge ask the defense to
pick up the pace. But I discern no judicial
misconduct.

I agree with the majority's assessment that the
district court's ruling on the State's objection
during the defense closing argument was
legally infirm and constituted an unassigned
trial error. But, as the majority correctly
states, Kahler had to show more than an
erroneous ruling on an objection to establish
his assigned error of judicial misconduct. He
did not do so here, even with the judge's use
of the word "improper" to describe the legal
status of the argument.

Further, I agree with the majority's finding of
error regarding the third alleged incident of
judicial misconduct during which the district
judge told the jury that he normally did not
give the instruction on counsel's statements
not being evidence after the opening
statements. The majority correctly discerns
that, in context, the judge's comment brought
special attention to the instruction and the
jury could have concluded that the extra
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Kahler's complaint about the judge's remarks
concerning
jury
questions
during
deliberations is similarly miscast as judicial
misconduct. Even if the judge's comments
were erroneous, Kahler does not explain how
discouraging jury questions would inevitably
result in bias, prejudice, or partiality that was
adverse to the defense. One can imagine that
a jury could have some questions which, if
left unresolved, would prejudice the State.
Consequently, although I view the judge's
remarks to be ill-advised and erroneous,
especially in a death penalty case, I cannot
say they rise to the level of being misconduct.

I agree with the majority that the district court
erred in refusing to give the requested
instruction on expert witness credibility, but
that the error standing alone did not affect the
jury's
guilt-phase
verdict.
ISSUE #4: CONSTITUTIONALITY
22-3220

In rejecting Kahler's constitutional challenge
to this state's elimination of the insanity
defense, in favor of a mens rea approach, the
majority leans heavily on its assessment that
Kahler adds nothing new to the arguments
that were rejected in State v. Bethel. While
stare decisis is a valid tack, the majority
conveniently overlooks a significant
distinction between this case and Bethel.
Although Bethel was convicted of capital
murder, the death penalty was not
involved. "Pursuant to an agreement of the
parties, Bethel waived his right to a jury trial,
the case was tried to the bench on stipulated
facts, and the State did not pursue the death
penalty."

In sum, I concur with the majority that the
record does not support the defendant's claim
that the district judge engaged in a pattern of
conduct that manifested bias, prejudice, or
partiality against the defense. But defendant's
arguments on this issue point out two
unassigned errors, i.e., the district court
erroneously sustained the State's objection
during the defense closing argument, and the
district court erroneously discouraged the
jury from exercising its right, after retiring
for deliberations, "to be informed as to any
part of the law or evidence arising in the
case."

Recently, we acknowledged that this court is
supposed to employ a higher degree of
scrutiny in a death penalty case. We stated:
"This court has, in several cases,
noted that issues in a death penalty
review are subject to a heightened
reliability standard.”

Individually,
the
judge's
erroneous
instruction following defense counsel's
opening statement and the two unidentified
errors would not have changed the jury's
guilty verdict. I discuss their cumulative
prejudicial
effect
in
Issue
#7.
ISSUE #3: REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
EXPERT WITNESSES

OF K.S.A.

"A sentence of death is different from
any
other
punishment,
and
accordingly there is an increased need
for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate sentence.
“

ON
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At the very least, this court has the obligation
to independently analyze whether the
procedure of replacing the insanity defense
with the mens rea approach undermines the
reliability of the jury's determination to
impose the death penalty. One might question
whether a juror would be as likely to vote to
kill a defendant who did not know that his or
her murderous act was wrong.

wit: (1) Giving the jury instruction after
opening statements with accompanying
remarks about it being unusual; (2) sustaining
the State's objection during the defense
closing argument, thereby precluding
argument on the admitted Life Alert tape
recording; (3) discouraging the jury from
submitting questions during its deliberations;
and (4) refusing to give the legally
appropriate and factually supported expert
witness instruction proffered by the defense.

ISSUE # 5: LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION ON FELONY MURDER

Notwithstanding the existence of more than
one error, I would not hold that their
collective effect requires reversal of the
guilty verdict. But I strongly disagree with
the majority's determination that the guiltphase errors can be ignored when considering
the same jury's penalty-phase decision. Our
heightened reliability obligation mandates
that we not approve a sentence of death that
is obtained through erroneous procedures. I
would hold that the errors made in this case
undermined the reliability of the jury's death
sentence, and I would require that it be
vacated and remanded for a new sentencing
trial. A death sentence that fails the unreliable
procedures test cannot pass constitutional
muster, even if the majority believes that a
subsequent trial would yield the same result.

The majority follows recent precedent to
opine that the legislature retroactively
eliminated felony murder as a lesser included
offense of capital murder. One can certainly
make a logical argument for the proposition
that eliminating felony murder as a lesser
offense of capital murder effectively changes
the definition of the crime of capital murder,
and, although the legislature is entitled to
change the definition of a crime, it cannot
redefine the crime after it is committed.
Nevertheless, that is the settled law in this
state now.
ISSUE #6: LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSE VOIR
DIRE
I have no quibble with the majority's holding
that the district court did not impermissibly
limit the defense's voir dire of the jury panels
given the record before the court and defense
counsel's failure to conduct individual voir
dire of venire members.

ISSUE
#8:
EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
CATEGORICAL CHALLENGE TO DEATH
PENALTY
The majority relies exclusively on Kleypas,
to reject Kahler's argument that it is cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment
to the United States
Constitution for the State to kill a person who
was severely mentally ill at the time of the

ISSUE #7: CUMULATIVE ERROR DURING
THE GUILT PHASE
I discern that the following judicial acts
constitute multiple guilt-phase trial errors, to176

capital murder. I did not specifically address
this issue in my Kleypas dissent, but I do so
now.

gets his 'just deserts'—the severity of
the
appropriate
punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability
of the offender. Since Gregg, our
jurisprudence
has
consistently
confined the imposition of the death
penalty to a narrow category of the
most serious crimes. For example,
in Godfrey v. Georgia, we set aside a
death
sentence
because
the
petitioner's crimes did not reflect 'a
consciousness
materially
more
"depraved" than that of any person
guilty of murder.' If the culpability of
the average murderer is insufficient to
justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State, the lesser
culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that
form of retribution. Thus, pursuant to
our narrowing jurisprudence, which
seeks to ensure that only the most
deserving of execution are put to
death, an exclusion for the mentally
retarded is appropriate.

Fifteen years ago, in Atkins v. Virginia, the
United States Supreme Court construed and
applied the Eighth Amendment "in the light
of our 'evolving standards of decency,'" and
concluded that imposing the death penalty on
a mentally retarded offender was excessive
and "that the Constitution 'places a
substantive restriction on the State's power to
take the life' of a mentally retarded offender."
While recognizing that a preferred label is
intellectual disability, see Hall v. Florida, for
clarity I will use the terms employed
in Atkins and Kleypas,
i.e.,
mental
retardation and mentally retarded.
Part of the rationale for Atkins' holding was
that the Court seriously doubted that either of
the two justifications for the death penalty
that it had recognized—retribution and
deterrence—could be applied to mentally
retarded offenders. The Court opined that
"[u]nless the imposition of the death penalty
on a mentally retarded person 'measurably
contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is
nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering,"
and hence an unconstitutional punishment.'"

"With respect to deterrence—the
interest in preventing capital crimes
by prospective offenders—'it seems
likely that "capital punishment can
serve as a deterrent only when murder
is the result of premeditation and
deliberation,"'
Exempting
the
mentally
retarded
from
that
punishment will not affect the 'cold
calculus that precedes the decision' of
other potential murderers. Indeed,
that sort of calculus is at the opposite
end of the spectrum from behavior of
mentally retarded offenders. The
theory of deterrence in capital

In reaching its conclusion that it was "not
persuaded that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals will measurably advance
the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the
death penalty," Atkins, the Court engaged in
the following analysis:
"With respect to retribution—the
interest in seeing that the offender
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sentencing is predicated upon the
notion that the increased severity of
the punishment will inhibit criminal
actors from carrying out murderous
conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive
and behavioral impairments that
make these defendants less morally
culpable—for
example,
the
diminished ability to understand and
process information, to learn from
experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, or to control impulses—
that also make it less likely that they
can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty
and, as a result, control their conduct
based upon that information. Nor will
exempting the mentally retarded from
execution lessen the deterrent effect
of the death penalty with respect to
offenders who are not mentally
retarded. Such individuals are
unprotected by the exemption and
will continue to face the threat of
execution. Thus, executing the
mentally retarded will not measurably
further the goal of deterrence."

reasoning, or to control impulses," as well as
not being amenable to deterrence. I fail to
grasp how a severely mentally ill person
possessing those same characteristics is not
in the same less-morally-culpable category as
the mentally retarded offender. If a person is
incapable of understanding the nature and
quality of their murderous act and/or did not
know that the act was wrong, does it matter
whether the cause of the cognitive deficiency
is labeled mental retardation or chronic
mental illness? The point is that, when
executing a severely mentally ill person will
not "measurably advance the deterrent or the
retributive purpose of the death penalty," it
becomes "nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and
suffering."
Kleypas strained to distinguish severe mental
illness by declaring that the condition
presents
"less
discernable
common
characteristics than age or mental
retardation." The apparent suggestion was
that the courts might have to work more
diligently to identify which mentally ill
persons are less culpable. That argument is
unpersuasive, if for no other reason than the
notion that a person's life—even a murderer's
life—should not be taken away without this
court's heightened scrutiny, even if that takes
more effort.

The Kleypas majority "recognize[d] that
some mental illnesses may make a defendant
less culpable and less likely to be deterred by
the death penalty." Notwithstanding the selfserving equivocation in that recognition, it
nevertheless points out the logical fallacy in
categorically protecting the mentally retarded
but
not
the
severely
mentally ill. Atkins spoke about mentally
retarded offenders being less morally
culpable because of their "diminished ability
to understand and process information, to
learn from experience, to engage in logical

But, more importantly, I do not accept the
premise. This state has decades of
jurisprudence applying the M'Naghten rule.
Determining whether a person was so
severely mentally ill at the time of the crime
as to render him or her less culpable is not
much of a leap from that former knowingright-from-wrong jurisprudence. Likewise,
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the argument falters when one considers that
intellectual disability in this state is not
determined
through
a
mathematical
calculation, but rather the condition requires
a case-by-case determination as well.

ISSUE #9: CONSTITUTIONALITY
AGGRAVATING FACTORS

OF TWO

I concur with the majority's determination
that the issues raised here were previously
decided adversely to Kahler, and I see no
reason to attempt to avoid the doctrine of
stare
decisis
today.

Moreover, I must confess to being baffled by
the point Kleypas attempted to make by
stating that "often such [mental] illnesses can
be treated and may not manifest in criminal
behavior." If the suggestion is that mental
retardation
and
being
underage always manifests
in
criminal
behavior, that would, of course, be ludicrous.
The fact that not all mentally ill persons
engage in criminal activity is no more
compelling than the fact that not all mentally
retarded persons are criminals. Moreover, if
the statement means to suggest that mentally
retarded persons can never receive training
that will permit them to peacefully exist in
society, that, too, would be wrong-headed.

ISSUE #10: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
I would agree with the majority's assessment
that this case presents an exception to the
general proposition that shooting deaths are
not inherently heinous, atrocious, or cruel. A
person who stalks and systematically shoots
his wife and daughters, one after the other,
whereupon each remains aware of her own
impending death and the deaths of her
relatives has committed capital murder in a
heinous, atrocious, and cruel manner.

Finally, Kleypas' rationale that the problem
of executing severely mentally ill persons is
ameliorated because mental illness can be
presented to the jury as a mitigator does not
pass cursory consideration. Would telling a
juror that the defendant suffers from a
severe mental illness that resulted in him or
her killing people without knowing it was
wrong, suggesting that the defendant will
always be a danger to society, make the juror
more, or less, likely to vote for death? If it is
morally and legally wrong to execute a
person who is no more culpable than Atkins'
"average murderer," the decision to do so
should not be left in the emotionally charged
hands of the jury.

OTHER UNASSIGNED ERRORS
Kahler
does
not
challenge
the
constitutionality of Kansas' death penalty law
under our State Constitution. But as noted
above, we can—and should—consider
unassigned errors that impact on fairness and
justice. In Robinson, I expressed my view
that the death penalty violates the prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment in our
State Constitution. I relied heavily on Justice
Breyer's dissent in Glossip, which I
summarized as follows:
"The Glossip dissent opined that in
1976, when the United States
Supreme Court upheld the death
penalty, 'the Court thought that the
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constitutional infirmities in the death
penalty could be healed,' and it
'delegated significant responsibility
to the States to develop procedures
that would protect against those
constitutional
problems.' But
'[a]lmost 40 years of studies, surveys,
and experience strongly indicate . . .
that this effort has failed.' The dissent
related that the current administration
of the death penalty 'involves three
fundamental constitutional defects:
(1)
serious
unreliability,
(2)
arbitrariness in application, and (3)
unconscionably long delays that
undermine the death penalty's
penological purpose.' Moreover, the
dissent noted that, perhaps as a result
of these constitutional defects in the
death penalty, 'most places within the
United States have abandoned its use,'
which makes the penalty 'unusual.'”

of proof does not mean beyond all doubt.
Then, in the sentencing phase, the same lessthan-certain standard is applied to the
existence of aggravating factors, which must
then
be outweighed by
mitigating
circumstances.
But there is nothing uncertain about the
punishment of death. There is no taking back
a completed execution, even if we learn that
the jury was hoodwinked by unscrupulous
forensics,
sandbagged
by
unethical
prosecutions, or left less than fully informed
by inconceivably incompetent defense
counsel. In recent years, death row inmates
have been found to have been wrongfully
convicted
for
a
plethora
of
reasons. Moreover, after a death sentence is
executed, it matters not one whit whether the
sentence was unconstitutionally imposed. For
instance, there was no relief for all of the
mentally retarded offenders put to death
before the Atkins court announced that it was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
punishment to do so. Likewise, the 22
juvenile offenders put to death between 1985
and 2003 were not brought back to life
by Roper's epiphany that a state executing its
children is categorically unconstitutional.

The only thing I would add here is the
obvious observation that a part of what makes
the death penalty unfair and unjust is that the
degree of certainty that a jury must possess to
vote for the death penalty does not match the
finality of the punishment, once executed. A
jury can convict a person of capital murder
without being certain that the person is guilty.
Indeed, prosecutors frequently argue to juries
that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard

In short, when it comes to our death penalty,
the scales of justice are not in equipoise. That
is cruel.
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“Supreme Court to Examine Insanity Defense, Need for Jury Unanimity”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
March 18, 2019
The Supreme Court said Monday it would
consider whether two pillars of criminal
law—the insanity defense and the rule that
only unanimous juries may convict—are
required by the Constitution.

The Kansas law, he argues, violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment and the 14th
Amendment guarantee of due process of law.
The insanity defense dates from an 1843
British case of Daniel M’Naghten, a Scottish
wood-turner who fatally shot a government
secretary he mistook for the prime minister.
Under the resulting M’Naghten rule followed
by British and American courts, defendants
can be acquitted if they don’t comprehend
what they are doing or don’t understand that
it is wrong.

The court also agreed to decide cases
involving two other questions of criminal
law. One is how recent decisions limiting
punishment of juvenile offenders apply
retroactively, an issue raised by Beltway
sniper Lee Boyd Malvo in challenging his
sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. It said it would also
decide whether states can prosecute crimes
based on false information entered on federal
immigration forms.

In the mid-20th century, courts expanded the
grounds for insanity or mental-defect
defenses. A tiny number of defendants plead
insanity, but after several notorious cases,
including John Hinckley’s acquittal for
attempting to assassinate President Reagan
and for severely wounding his spokesman
James Brady, lawmakers and voters began to
rein in mental-capacity defenses.

All four cases will be heard in the court’s next
term, which begins Oct. 7.
The insanity case comes from Kansas, which
in 1996 eliminated the right of a defendant to
claim he or she couldn’t distinguish between
right and wrong. James Kahler, sentenced to
death for the 2009 murders of four family
members, contends he was denied the chance
to argue he was criminally insane based on
severe depression that may have made him,
as a defense expert testified, “psychotic and
impaired to the point” of losing the required
degree of moral consciousness.

States like California, where voters were
shocked by the so-called Twinkie defense
invoked to claim that the accused’s poor diet
partly led him to kill San Francisco Mayor
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey
Milk, dialed back the scope of the insanity
defense. But according to Mr. Kahler’s
petition, Kansas, Alaska, Idaho, Montana and
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Utah go further, prohibiting defendants from
arguing that they lack the capacity to
distinguish right from wrong.

consideration
of
their
incomplete
development and capacity for rehabilitation
before imposing life without parole.

In a separate case, the court will examine
whether defendants can be convicted of
crimes without a unanimous jury vote.
Oregon is the last state permitting 10-2 votes
for conviction, after Louisiana voters
amended the state constitution to require
unanimous verdicts after Jan. 1, 2019.

A federal appeals court in Richmond, Va.,
found the 2012 decision applied retroactively
to Mr. Malvo’s case. The Virginia attorney
general appealed.
The fourth case granted Monday involves a
state prosecution for identity theft of three
illegal immigrants who used other people’s
Social Security numbers to fill out
employment forms in Kansas. The state
supreme court ruled that federal law doesn’t
permit states to base such charges on false
information entered on federal immigration
forms. Kansas, backed by the Trump
administration, argues that reading is
mistaken.

Evangelisto Ramos, however, who was
convicted of a New Orleans murder in 2016
by a 10-2 vote and sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole, argues that the
unanimity requirement, long recognized as
applying to federal courts under the Sixth
Amendment, is constitutionally demanded of
state courts as well.
The Supreme Court has found that nearly
every provision of the Bill of Rights also
applies to state governments, but the Sixth
Amendment has been an anomaly since 1972,
when the justices splintered 5-4 against
applying it to the states.

After accepting those cases, the Supreme
Court heard argument over 11 districts in the
Virginia House of Delegates that a lower
court found had impermissibly been drawn to
discriminate against African-American
voters. The argument focused primarily not
on the lower court’s reasoning, however, but
on whether the Republican-controlled House,
which intervened in the case, had legal
standing to defend the map over opposition
from the state’s Democratic attorney general.

The Malvo case revisits a series of random
shootings that terrorized the Washington,
D.C. area in 2002 and left 10 victims dead.
The crime spree’s mastermind, John
Muhammad, was executed by Virginia in
2009. Mr. Malvo, who was aged 17 when he
committed most of the crimes, was sentenced
to life without parole.

Virginia holds off-year state elections, and all
140 legislative seats are at issue. Republicans
hold a 51-49 advantage in the state House.

Starting in 2005, however, the Supreme
Court delivered a series of opinions that
prohibited the death penalty for juvenile
offenders and, in 2012, required additional

A decision in the case, Virginia House of
Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, is expected before
July.
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“Kansas quadruple killer’s SCOTUS appeal could change insanity defenses
nationwide”
WIBW, Topeka, Kansas
Nick Viviani
March 19, 2019
A U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the case of a
Kansas man convicted of killing four family
members ten years ago in Osage County
could change the way insanity defenses work
across the country.

in 2003 following the Michael Bethel’s
appeal of his murder conviction.
“Kansas still allows that information to be put
on, but through a different statute regarding
information about mental disease or defect,”
said Schmidt.

On Monday, Kansas Attorney General Derek
Schmidt announced the nation’s highest
court would hear the appeal of James Kraig
Kahler, who was sentenced to death for the
November 2009 killings of his estranged
wife, two daughters, and wife's grandmother
a day after Thanksgiving.

In its decision to hear Kahler’s appeal, federal
Justices pointed out seven states’ high courts
have recognized a Constitutional right to an
insanity defense, defying their respective
state legislatures’ efforts to place restrictions
on it or get rid of it altogether. They
specifically pointed to the Nevada Supreme
Court’s determination the “legal insanity is a
well-established and fundamental principle
of the law of the United States… (and)
…therefore protected by the Due Process
Clauses of both the United States and Nevada
Constitutions.”

The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Writ of
Certiorari filed on behalf of Kahler by the
state’s Capital Appellate Defender’s office,
Sidley Austin LLP, and the Northwestern
Supreme Court Practicum. The case is
scheduled to be heard in the October 2019
session.
The Justices called Kahler’s case an “ideal
vehicle” to determine whether the state’s
restrictions on insanity pleas violate his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
According to Kansas statute, mental disease
or defect is not a defense if the defendant had
the intention of committing the offense
“regardless of why he thought he was doing
it or whether he knew it was right or wrong.”
The state Supreme Court upheld the measure

The writ issued by the Court also pointed to
precedent by the Washington Supreme Court
citing the long history of insanity defenses
“from the earliest period of the common
law.” In Washington v. Strasburg the court
ruled it was “too plain for argument” that
“prior to and at the time of the adoption of our
Constitution” a defendant was entitled to
such a defense.
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“We have a very limited use of evidence
regarding a mental disease or defect that can
be used in criminal cases in Kansas,” said
John Francis, a law professor at Washburn
University.

U.S. Supreme Court to call Kahler’s appeal
“an ideal vehicle to decide the issue.”

The High Court said its counterparts in the
Kansas Supreme Court were wrong when
they decided an insanity defense was not a
fundamental
tenet
of
American
jurisprudence, reaching back to scholarly
thought from Hebrew and Greek thinkers
from the 6th and 5th centuries B.C.,
respectively. They noted by the 12th century
such a defense “had taken root within the
English common law tradition, and by the
sixteenth century, insanity was a “well
recognized defense.”

“(I)n forty-six other states, Mr. Kahler could
have been found not responsible as result of
his mental state,” the Justices said. “Not in
Kansas.”

It added that the Kahler case “cleanly" offers
the Justices a chance to settle the issue.

In Idaho, one of the state’s that has restricted
its insanity defense, a three-Justice majority
ruled Due Process does not mandate an
insanity defense either at the state or federal
level. The Justices found the “wide disparity”
in decisions by state legislatures and courts
“suggests” it is not Constitutionally-required.
The U.S. Supreme Court noted other state
high courts have issued similar decisions.
Additionally,
both
sides
of
the
constitutionality split are filled with
precedents affirming their positions.

According to the Court’s writ, the Bethel
decision found the Kansas state legislature
did not eliminate the insanity defense
altogether, however it did “redefine” it.
Kansas law as it stands allows defendants
claiming insanity to be convicted “if the
defendant was able to form the intent
required to commit the offense” – even if they
did not know whether doing it was right or
wrong. The statement called irrelevant the
fact malice is not an essential part of a murder
decision in Kansas, only the intent to kill a
human being.

“We think that the Kansas law has a solid
constitutional basis,” said Schmidt.
VITALLY IMPORTANT
“Whether the Constitution permits states to
criminally punish (and potentially execute)
individuals who could not control their
actions or understand they were wrong has
profound legal, moral, and practical
implications for our criminal justice system.”

AN IDEAL VEHICLE
In contrast, four states besides Kansas –
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Utah – have all
placed restrictions on the M’Naghten (or
similar) rule that typically is used in insanity
defenses. This discrepancy has prompted the

- U.S. Supreme Court Review of Petition for
Writ of Certiorari for Kahler v. Kansas
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In declaring the questions posed by the
Kahler case “a vitally important and
recurring issue,” the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the legitimacy of our criminal law
rests in part on whether it “reflects the moral
judgment of the community.”

In February of last year, the Kansas Supreme
Court upheld Kahler's conviction. The state
Justices ruled that, while prosecutors did
make errors in the course of the trial, those
mistakes would not have affected the verdicts
nor his sentence. In addition, they concluded
his crimes met the standard of "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" that justifies the death
penalty.

They cite precedent from Tison v
Arizona that argues the “heart of the
retribution rationale” relates directly to
personal culpability of the offender. They
declare this “crucial link” is broken in cases
involving the severely mentally ill who
cannot control or comprehend the nature of
their actions.
Beyond that, a guilty verdict, as opposed to
an insanity verdict, could in turn prevent a
defendant from receiving necessary medical
treatment because “prisons are notoriously
ill-suited to provide adequate mental health
treatment.”
SENTENCED TO DEATH
Kahler was sentenced to death for the
November 2009 killings of his estranged
wife, two daughters, and wife's grandmother
a day after Thanksgiving.
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“Consensus of Confusion: Determining the Constitutionality of the Insanity
Defense”
The Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy
Rafael Santa Maria
February 11, 2019
A grisly capital murder case might determine
the constitutionality of the insanity defense.
In 2009, James Kraig Kahler shot and
killed his wife, his mother-in-law, and his
own two daughters in Burlingame, Kansas.
After being found guilty and facing a capital
murder conviction, Kahler appealed to the
Kansas Supreme Court in an attempt to
overturn his death sentence. In doing so, the
defense claimed that Kahler’s severe
depression, seemingly caused by his wife’s
extramarital affair and estrangement from his
family, impaired Kahler’s judgment and
caused him to lose control of his actions.
Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s capital conviction.
Kahler then petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
bringing the future of the insanity defense to
the national stage.

illness as a defense to criminal action, Kahler
was not allowed to provide evidence that his
mental illness caused him to lose control and
thus was not given proper due process.
Furthermore, the defense claimed that
punishing Kahler would be cruel and unusual
since his mental illness, as opposed to Kahler
himself, bore the moral culpability of the
crime.
By framing the issue of the insanity defense
in these terms, Kahler v. Kansas may provide
a definitive answer to whether “the
Constitution mandates an insanity defense,”
a question that the Supreme Court avoided
in Clark v. Arizona, a previous case involving
a similar issue. In said case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Arizona Court of Appeals
decision to convict Eric Michael Clark, a man
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, since
Clark could reasonably distinguish between
morally right or wrong actions. Still, the
Supreme Court remained ambiguous
regarding the constitutionality of the insanity
defense and instead left the issue largely up
to the state courts. Justice Souter’s
decision reflected this equivocality, stating:
“We have never held that the Constitution
mandates an insanity defense, nor have we
held that the Constitution does not so
require.”

Although the insanity plea is very seldom
used in
US
criminal
cases,
the
pending Kahler v. Kansas case nonetheless
presents interesting constitutional questions.
In pleading for Kahler’s innocence, the
Kahler defense argued that the Kansas courts
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process and his Eighth Amendment right
to freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment. They argued that, since
Kansas does not recognize severe mental
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Without a definitive stance on the insanity
defense from the Supreme Court, state high
courts differ significantly on whether or not
the insanity defense is constitutionally
required. In Kahler’s petition to the Supreme
Court, the petitioners highlight these wide
disagreements and use them to argue for
a writ
of
certiorari.
Notably,
the
petition points out that while Nevada,
California,
Louisiana,
Washington,
Mississippi, Colorado and Minnesota
condemn criminal convictions of defendants
who are mentally unable to understand or
control their actions, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana and Utah explicitly deny that due
process requires states to recognize an
insanity defense. Moreover, the petitioners
stress that these states overwhelmingly tend
to reaffirm their previous rulings, further
entrenching
insanity
defense
inconsistencies.

the insanity defense is a constitutionally
mandated aspect of the criminal legal system.
Throughout the petition brief, the petitioners
decry the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision
and Kansas policy on the insanity defense in
general, presenting the need for a
constitutionally-mandated insanity defense
as the culmination of hundreds of years of
English common law principles and
precedents.
Regardless of the petitioners’ bias, the brief
draws attention to how the constant
prevalence of mental illness ensures that
there will always be at least some cases in
which the culpability of the defendant cannot
easily be determined. Since this issue will
inevitably persist, the issue of consensus on
the insanity defense will continue to boil to
the surface. Therefore, even if it is not
addressed and resolved in Kahler v. Kansas,
the issue will likely turn up again in the
future.

Of course, the Kahler petition unabashedly
advocates for the Supreme Court to rule that
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“Kansas Supreme Court uphold James Kahler’s murder conviction, death
sentence”
The Topeka Capital Journal
Morgan Chilson
February 9, 2018
An appeal by James Kraig Kahler to overturn
a capital murder conviction after he was
found guilty of killing four family members
in 2009 was quashed Friday by the Kansas
Supreme Court, which also upheld a state
statute that allows the execution of people
with severe mental illnesses.

had argued Kahler was severely mentally
impaired when he committed murder because
of depression.
“Kahler has offered no new reason to
reconsider the arguments previously and
thoughtfully rejected by this court,” the
majority court opinion said.

Kahler, who killed his wife, two daughters
and his wife’s grandmother in a Burlingame
shooting, raised 10 issues in his appeal,
challenging the conduct of the prosecutor and
trial judge and arguing the death penalty is
unconstitutional when applied to a person
who has a severe mental illness when
committing a crime.

Kahler murdered his estranged wife, Karen
Kahler, 44; daughters Lauren Kahler, 16, and
Emily Kahler, 18; and Karen Kahler’s
grandmother, Dorothy Wight, 89. He left his
then 10-year-old son alive.
Kansas Attorney General Derek Schmidt
applauded the court’s decision to uphold a
death sentence for the fifth time.

While the Supreme Court acknowledged the
trial judge committed errors, the majority
agreed those errors didn’t affect the trial’s
outcome and didn’t justify reversing the
guilty verdict or death sentence.

“The decision today affirms the conviction
and death sentence based on an Osage
County jury’s findings and moves this case
forward one more step,” Schmidt said.

The court asserted arguments by Kahler’s
attorney regarding the constitutionality of a
Kansas statute that abandoned the insanity
defense didn’t make a case for
reconsideration. Kahler’s defense attorney

Others with a death penalty upheld by the
court are Scott Cheever, John Robinson,
Gary Kleypas and Sydney Gleason.
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Kelly v. United States
Ruling Below: United States v. William E. Baroni, Jr., 909 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2018).
Overview: Kelly was convicted of fraud from federally funded programs, wire fraud, conspiracy
to commit fraud, and conspiracy against civil rights. She appealed her conviction. The issue is
whether a public official “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy
reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision.
Issue: Whether a public official “defraud[s]” the government of its property by advancing a “public
policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the
decision.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
William E. BARONI, Jr. and Bridget Anne KELLY, Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided on November 27, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge:
Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and
Bridget Anne Kelly engaged in a scheme to
impose crippling gridlock on the Borough of
Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee's mayor
refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of
then-Governor Chris Christie. To this end,
under the guise of conducting a "traffic
study," Baroni and Kelly, among others,
conspired to limit Fort Lee motorists' access
to the George Washington Bridge—the
world's busiest bridge—over four days in
early September 2013: the first week of Fort
Lee's school year. This scheme caused
vehicles to back up into the Borough,
creating intense traffic jams. Extensive media

coverage ensued, and the scandal became
known as "Bridgegate."
In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and
Kelly for their role in the scheme. Each
Defendant was charged with seven counts:
conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly
convert, or intentionally misapply property of
an organization receiving federal benefits, 18
U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense;
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and two
counts of the substantive offense; and
conspiracy against civil rights, and the
substantive offense. A jury convicted
Defendants on all counts. They appeal only
their judgments of conviction.
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For reasons that follow, we will affirm
Defendants' judgments of convictions on the
wire fraud and Section 666 counts but will
reverse and vacate their civil rights
convictions.

local traffic and "immediately thought that
this would be . . . a potential leverage point
with [Fort Lee] Mayor [Mark] Sokolich
down the road." Wildstein shared this
observation with Baroni, Governor Christie's
then-Chief of Staff Bill Stepien, and Kelly,
then the Deputy Chief of Staff for New
Jersey's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
(IGA). Wildstein did not, however, use the
Special Access Lanes as leverage at that time.

I.
In 2010, then-New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie appointed Baroni to serve as Deputy
Executive Director of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey. That same year,
David Wildstein—a cooperating witness in
this case—was hired to serve as the Port
Authority's Director of Interstate Capital
Projects, in which capacity he functioned as
Baroni's chief of staff.

Around the same time that Wildstein realized
the Special Access Lanes could be used as
leverage, IGA officials—including Kelly—
were discussing a plan to solicit
endorsements from Democratic elected
officials to generate bipartisan support for
Governor Christie's 2013 re-election bid.
IGA officials rewarded potential endorsers
with, among other things, "Mayor's Days"
(meetings with top departmental and
agency staff) and invitations to sporting
events,
breakfasts
and
parties
at
Drumthwacket (the Governor's Princeton
residence), and the Governor's State of the
State address.

Among its many functions, the Port
Authority operates the George Washington
Bridge, a double-decked suspension bridge
connecting the Borough of Fort Lee, New
Jersey, and New York City across the
Hudson River. On the bridge's upper deck,
twelve toll lanes carry traffic from New
Jersey into New York. During the morning
rush hour, Port Authority police place traffic
cones to reserve the three right-most lanes—
the "Special Access Lanes"—for local traffic
from Fort Lee. This leaves the other nine
lanes for drivers on the "Main Line," which
includes traffic from I-80 and I-95. This
practice of reserving Special Access Lanes
was a decades-long custom dating back to a
political deal between a former New Jersey
governor and Fort Lee mayor.

The Governor's Office and IGA used the Port
Authority similarly to bestow political favors
on potential endorsers. As Wildstein
explained at trial, the Port Authority "was
viewed as the economic engine of the region"
and "had an ability to do things for
Democratic officials that would potentially
put the Governor in a more favorable
position." Baroni and Wildstein were thus
asked "to assist the Governor's Office in
identifying opportunities that would be
helpful." The Port Authority gave benefits
ranging from gifts (e.g., steel from the
original World Trade Center towers, flags

Wildstein testified he first became aware of
the Special Access Lanes in March 2011. He
learned the three lanes were given to Fort Lee
by a former New Jersey governor to reduce
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that had flown over Ground Zero, framed
prints) and tours, to jobs, to large economic
investments (e.g., the $250 million purchase
of the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne).

Fort Lee." Wildstein testified that, on a
follow up telephone call, Kelly told him that
"Mayor Sokolich needed to fully understand
that life would be more difficult for him in the
second Christie term than it had been [i]n the
first." Wildstein admitted at trial that he
agreed to change the lane configuration "[f]or
the purpose of causing—of punishing Mark
Sokolich, of creating a traffic jam that would
punish him, send him a message," and that
there was no other reason for the change.

One Democratic endorsement sought by the
Governor's Office was that of Mayor
Sokolich. IGA invited Sokolich to a New
York Giants game, several holiday parties,
and one of Governor Christie's budget
addresses. And, as early as 2010, the
Governor's Office and IGA directed
Wildstein to leverage the Port Authority's
resources to obtain Sokolich's endorsement.
Sokolich received benefits ranging from the
sort of gifts described above to substantial
Port Authority assistance for Fort Lee (e.g.,
Port Authority Police assistance directing
traffic in Fort Lee, a $5,000 contribution to
the Fort Lee fire department for an equipment
purchase, and over $300,000 in funding for
four shuttle buses providing Fort Lee
residents with free transport between ferry
and bus terminals). Despite that, Sokolich
informed IGA in 2013 that local political
considerations precluded him from endorsing
the Governor's reelection bid.

Wildstein testified he told Baroni he
"received an email from Miss Kelly that [he]
viewed as instructing [him] to begin to put
leverage on Mayor Sokolich by doing a lane
closure." He also testified he told Baroni "that
Miss Kelly wanted the Fort Lee lanes closed
. . . [f]or the purpose of punishing Mayor
Sokolich . . . [b]ecause he had not endorsed
Governor Christie" and that "Mr. Baroni was
fine with that."
According to Wildstein, he decided "to create
the cover of a traffic study" and shared his
plan with both Baroni and Kelly. Wildstein
believed "calling it a traffic study would
provide a cover story for the true purpose of
changing and realigning that traffic pattern at
the bridge" and "to have a public policy
reason for doing so as opposed to saying it
was political and it was punitive and
revealing the true purpose." In furtherance of
Defendants' traffic study cover story,
Wildstein contacted Peter Zipf, the Port
Authority's chief traffic engineer, and told
him he wanted to take away the cones that
created the Special Access Lanes "so that
New Jersey could determine whether those
three lanes given to Fort Lee would continue
on a permanent basis." Zipf responded later

In June 2013, Kelly told Wildstein that she
was disappointed Sokolich would not be
endorsing Governor Christie, and Wildstein
reminded her "if she want[ed] the Port
Authority to close down those Fort Lee lanes
to put some pressure on Mayor Sokolich, that
that c[ould] be done." On August 13, 2013,
Kelly sent an email to Wildstein that read:
"Time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee."
Wildstein "understood that to mean it was
time to change the lane configurations, the
upper level of the George Washington Bridge
in order to create traffic in the Borough of
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that day with various proposals but
recommended that at least one segregated
lane be left in place to prevent sideswipe
crashes.

Baroni and Kelly, and none of the three saw
a problem with this extra cost. Wildstein and
Zipf also discussed collecting data on the
ensuing traffic, and Wildstein testified he
understood it would require "some staff
time."

According to Wildstein, he and Baroni
discussed when to implement the lane closure
at the end of August 2013, and they selected
Monday, September 9, 2013—the first day of
school in Fort Lee. But Wildstein waited to
give the instruction until Friday, September
6. He testified "[i]t was a deliberate effort on
[his] part to wait until the last minute to give
a final instruction so that nobody at the Port
Authority would let Fort Lee know, would
communicate that to Fort Lee or anyone else
within the Port Authority," including
Executive Director Patrick Foye. According
to Wildstein, he discussed waiting to give the
instruction with both Baroni and Kelly, who
agreed. This directly contravened normal
Port Authority protocol, with any lane
closures announced to the public weeks, and
even months, in advance.

On the morning of Monday, September 9,
Port Authority police placed traffic cones
two toll booths to the right of where they
were customarily placed on the upper deck,
thereby reducing the number of Special
Access Lanes from three to one, and
increasing the number of Main Line lanes
from nine to eleven. This realignment meant
that Fort Lee's sole remaining Special Access
Lane had to accept both cash and E-ZPass,
further delaying traffic. As discussed, Fort
Lee received no advance warning of the
change—contrary to the Port Authority's
standard procedures.
As a result of this change, cars attempting to
cross the George Washington Bridge during
the morning commute backed up into Fort
Lee and gridlocked the entire town. Mayor
Sokolich repeatedly attempted to contact
Baroni and IGA to have the two other Special
Access Lanes reinstated, but Baroni
deliberately did not respond. Wildstein
testified "that was the plan that [he] had come
up with along with Mr. Baroni and Miss
Kelly, which is that all calls would be
directed to Mr. Baroni. And that Mr. Baroni
would be radio silent. Meaning any—all the
calls would come to him, and he wasn't
planning on returning any of them."

Wildstein gave the instruction to Zipf and
two other Port Authority managers, Bob
Durando (the general manager of the George
Washington Bridge) and Cedric Fulton (the
director of Tunnels, Bridges & Terminals),
again claiming that New Jersey wanted to see
whether the Special Access Lanes would
remain permanent. When Fulton asked if
Foye knew, Wildstein lied and said he did.
Wildstein later told the same lie to Durando.
Durando explained that because only one
Special Access Lane would remain open, the
Port Authority needed to pay an extra toll
collector to be on relief duty for that sole toll
collector. Wildstein discussed this with

On the morning of September 9, Mayor
Sokolich called Baroni's office about an
"urgent matter of public safety in Fort Lee,"
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but received no response. The Fort Lee
borough administrator also called to say Fort
Lee police and paramedics had difficulty
responding to a missing child and a cardiac
arrest. The next day, the mayor called again,
saying the traffic was a "life/safety" issue and
that paramedics had to leave their vehicle and
respond to a call on foot. Receiving no
response to his calls, he then sent Baroni a
letter on September 12 detailing the negative
impact on public safety in Fort Lee. Kelly
was similarly unmoved by the traffic and the
anger it generated, reportedly smiling when a
colleague at IGA informed her of the
situation.

In response to significant public backlash,
Baroni and Wildstein began preparing a
report that would describe what happened as
"a traffic study to determine whether it was
fairer to give three lanes to Fort Lee." The
report would also have admitted that the Port
Authority had failed to give Fort Lee
appropriate notice due to an alleged
"communications breakdown." But the report
was never released because Port Authority
staff were asked to testify before the New
Jersey State Assembly. Wildstein helped
Baroni prepare his testimony, which was
based on the draft report and the traffic study
and "fairness" rationale.

Executive Director Foye first learned of the
realignment on the evening of Thursday,
September 12. The following morning, he
sent an email to Baroni and others, criticizing
the "hasty and ill-advised" realignment and
ordering the restoration of the prior
alignment with three Special Access Lanes.
Baroni went to Foye's office and asked that
the realignment be put back into effect, with
only one Special Access Lane for Fort Lee.
Foye testified Baroni said the issue was
"important to Trenton," which Foye
understood to reference the Governor's
Office. Foye refused to do so. Baroni
returned to Foye's office later that day, again
asked that two of Special Access Lanes be
taken away from Fort Lee, and said the issue
was "important to Trenton" and "Trenton
may call." Foye held firm and continued to
refuse. Wildstein testified Baroni reached out
to David Samson, the New Jersey-appointed
Chairman of the Port Authority, to "overrule
Mr. Foye and talk to others on the New York
side," but Samson ultimately declined to do
so, instead recommending Baroni "let it go."

Then-Governor Christie fired Wildstein on
December 6 and Baroni on December 12.
Kelly was fired on January 9, 2014. A federal
criminal investigation followed and resulted
in
the
underlying
prosecution.
II.
On April 23, 2015, a federal grand jury
returned a nine-count indictment, charging
Defendants with seven counts each.
In Count 1, the grand jury charged
Defendants with conspiracy to obtain by
fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally
misapply property of an organization
receiving federal benefits. As charged, "[t]he
object of the conspiracy was to misuse Port
Authority property to facilitate and conceal
the causing of traffic problems in Fort Lee as
punishment of Mayor Sokolich." In Count 2,
Defendants were charged with the
substantive offense of that conspiracy. The
grand jury alleged Defendants, through Port
Authority agents Baroni and Wildstein,
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"obtained by fraud, otherwise without
authority knowingly converted to their use
and the use of others, and intentionally
misapplied property owned by and under the
care, custody, and control of the Port
Authority, with a value of at least $5,000."

At the outset, Defendants moved to dismiss
all the charges. The District Judge held oral
argument and denied the motions. After a sixweek trial, the jury found Defendants guilty
on all counts. Defendants moved for
judgments of acquittal, and for a new trial.
Again, the trial judge denied the motions. She
then sentenced Baroni to 24 months'
imprisonment and Kelly to 18 months'
imprisonment. Defendants, who are free on
bail pending this appeal, challenge only their
judgments of conviction.

In Count 3, Defendants were charged with
conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The
charged "object of the conspiracy was to
obtain money and property from the Port
Authority and to deprive the Port Authority
of its right to control its own assets by falsely
representing
and
causing
false
representations to be made that the lane and
toll booth reductions were for the purpose of
a traffic study." In Counts 4 through 7, the
grand jury charged each Defendant with two
substantive wire fraud violations. Count 4
pertained to Kelly's August 13, 2013 email
informing Wildstein it was "[t]ime for some
traffic problems in Fort Lee," and Count 6 to
her September 9, 2013 email thanking
Wildstein for confirming there would be
"[r]adio silence" from Baroni in response to
Mayor Sokolich's inquiries. Counts 5 and 7
related to Baroni's September 9 and 12, 2013
emails to Wildstein concerning complaints
from Mayor Sokolich.

III.
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting their wire fraud
and Section 666 convictions.
"We exercise plenary review over a district
court's grant or denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal based on the
sufficiency of the evidence," and we apply
the same standard as the district court. "A
judgment of acquittal is appropriate
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
29 if, after reviewing the record in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, we
determine that no rational jury could have
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Where sufficiency arguments give
rise to questions of statutory interpretation,
our
review
is
also
plenary.

In Count 8, the grand jury charged
Defendants with conspiracy against civil
rights. The charged "object of the conspiracy
was to interfere with the localized travel
rights of the residents of Fort Lee for the
illegitimate purpose of causing significant
traffic problems in Fort Lee to punish Mayor
Sokolich." In Count 9, Defendants were
charged with the substantive violation.

A.
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying their wire fraud
convictions. "A person violates the federal
wire fraud statute by using interstate wires to
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execute 'any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises.'" Conspiracy to commit wire
fraud is a separate crime subject to the same
penalties as the substantive offense.

. . . [were] wasting their time in furtherance
of this conspiracy," and "money paid to the
engineers who wasted time—and Port
Authority professional staff, who wasted
time collecting data that no one ever wanted."
The Government also invoked the costs the
Port Authority incurred in redoing a
legitimate traffic study—at Center and
Lemoine Avenues in Fort Lee—that was
spoiled by the gridlock and "would not have
been ruined without these lane reductions."

The Government's theory at trial was that
Defendants sent emails in furtherance of, and
to execute, a scheme to defraud the Port
Authority of physical property (i.e., the
Special Access Lanes and toll booths) and
money (i.e., public employee labor) in order
to carry out the lane reductions. In
summation, the Government explained this
was the "same money, the salaries, the same
property, the lanes, the toll booths," that it
alleged Defendants fraudulently obtained,
knowingly converted, or intentionally
misapplied in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666.
The Government explained:

According to the Government, Defendants'
untruthful claim they were conducting a
traffic study was what allowed them to carry
out the lane reductions and to obtain the Port
Authority property and money necessary to
do so. The Government also contended
Defendants conspired with each other and
Wildstein in furtherance of this fraudulent
scheme.

The physical property that was
misused were the local access lanes,
themselves, and the toll booths. . . .
The defendants agreed to use these
Port Authority assets, that property, to
purposely create a traffic jam in Fort
Lee. That agreement was not a
legitimate use of the George
Washington Bridge, the Port
Authority's property.

Defendants argue the evidence was
insufficient to prove a scheme to
defraud because (1) Baroni possessed
unilateral authority over Port Authority
traffic patterns and any resources necessary
to implement his decisions, and (2) the Port
Authority was not deprived of any property
right. In addition to these challenges,
Defendants contend the Government has
disguised an impermissible honest services
fraud case as a wire fraud case in an attempt
to circumvent the Supreme Court's decision
in Skilling v. United States.

The Government identified the "money" as
"the salaries of each of the employees who
wasted their time in furtherance of the
defendants' scheme," including "the salary
paid to the overtime toll booth collectors for
the one remaining toll booth that was
accessible to Fort Lee," "the money paid to
Baroni and Wildstein themselves while they

For reasons that follow, we hold the
Government presented evidence sufficient to
prove Defendants violated the wire fraud
statute by depriving the Port Authority of, at
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a minimum, its money in the form of public
employee labor.

authority to invest the fund's monies with
others." Likening Baroni to the pension fund
trustees in Zauber, Defendants argue "the
undisputed evidence showed that Baroni's
position as co-head of the Port Authority
gave him authority to make unilateral
decisions about the alignment of traffic
patterns at Port Authority facilities, and to
command the resources needed to carry those
decisions out." We disagree.

1.
Defendants principally argue they could not
have committed fraud because Baroni
possessed the unilateral authority to control
traffic patterns at Port Authority facilities and
to marshal the resources necessary to
implement his decisions.

As a preliminary matter, Zauber is inapposite
because here the grand jury alleged, and the
Government proved at trial, that the Port
Authority was actually deprived of its money
and property. In any event, the evidence
refutes the notion Baroni possessed
"unilateral" authority to realign the bridge's
lanes. To the contrary, it reveals Defendants
would not have been able to realign the lanes
had Baroni and Wildstein provided the actual
reason or no reason at all. They had to create
the traffic study cover story in order to get
Port Authority employees to implement the
realignment. And, as we described above,
Wildstein lied to Port Authority officials
Durando and Fulton about whether Executive
Director Foye knew of the realignment. This
lie was necessary to keep Foye in the dark
and prevent him from putting an immediate
end to the scheme. In fact, that is exactly what
happened when he finally learned of the
realignment. Foye ordered the three Special
Access Lanes be restored to the use of Fort
Lee motorists and refused Baroni's repeated
entreaties to reinstate the realignment. Baroni
then appealed to Chairman Samson, who
declined to intervene and overrule Foye's
decision. This evidence belies Defendants'
assertion Baroni had anything approaching
"authority to make unilateral decisions about

They previously raised this argument in
moving both to dismiss the indictment and
for judgments of acquittal or a new trial.
Before trial, the District Judge declined to
dismiss the wire fraud counts on this basis,
holding the existence and scope of Baroni's
authority was a question of fact for the jury.
After trial, the judge denied Defendants'
motions because that question was "one that
the jurors resolved in favor of the
prosecution." Carefully reviewing the
relevant witness testimony, the judge held
"the Government presented evidence at trial
from which the jury could reasonably have
found that Baroni did not have the authority
to change the lane configurations, and in fact,
did defraud the Port Authority." We agree.
Defendants rely on our opinion in United
States v. Zauber. There, the defendants were
pension fund trustees who received
kickbacks for investing in a mortgage
company. We held the indictment failed to
charge violations of the mail and wire fraud
statutes because it did not allege "an actual
money or property loss to the pension
fund." In so holding, we observed, among
other things, that the defendants, "as trustees
of the pension fund, had the power and the
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the alignment of traffic patterns at Port
Authority facilities." If that were so, Baroni
could have reinstated the realignment on his
own without needing to appeal to Foye and
then
Samson.
That
Baroni
was
countermanded shows he lacked the
unencumbered authority he claims he
possessed, and that he needed to lie to realign
the traffic patterns. The record contains
overwhelming evidence from which a
rational juror could have reached these
conclusions. Indeed, it is difficult to see how
any rational juror could have concluded
otherwise. The jury's verdict necessarily
reflects its rejection of Defendants' argument
that Baroni possessed unilateral authority to
control the bridge.

This instruction forecloses the possibility the
jury convicted Defendants of fraud without
finding Baroni lacked authority to realign the
lanes. For Baroni could not deprive the Port
Authority of money and property he was
authorized to use for any purpose. Nor could
he deprive the Port Authority of its right to
control its money or property if that right to
control were committed to his unilateral
discretion. In finding the existence of a
scheme to defraud, the jury necessarily
concluded Baroni lacked authority to order
the realignment.
2.
Defendants also argue the Port Authority was
not deprived of any tangible property and
challenge the Government's and District
Court's invocation of the "right to control"
theory of property.

Defendants contend we cannot draw this
inference because the trial judge declined to
give a jury instruction based on Zauber. We
disagree. The judge instructed the jury that

Before trial, the trial judge rejected
Defendants' related argument the charges
should be dismissed because they did not
"obtain" money or property. Relying on our
decision in United States v. Al Hedaithy, the
judge ruled "it [wa]s enough that they
prevented the Port Authority from exercising
'its right to exclusive use of' its property,
which here allegedly includes toll booths and
roadways, in addition to money in the form
of employee compensation and the costs of
redoing a traffic study."

[i]n order to establish a scheme to
defraud, the Government must also
prove that the alleged scheme
contemplated depriving the Port
Authority of money and property.
An [**22] organization is deprived
of money or property when the
organization is deprived of the right
to control that money or property.
And one way the organization is
deprived of the right to control that
money and property is when the
organization receives false or
fraudulent statements that affect its
ability to make discretionary
economic decisions about what to do
with that money or property.

In their post-trial motions, however,
Defendants raised no sufficiency arguments
respecting the property at issue. Rather, they
contended only that Baroni possessed the
authority to realign the lanes. We note
Defendants arguably forfeited their right to
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raise these issues on appeal by not presenting
them to the District Court. But we need not
decide that question because Defendants'
arguments are unpersuasive under any
standard of review.

the New Jersey side of the Port Authority
wanted to be able to "make a determination
down the road as to whether those [Fort Lee]
lanes would stay on a permanent basis." Of
course, as Wildstein admitted at trial, the
traffic study rationale offered to Durando was
not the real reason for the realignment.

The wire fraud statute proscribes "scheme[s]
or artifice[s] to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses." As Defendants note,
the federal fraud statutes require the
defendants to scheme to defraud a victim of
"property rights."

Among other things, Durando told Wildstein
he would need to have a relief toll worker on
duty because all of Fort Lee's traffic would be
going through one lane. Wildstein testified he
"understood that the Port Authority would
have to pay for an extra toll collector to be on
relief duty for that first toll collector," and
discussed this cost with both Defendants.
According to Wildstein, both Baroni and
Kelly found it humorous that the Port
Authority would have to "pay a second toll
collector to sit and wait in case the first toll
collector had to go to the bathroom," and they
had no problem with the extra cost. On
Sunday, September 8, 2013, Wildstein
emailed Durando to say he would "be at [the]
bridge early Monday [morning] to view [the]
new lane test." S.A. 49. Durando replied that
he would also be present, and that he had
"also brought a toll collector in on overtime
to keep toll lane 24 (the extreme right hand
toll lane Upper level) in the event the
collector assigned to TL 24 needs a
personal." Wildstein forwarded the email to
Baroni. On cross-examination, Baroni
admitted he had received the email and did
not object to bringing in overtime toll booth
workers.

Defendants argue they "did not deprive the
Port Authority of any tangible property."
"After all," they say, "the Port Authority still
owns all of the lanes and tollbooths (and
always
has)."
But
even
assuming arguendo Defendants are correct,
the federal fraud statutes are not limited to
protecting tangible property rights. "[T]o
determine whether a particular interest is
property for purposes of the fraud statutes,
we look to whether the law traditionally has
recognized and enforced it as a property
right."
The Government introduced ample evidence
Defendants obtained by false or fraudulent
pretenses, at a minimum, public employees'
labor. Their time and wages, in which the
Port Authority maintains a financial interest,
is a form of intangible property.
Wildstein testified that, on the Friday before
the lane reductions, he called Durando, the
general manager of the George Washington
Bridge, and said he wanted to study traffic
patterns and see the effect of taking two lanes
away from Fort Lee. Wildstein told Durando

The Government also called Theresa Riva, a
Port Authority employee who served as an
Operations Planning Analyst for the George
Washington Bridge during the relevant time
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period. In that capacity, Riva supervised time
keeping for operations staff and managed
scheduling and coverage for toll collectors.
Riva testified she learned of the lane
reductions the Friday before, and Bob
Durando "asked [her] to staff one additional
toll collector" on the upper level toll plaza
twenty-four hours a day. Because toll
collectors work eight-hour shifts, this meant
"three toll collectors a day to be an excess toll
collector in the toll house." Riva testified all
these additional toll collectors were paid an
overtime rate "[b]ecause they either worked
on their regular day off or in excess of eight
hours, a double [shift]." Riva testified these
employees would not have been paid absent
the lane realignment.

the impact of reducing Fort Lee's Special
Access Lanes from three to one. Chung
testified he spent a little over eight hours
doing this analysis on the Friday before the
reductions went into effect. During the week
of the reductions, Chung was asked to
compare travel times approaching the
bridge's upper-level toll plaza during peak
hours and to compare it to historical travel
times. Chung testified he spent about six
hours on this analysis, for a total of 14 hours
spent on unnecessary work.
And Umang Patel, Staff Service Engineer in
the Port Authority's Traffic Engineering
department, downloaded and analyzed data
relating to travel time on the Main Line
during the lane reductions. Patel testified he
spent two hours discussing the lane
reductions on Monday, September 9, and
four hours per day analyzing data on
Tuesday, September 10, through Thursday,
September 12, for a total of fourteen hours.

In addition to the overtime toll workers,
Wildstein discussed with Zipf using Port
Authority professional staff to track data,
which would include "numbers on how—
how many cars were involved and how far
back the traffic was delayed." Wildstein
understood Zipf "would have to use some
staff time." At trial, the staff members
testified to the significant amount of time
they spent performing unnecessary work
related to the realignment.

Moreover, Wildstein estimated he spent
twenty-five to thirty hours working on the
lane reductions, and that Baroni spent fifteen
to twenty hours, for a total of forty to fifty
hours. Their compensation is plainly
"money" for the purposes of the wire fraud
statute.

Amy Hwang, Senior Operations Planning
Analyst for the Port Authority, testified she
collected data on traffic at the bridge and
compared it to traffic on the same date the
year before. Hwang testified she spent two
hours working on the traffic study per day
from Monday, September 9, through Friday,
September 13, for a total of 10 hours.

The Government's evidence that Defendants
fraudulently conscripted fourteen Port
Authority employees into their service, and
that Baroni and Wildstein accepted
compensation for time spent conspiring to
defraud the Port Authority, is alone sufficient
for a rational juror to have concluded
Defendants deprived the Port Authority of its
money or property.

Victor Chung, Senior Transportation Planner
for the Port Authority, was asked to forecast
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Although we need not reach or decide
Defendant's arguments on the "right to
control" theory in light of our holding, we
recognize this traditional concept of property
provides an alternative basis upon which to
conclude Defendants defrauded the Port
Authority. As Baroni notes, "[i]ncluded
within the meaning of money or property is
the victim's 'right to control' that money or
property."

In denying Defendants' post-trial motions,
the District Court summarily rejected this
argument, holding "[t]here is a difference . . .
between intangible rights to honest services
not covered by the wire fraud statute, and
intangible property rights which are." We
agree.
Defendants primarily rely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Skilling v. United States,
which narrowed the scope of the honest
services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346. After the
Supreme Court ruled in McNally that the
mail fraud statute was "limited in scope to the
protection of property rights," Congress
enacted Section 1346 "specifically to cover
one of the 'intangible rights' that lower courts
had protected . . . prior to McNally: 'the
intangible right of honest services.'" That
statute provides, for the purposes of the mail
and wire fraud statutes, that "the term
'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible
right
of
honest
services." In Skilling, the Supreme Court
acknowledged "Congress intended § 1346 to
refer to and incorporate the honest-services
doctrine recognized in Courts of Appeals'
decisions
before McNally derailed
the
intangible-rights theory of fraud." But it also
recognized a broad reading of the statute
"would raise the due process concerns
underlying the vagueness doctrine." In order
to preserve the statute, the Court surveyed
pre-McNally honest services case law, and
concluded "there is no doubt that Congress
intended § 1346 to reach at least bribes and
kickbacks.” Accordingly, the Court limited
the application of Section 1346 to "the bribeand-kickback core of the pre-McNally case
law."

The George Washington Bridge is the world's
busiest motor vehicle bridge leading to our
nation's most populous city. The Port
Authority's physical property—the bridge's
lanes and toll booths—are revenuegenerating assets. The Port Authority has an
unquestionable property interest in the
bridge's exclusive operation, including the
allocation of traffic through its lanes and of
the public employee resources necessary to
keep vehicles moving. Defendants invented a
sham traffic study to usurp that exclusive
interest, reallocating the flow of traffic and
commandeering public employee time in a
manner that made no economic or practical
sense. Indeed, the realignment—intended to
limit access to the bridge and gridlock an
entire town—was impractical by design.
In sum, Defendants' arguments concerning
the property interest at issue fall far short.
3.
Finally, Defendants argue we "should reject
the government's attempt to shoehorn a
repudiated theory of honest services fraud
into an ill-fitting theory of money or property
fraud."
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Defendants argue it cannot be a crime "for a
public official to take official action based on
concealed 'political interests.'" And they
warn that "[t]he government's theory—that
acting with a concealed political interest
nonetheless becomes mail or wire fraud so
long as the public official uses any
government resources to make or effectuate
the decision—would render the Supreme
Court's carefully considered limitation [on
honest services fraud] a nullity." According
to Defendants, "[i]t cannot be the case that the
Supreme Court has pointedly and repeatedly
rebuffed the government's attempts to
prosecute public officials for the deprivation
of the public's intangible right to honest
services or honest government if, all along,
the inevitable use of at least a peppercorn of
public money or property made every
instance of such conduct prosecutable as
money or property fraud."

procedures. Indeed, witnesses testified that
traffic studies are usually conducted by
computer modeling, without the need to
realign traffic patterns or disrupt actual
traffic. When traffic disruptions are
anticipated, the Port Authority gives advance
public notice. And, as we have discussed, the
evidence conclusively demonstrates Baroni
lacked the authority to realign the bridge's
traffic patterns unilaterally.
It is hard to see, under Defendants' theory,
how a public official could ever be charged
with simple mail or wire fraud. They appear
to suggest that, as public officials, any fraud
case against them necessarily entails
intangible right to honest services. That is not
so. As we have explained, Defendants were
charged with defrauding the Port Authority
of its money and property—not the intangible
right to their honest services. Prosecutions of
public officials for defrauding the
government of money and property are
unfortunately quite common.

We are mindful of the Supreme Court's
honest services case law but do not believe it
counsels a different result in this case.
Defendants were charged with simple money
and property fraud under Section 1343—not
honest services fraud—and the grand jury
alleged an actual money and property loss to
the Port Authority. In any event, their
conduct in this case can hardly be
characterized as "official action" that was
merely
influenced
by
political
considerations. Defendants invented a cover
story about a traffic study for the sole
purpose of reducing Fort Lee's access to the
George Washington Bridge and creating
gridlock in the Borough. Trial testimony
established that everything about the way this
"study"
was
executed
contravened
established Port Authority protocol and

Defendants also argue their convictions pose
federalism concerns and would "involve[] the
Federal Government in setting standards of
good government for local and state
officials." Again, we disagree. This case
lacks the federalism concerns present
in McNally, where the federal government
prosecuted a Kentucky state official and a
private citizen for their role in a "self-dealing
patronage scheme" involving the state's
purchase of insurance policies. But unlike a
typical state or local governmental body, the
Port Authority is an interstate agency created
by Congressional consent, and Defendants
acknowledge it receives substantial federal
funding. The federal government thus has an
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especially significant interest in protecting
the Port Authority's financial and operational
integrity.

such
organization,
government,
or
agency; . . .

***

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.

In sum, the Government presented sufficient
evidence for the jury to convict Defendants
of wire fraud.

(b) The circumstance referred to
in subsection (a) of this section is that
the organization, government, or
agency receives, in any one year
period, benefits in excess of $10,000
under a Federal program involving a
grant, contract, subsidy, loan,
guarantee, insurance, or other form of
Federal assistance.

B.
Defendants' other sufficiency challenge
contests thei Section 666 convictions. In
relevant part, Section 666 provides:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance
described in subsection (b) of this section
exists—

Accordingly,
a
violation
of Section
666(a)(1)(A) requires proof of five elements.
The government must prove that: (1) a
defendant was an agent of an organization,
government, or agency; (2) in a one-year
period that organization, government, or
agency received federal benefits in excess of
$10,000; (3) a defendant stole, embezzled,
obtained by fraud, knowingly converted, or
intentionally misapplied property; (4) that
property was owned by, or in the care,
custody, or control of, the organization,
government, or entity; and (5) the value of
that property was at least $5,000.

(1) being an agent of an
organization, or of a State,
local, or Indian tribal
government, or any agency
thereof—
(A) embezzles, steals,
obtains by fraud, or
otherwise
without
authority knowingly
converts to the use of
any person other than
the rightful owner or
intentionally
misapplies, property
that—
(i) is valued at $5,000
or more, and

Defendants' appeal involves only the third
and fifth elements—whether they obtained
by fraud, knowingly converted, or
intentionally misapplied Port Authority
property (the actus reus), and whether that
property was worth at least $5,000.

(ii) is owned by, or is
under
the
care,
custody, or control of

As with the wire fraud counts, the
Government's theory at trial was that the
property at issue fell into two categories:
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physical property (i.e., the Special Access
Lanes and toll booths) and money (i.e.,
employee labor).

Port Authority protocol—for the sole purpose
of creating gridlock in Fort Lee. To execute
their scheme, they conscripted fourteen Port
Authority employees to do sham work in
pursuit of no legitimate Port Authority aim.
That Defendants were politically motivated
does not remove their intentional conduct
from the ambit of the federal criminal law.
What Defendants did here is hardly
analogous to a situation where a mayor
allows political considerations to influence
her discretionary allocation of limited
government resources in the normal course of
municipal operations. There is no facially
legitimate justification for Defendants'
conduct here.

Defendants argue the evidence was
insufficient to prove a violation of Section
666 because (1) that provision criminalizes
theft, not the allocation of a public resource
based on political considerations, and (2) the
value of the property at issue was under
$5,000.
For reasons that follow, we hold the
Government presented evidence sufficient to
prove Defendants violated Section 666 by
fraudulently obtaining, at a minimum, the
labor of Port Authority employees in
furtherance of their scheme, and that the
value of that labor exceeded the statute's
$5,000 threshold.

Nor are we persuaded by Defendants'
arguments that the Government has sought to
expand the reach of Section 666 beyond
conduct involving bribery and theft. Relying
upon our decision in United States v. Cicco,
Defendants contend the Government is
attempting to use Section 666 "to criminalize
a public official's efforts to allocate or
reallocate public resources based on politics."
In that case, Cicco, a mayor, declined to
rehire two auxiliary police officers because
they failed to support the Democratic Party in
a local election. The Government filed a
multi-count indictment charging Cicco and a
member of the town council with, among
other things, violations of Section 666's antibribery provision, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).
After the jury found the defendants guilty, the
trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on
the Section 666 counts, reasoning Congress
did not intend for the statute to apply to their
conduct and that it was unconstitutionally
vague.

1.
Defendants broadly argue they merely
allocated a public resource based on political
considerations, which cannot be criminal.
Offering an analogy, Kelly contends
Defendants'
conduct
is
"materially
indistinguishable" from that of a mayor who,
after a heavy snowfall, directs city employees
to plow the streets of a ward that supported
her before getting to a ward that supported
her opponent. Baroni makes similar
arguments.
While such analogies have some superficial
appeal, we find them unpersuasive. We agree
with the District Court that this argument
"conflates motive . . . with mens reas and
conduct." Defendants altered the bridge's
decades-old
lane
alignment—without
authorization and in direct contravention of
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On appeal, we recognized Section 666, read
literally, might cover the defendants' use of
municipal employment to solicit election day
services as a form of quid pro quo, but that
the statute's language was "also consistent
with an intention of focusing solely on
offenses involving theft or bribery, the crimes
identified in the title of that section." Because
we found the statute ambiguous, we turned to
the legislative history. Concluding "the
crimes Congress targeted when it created §
666 are simply different in kind than those
alleged" against the defendants, we held they
did not violate the statute. We also observed
that the conduct in question—deprivation of
public employment to solicit political
contributions—was within the ambit of a
different criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 601.

organizations or State and local governments
pursuant to a Federal program.'” We
observed "[t]he Senate Report expressly
notes that Congress wished the new statutory
provision to be interpreted 'consistent with
the purpose of this section to protect the
integrity of the vast sums of money
distributed through Federal programs from
theft, fraud, and undue influence by
bribery.'" And "[w]e quote[d] extensively
from the legislative history to illustrate that
Congress intended § 666 to redress particular
deficiencies in identified existing statutes."
We have subsequently reaffirmed our
understanding
that
Congress
intended Section 666 to focus on offenses
involving fraud and theft, observing "that
Congress intended to expand the federal
government's prosecutorial power to
encompass significant misapplication of
federal funds at a local level." We have also
"not[ed] that courts have been wary
of interpreting § 666 too narrowly" and that
"the Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided
constructions of § 666 that would impose
limits beyond those set out in the plain
meaning of the statute." Although all of the
relevant Supreme Court cases involve
challenges
to Section
666's
bribery
provisions, their discussion of the statute's
text and legislative history validate our longestablished understanding of the statute's
purpose and scope.

The Government responds that Cicco is
inapposite because the conduct at issue in that
case "potentially implicated the bribery
provisions of § 666(a)(1)(B), but has nothing
to do with property obtained by fraud,
converted or otherwise intentionally
misapplied." We agree that this case is not
like Cicco.
But Cicco is instructive here. Our exposition
of Section 666's legislative history—which
was not limited to Section 666's bribery
provisions—confirms
that
Defendants'
conduct in this case falls squarely within the
statute's purpose. As we explained in Cicco,
Congress enacted Section 666 as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Bill of 1984. We
noted "[t]he provision was 'designed to create
new offenses to augment the ability of the
United States to vindicate significant acts of
theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal
monies which are disbursed to private

In Salinas v. United States, for example, the
petitioner contended the Government must
prove a connection between a bribe and
federal funds to obtain a conviction
under Section 666(a)(1)(B). The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that Section 666's
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bribery prohibition "is not confined to a
business or transaction which affects federal
funds." Relying upon the statute's
"expansive, unqualified language, both as to
the bribes forbidden and the entities
covered," and "the broad definition of the
'circumstances' to which the statute applies,"
the Court found "no textual basis for limiting
the reach of the bribery prohibition." The
Court held the statute was unambiguous on
this point because it would "be 'plain to
anyone reading the Act' that the statute
encompasses the conduct at issue."

proof of any connection between a bribe or
kickback and some federal money." The
Court disagreed, holding that the Necessary
and Proper Clause gives Congress the power
"to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated
under [its Spending Clause] power are in fact
spent for the general welfare, and not frittered
away in graft or on projects undermined
when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public
officers are derelict about demanding value
for dollars." The Court thus held "[i]t is
certainly enough that the statutes condition
the offense on a threshold amount of federal
dollars defining the federal interest, such as
that provided here." To confirm its
understanding of the statute, the Court relied
upon the same legislative history we
discussed extensively in Cicco:

The
Court
next
addressed Section
666 in Fischer v. United States. At issue was
whether Medicare payments paid to a
hospital constituted federal "benefits" for the
purposes of Section 666(b). The petitioner
argued the qualifying patient was the sole
beneficiary of payments made under the
Medicare program and that hospitals were
merely being compensated for services
rendered. The Court disagreed, holding that a
federal assistance program can have multiple
beneficiaries, and that participating health
care organizations were also beneficiaries
under the Medicare program. The Court
reasoned, in part, that "[c]oupled with the
broad substantive prohibitions of subsection
(a), the language of subsection (b) reveals
Congress' expansive, unambiguous intent to
ensure the integrity of organizations
participating in federal assistance programs."

For those of us who accept help from
legislative history, it is worth noting
that the legislative record confirms
that § 666(a)(2) is an instance of
necessary and proper legislation. The
design was generally to 'protect the
integrity of the vast sums of money
distributed through Federal programs
from theft, fraud, and undue influence
by bribery,' see S.Rep. No. 98-225, p.
370 (1983), in contrast to prior federal
law affording only two limited
opportunities to prosecute such
threats to the federal interest: 18
U.S.C. § 641, the federal theft statute,
and § 201, the federal bribery law.
Those laws had proven inadequate to
the task. The [federal theft statute]
went only to outright theft of
unadulterated federal funds . . . .
"Congress was within its prerogative
to protect spending objects from the

Finally, in Sabri v. United States, the
Supreme Court addressed another challenge
to Section 666's bribery provision. The
petitioner argued, inter alia, that Section
666(a)(2) could
"never
be
applied
constitutionally because it fails to require
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menace of local administrators on the
take."

666 "unless the public employee is on the
take."

Recognizing that the statute was intended to
address offenses involving fraud and theft,
the Court held that

Thompson is distinguishable. Thompson
applied the state's procurement regulations in
a way that actually saved the federal
government money and caused no loss.
Defendants, on the other hand, lied in order
to obtain public employee labor from
fourteen Port Authority employees. They
forced the Port Authority to pay unnecessary
overtime to toll workers and diverted wellpaid professional staff away from legitimate
Port Authority business. Their fraud is
soundly within the scope of conduct
Congress sought to proscribe in Section 666.

Defendants' reliance on United States v.
Thompson, is also misplaced. In that case,
Thompson, a Wisconsin state procurement
official, was prosecuted for steering a
contract to a local travel agency, allegedly in
violation of state procurement statutes and
regulations. The government's theory had
been
that
Thompson
"'intentionally
misapplie[d]' more than $5,000 by diverting
it" away from the firm that should have been
selected under the state's procurement
regulations. The Seventh Circuit was not
convinced that Thompson's decision actually
violated the state's regulations. And it
observed that, unlike "[a]pproving a payment
for goods or services not supplied," her
conduct "d[id] not sound like 'misapplication'
of funds." Significantly, the firm she selected
was actually the low bidder, and "[t]he
federal government saved money because of
Thompson's decisions." The Seventh Circuit
turned to the statute's caption—"Theft or
bribery concerning programs receiving
Federal
funds"—because
"the
word
'misapplies' is not a defined term." Relying
on that caption and the Rule of Lenity, the
Seventh Circuit adopted a more narrow
reading of intentional misapplication "that
limits § 666 to theft, extortion, bribery, and
similarly corrupt acts." The Court further
commented it did not believe a state official's
violation of state regulations and statutes—
even if intentional—would violate Section

We hold that, at a minimum, the Government
offered a valid theory that Defendants
fraudulently obtained, knowingly converted,
or intentionally misapplied the labor of Port
Authority employees, and that it offered
evidence sufficient to sustain Defendants'
convictions.
It is well established that public employees'
labor is property for the purposes of Section
666.
We have explained, in addressing
Defendants' sufficiency challenge to the wire
fraud counts, how they defrauded the Port
Authority of the labor of fourteen public
employees—eleven toll collectors paid
overtime and three professional staff
members—in furtherance of the scheme.
Those public employees spent hours doing
work that was unnecessary and furthered no
legitimate Port Authority aim. Defendants
were able to obtain these employees' labor
only by lying about the purpose of the
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realignment, claiming they were conducting
a traffic study.

conduct. While their decision to punish
Mayor Fulop may have been animated by the
same desire to exact political revenge, there
were no allegations they defrauded their
federally funded employer in order to do so.

Defendants argue they could not have
misapplied Port Authority employee labor
because they did not receive a "personal
pecuniary benefit." We disagree. Defendants
had Port Authority employees do work they
would not have otherwise done to further
their personal scheme. The fact Defendants
sought
to
benefit
politically,
not
monetarily, does not alter the fact they forced
the Port Authority to pay toll workers
overtime, and diverted the time of salaried
professional staff, in furtherance of no
legitimate purpose.

Defendants also raise federalism concerns,
arguing the Government is improperly
attempting "to police state and local officials
in the conduct of their official duties." As we
have observed, Congress has a uniquely
significant interest in safeguarding the Port
Authority, an interstate agency created by its
consent. But we also believe federalism
arguments are especially inapposite in the
context of Section 666. We have described
how
Congress
enacted Section
666 specifically to bring state and local
officials within the scope of the federal
criminal theft law. And as the Supreme Court
has observed, "Congress was within its
prerogative to protect spending objects from
the menace of local administrators."

Defendants argue this interpretation raises
constitutional vagueness concerns. We
disagree. At trial, the Government introduced
evidence that, after Jersey City Mayor Steven
Fulop declined to endorse Governor Christie,
the Governor's office directed state agencies
(including the Port Authority) to cancel
meetings with Fulop and otherwise ignore
him. In seeking to admit this evidence, the
Government argued there was no danger of
unfair prejudice because "[t]he mistreatment
of Mayor Fulop, while hardly reflective of
good government, was not criminal and thus,
was less serious than the criminal conduct for
which Defendants stand accused, conduct
that needlessly imperiled public safety in Fort
Lee and directly inconvenienced thousands
of people." Defendants contend it is not clear
why their mistreatment of Mayor Sokolich is
criminal, but their mistreatment of Mayor
Fulop was not, and that "[t]his inconsistency
demonstrates the inherent arbitrariness of the
government's interpretation of Section 666."
Defendants again conflate motive with

In sum, the Government presented evidence
sufficient to prove Defendants fraudulently
obtained,
knowingly
converted,
or
intentionally misapplied Port Authority
employee labor in violation of Section
666(a)(1)(A).
2.
Finally, Defendants contend there was
insufficient evidence to meet the $5,000
threshold because the Port Authority
employees' wages are exempt under 18
U.S.C. § 666(c)'s safe harbor for bona fide
compensation,
and
the
Government
quantified only $3,696 in toll workers' wages.
They also assert the costs the Port Authority
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incurred in redoing the legitimate Center and
Lemoine traffic study cannot satisfy the
$5,000 threshold because they were not
aware of the study and the costs represent
consequential damages, not the value of
misapplied property.

presented witness testimony and detailed
payroll records. On the first day of trial,
payroll records for the relevant Port
Authority employees were admitted by
stipulation. These records indicate an hourly
rate of $43.79 for Hwang, $52.11 for Chung,
$47.24 for Patel, $79.59 for Wildstein, and
$153.67 for Baroni. Based on these rates and
the hours Hwang, Chung, and Patel testified
they worked on the sham traffic study, the
evidence shows their time was valued at
$437.90 ($43.79 x 10 hours), $729.54
($52.11 x 14 hours), and $661.36 ($47.24 x
14 hours), respectively. Cumulatively, the
three Port Authority traffic engineers
provided unnecessary labor valued at
approximately $1,828.80. The value of the
work done by Hwang, Chung, and Patel,
taken with the $3,696.09 spent on overtime
toll workers, satisfies the $5,000 threshold.

The District Judge rejected these arguments,
concluding "the Government introduced
evidence that Defendants diverted Port
Authority personnel to do work that was not
part of the agency's 'usual course of business'
when reconfiguring the access lanes," and
that "[t]he jury could reasonably find that the
value of compensation paid to Port Authority
personnel, losses from a ruined traffic study,
and the value of the lanes and toll booths
were not bona fide and satisfied the
$5,000.00 threshold."
Without reaching the other costs presented to
the jury (i.e., the value of the lanes and toll
booths themselves, and the costs of redoing
the Center and Lemoine traffic study), we
hold the Government presented sufficient
evidence that Defendants fraudulently
obtained more than $5,000 worth of public
employee labor.

Furthermore, based on Wildstein's testimony
about the amount of time he and Baroni spent
in furtherance of the scheme, the value of
their time was, at a minimum, $4,294.80.
This figure reflects approximately $1,989.75
for Wildstein's time ($79.59 x 25 hours) and
$2,305.05 for Baroni's time ($153.67 x 15
hours).

As to the cost of compensating overtime toll
booth workers, the Government introduced,
and Riva testified to, detailed payroll records
showing eleven overtime toll booth workers
were paid $3,696.09. The Government
presented this number to the jury on a chart
and reminded them of the specific figure in
summation.

The Government reminded the jury of this
evidence in summation:
Based on Port Authority payroll
records and testimony you've heard,
about $5,000 in Port Authority
salaries were paid for the time in
connection for the lane reduction
work performed by Tunnels, Bridges
and Terminals, Miss Hwang, Mr.
Chung, traffic engineering Mr. Patel,

As to the value of the time of Port Authority
professional staff, and of Baroni and
Wildstein themselves, the Government also
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as well as for Mr. Baroni and Mr.
Wildstein's time spent to facilitate
and conceal causing traffic problems
in Fort Lee. Those service[s] were
wasted. Those services were wasted
for these lane reductions meant to
punish the Mayor.

The charges involving the compensation paid
to Baroni and Wildstein themselves are
different, however. The accusation is
essentially that they did not earn their salaries
in good faith by accepting payment for time
spent defrauding their employer, so their
compensation for that time could not have
been "bona fide." Section 666(c) thus could
apply to exempt compensation paid to Baroni
and Wildstein. " Whether wages are bona fide
and earned in the usual course of business is
a question of fact for the jury to decide."

Accordingly, we conclude the Government
presented to the jury evidence sufficient to
satisfy the $5,000 threshold.
Defendants argue this compensation cannot
count toward the threshold under the statute's
exemption for "bona fide salary, wages, fees,
or other compensation." According to
Defendants, "all of the Port Authority staff
responsibly performed actual work, in good
faith, for facially legitimate Port Authority
purposes." The Government responds this
argument is "a red herring" because
"Defendants fraudulently obtained and
misapplied the services of [Port Authority]
staff, not those employees' salaries." "But the
best way of measuring the value of those
services," according to the Government, "was
to calculate what portion of those employees'
salaries covered the time they spent
unwittingly carrying out Defendants'
vendetta." We agree.

In this case, the judge instructed the jury that
"[p]roperty does not include bona fide salary,
wages, fees or other compensation paid or
expenses paid or reimbursed in the ordinary
course of business," and that "[c]ompensation
for an employee's time and services obtained
through deception is not legitimate or bona
fide." This instruction allowed the jury
properly to exclude Baroni and Wildstein's
compensation under Section 666(c) only if it
found they were both bona fide and paid in
the usual course of business.
Because the jury in this case was provided
only a general verdict form, we do not know
how it determined the $5,000 threshold was
satisfied. The wire fraud convictions suggest
the jury did not find Baroni and Wildstein's
compensation "bona fide." But even if the
jury determined Baroni and Wildstein's
compensation was subject to the Section
666(c)'s safe harbor, the value of the services
of the eleven toll workers and of Hwang,
Chung, and Patel—which was not subject to
that exemption—was sufficient to satisfy the
statute's $5,000 threshold.

Section 666(c) has no application to the
services of the eleven overtime toll booth
workers, Hwang, Chung, or Patel. The
Government offered evidence Defendants
fraudulently obtained those public workers'
services and labor; their salaries are merely a
measure of the loss incurred by the Port
Authority when it compensated those
individuals for unnecessary, sham work.
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In light of our holding, we need not address
Defendants' argument the frustrated Center
and Lemoine traffic study is not cognizable
property under Section 666.

in instructing the jury: (1) to consider the
value of the Center and Lemoine study in
determining whether the $5,000 threshold
was satisfied; (2) that the Government did not
need to prove Defendants knew of the
specific property fraudulently obtained,
knowingly converted, or intentionally
misapplied; and (3) that "[t]o intentionally
misapply money or property" means to
intentionally use money or property
"knowing that the use is unauthorized or
unjustifiable or wrongful." Because any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we
will affirm.

***
Because the Government offered evidence at
trial sufficient to prove Defendants
fraudulently obtained the labor of Port
Authority employees, and that the value of
that labor exceeded $5,000, Defendants'
sufficiency challenge must fail.
IV.

1.

Defendants also challenge the jury
instructions on the Section 666 counts and
the District Judge's refusal to instruct the jury
it was required to find Defendants intended to
punish Mayor Sokolich.

Defendants contend that, even if there is
evidence sufficient to prove Section
666 violations, we should vacate their
convictions and remand for retrial because
the District Judge erroneously instructed the
jury to consider the value of the Center and
Lemoine traffic study. Because we can affirm
Defendants' convictions solely on the value
of public employee labor, we need not reach
the Center and Lemoine study.

Where, as here, a party has timely objected to
the trial court's jury instructions, we exercise
plenary review in determining whether the
jury instructions stated the proper legal
standard. "We must 'conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error'" for the
error to be harmless. Our inquiry "is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict
actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable
to
the
error."

We have already detailed the trial evidence
establishing the value of the public
employees' labor in addressing Defendants'
sufficiency challenge. Our analysis there
focused on whether the record, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Government,
provided a sufficient basis for a rational juror
to convict. But our inquiry here is different.
Defendants contend that, even if the record
contained sufficient evidence that the value
of public employee labor exceeded $5,000,
we cannot be certain beyond a reasonable
doubt the jury actually considered all of that

A.
Defendants raise three challenges to the jury
instructions on the Section 666 counts. They
argue we should vacate and remand their
convictions because the District Judge erred
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time in light of its instructions. We disagree.
No reasonable juror could have failed to
credit the value of Port Authority employee
labor Defendants used to effect their
fraudulent
scheme,
which
alone
satisfies Section 666(a)(1)(A)(i)'s $5,000
threshold.

because it was not presented a full calculation
of the value of their hourly rate multiplied by
the hours they claimed to have worked on the
sham study. We disagree. The parties
admitted the relevant payroll records by
stipulation, the Government elicited
testimony to establish the number of hours
worked, and it reminded the jury of this
evidence in summation, estimating that the
value of the engineers' and Baroni and
Wildstein's time exceeded $5,000—which is
correct. The amount was over $6,000.

Defendants do not assert any error in the jury
instructions as to the value of the public
employee labor, and we find none. The
Government presented overwhelming and
undisputed evidence—which we described in
analyzing
Defendants'
sufficiency
challenge—concerning the amount of time
Port Authority employees spent in
furtherance of Defendants' scheme.

Accordingly, the value of the work
performed by Hwang, Chung, and Patel,
taken together with the $3,696.09 spent on
overtime toll workers, satisfies the $5,000
threshold. The time Baroni and Wildstein
spent plotting their fraud represents an
additional $4,295.

As to the cost of compensating overtime
tollbooth
workers,
the
Government
introduced, and Riva specifically testified to,
detailed payroll records showing eleven
overtime tollbooth workers were paid
$3,696.09. The Government presented this
number to the jury on a chart and referenced
it in summation.

Because
the
jury
was
instructed
"[c]ompensation for an employee's time and
services obtained through deception is not
legitimate or bona fide," and the Government
presented
overwhelming
evidence
Defendants fraudulently obtained Port
Authority employee services, the jury
necessarily found all the toll worker and
professional staff time satisfied the $5,000
threshold and was not subject to Section
666(c)'s
exclusion
for
bona
fide
compensation. As noted, even if the jury did
not credit Baroni and Wildstein's
compensation, the value of employee time
Defendants obtained nonetheless exceeds
$5,000.

The Government also elicited testimony from
three members of the Port Authority's
professional staff—Hwang, Chung, and
Patel—about the time they spent collecting
traffic data on the realignment, in furtherance
of no legitimate Port Authority purpose, and
testimony from Wildstein about the time he
and Baroni spent in furtherance of the
scheme. Detailed payroll records reveal the
value of the traffic engineers' time was
approximately $1,828.80.

Defendants' convictions on the wire fraud
counts confirm this conclusion. The jury
found Defendants defrauded the Port

Defendants argue we cannot be confident the
jury considered the traffic engineers' time
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Authority and conspired to do so. The only
fraudulent scheme before them was one to
cause a traffic blockage in Fort Lee by
conducting a sham traffic study. There is
overwhelming evidence that the bridge lanes
were altered, eleven toll collectors worked
additional overtime hours as a result, and the
traffic study was conducted with the help of
several well-paid Port Authority engineers.
Defendants do not argue the study was not
conducted. At trial, they asserted they did not
know it was a sham or barely participated in
it—an argument the jury roundly rejected.
Indeed, the jury was instructed that, if it
found the Defendants believed the traffic
study was legitimate, it was a complete
defense. On appeal, they argue Baroni had
the authority to conduct the study even if it
was a sham. The jury could not have
concluded that Defendants conspired to
conduct a sham traffic study but then ignored
the value of the employee labor necessary to
effect that fraudulent scheme. As we have
explained, the jury was presented with
overwhelming and undisputed evidence
demonstrating the value of the toll workers'
and professional staff's time exceeds $5,000.

The Government does not have to
prove that the Defendants knew of the
specific property obtained by fraud,
knowingly converted, or intentionally
misapplied, or that the value of the
property met or exceeded $5,000.
This addition to the Third Circuit's Model
Jury Instruction was proposed by the
Government. In proposed
draft
jury
instructions submitted to the trial court, the
Government "propose[d] keeping [this]
language" on the following basis:
As this Court recognized in denying
Defendants' motions to dismiss the
Indictment, the $5,000 requirement is
a "jurisdictional element." The Third
Circuit has long held that a
defendant's "knowledge of . . .
jurisdictional fact[s]" is "irrelevant."
At the charging conference, Defendants
objected to this addition and requested the
judge instruct the jury it had to be "at least
reasonably foreseeable what property would
be obtained." The Government responded
that "[r]easonably foreseeable goes to mens
rea, which the Third Circuit has held clearly
does not extend to the jurisdictional elements
of statutes like 666." The judge agreed and
declined to instruct the jury the property at
issue had to be reasonably foreseeable to
Defendants.

2.
Next, Defendants contend the District Court
erred in instructing the jury it did not need to
know of the specific property obtained.
Defendants raise this argument to challenge
the inclusion of the Center and Lemoine
study in the jury instructions. Although we
agree the instruction was erroneous, the error
was harmless.

Defendants argue this was error because the
"Section 666's jurisdictional element is the
requirement that the victim be a federal
program beneficiary," and that "[t]he $5,000
threshold is a de minimis exception, below
which Congress simply chose not to

The District Judge instructed the jury:
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authorize prosecution." We agree Section
666(b) is the statute's jurisdictional provision
in the sense that this provision provides the
jurisdictional hook "tying the proscribed
conduct to the area of federal concern
delineated by the statute," here Congress's
Spending Clause power. But Section
666(a)(1)(A)(i)'s requirement that the value
of affected property be at least $5,000 can be
described as jurisdictional in the sense that it
is a "jurisdictional floor" below which
Congress has determined there is insufficient
federal interest in prosecution.

exists; to instruct the jury otherwise would
seemingly dispense with the intent
requirement.
But because we need not reach nor credit the
Center and Lemoine study to affirm
Defendants' convictions, the error was
harmless. There is overwhelming evidence
Defendants knew of the property fraudulently
obtained or intentionally misapplied,
including the work of fourteen of Baroni's
subordinates at the Port Authority.
3.

In any event, the affected property is not part
of Section
666(a)(1)(A)(i)'s
$5,000
requirement. That provision requires only
that the property "is valued at $5,000 or
more." The property is the direct object of the
conduct element, Section
666(a)(1)(A),
which provides that one who "embezzles,
steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without
authority knowingly converts to the use of
any person other than the rightful owner or
intentionally misapplies, property" violates
the statute.

Defendants next challenge the District
Judge's
definition
of
intentional
misapplication as ambiguous. We disagree.
Following the Third Circuit Model Jury
Instruction, the judge instructed the jury:
To intentionally misapply money or
property means to intentionally use
money or property of the Port
Authority knowing that the use is
unauthorized or unjustifiable or
wrongful. Misapplication includes
the wrongful use of the money or
property for an unauthorized purpose,
even if the use actually benefitted the
Port Authority.

While the jury need not have found that
Defendants knew the value of the property, it
was error for the trial judge to instruct the
jury "[t]he Government d[id] not have to
prove that the Defendants knew of the
specific property obtained by fraud,
knowingly converted, or intentionally
misapplied." Such an instruction runs the risk
of
negating
the
statute's mens
rea requirement and thus relieving the
Government of its burden of proof on an
essential element of the crime. We do not
believe, for example, one could intend to
misapply something one does not know

Defendants argue that "unjustifiable or
wrongful" is overbroad and ambiguous.
Defendants raised this same argument in
pretrial motions and at the charging
conference. The Government responded
these are common terms and have been used
in numerous intentional misapplication cases
going back decades. Kelly's lawyer suggested
that the judge "just define what unjustifiable
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and wrongful are," but when asked for
proposed definitions, had nothing to offer.
The judge overruled Defendants' objection
because the terms are not "inherently vague"
and were not "strong legal term[s]."

Circuit. The First Circuit's 18 U.S.C. §
656 (theft, embezzlement, or misapplication
by bank officer or employee) pattern
instructions define "willful misapplication"
to include "that [defendants] wrongfully used
the bank's funds" without further clarifying
what "wrongfully" means. The Ninth and
Tenth Circuits both have pattern instructions
for
statutes
containing
"willful
misapplication" that do not define those
terms at all. Jurors are regularly trusted to
understand the meaning of these ordinary
words
in
criminal
cases.

On appeal, Defendants argue these terms are
so broad that the jury could have convicted if
it believed the lane realignment was "a bad
idea," unjustifiable "as a policy matter," or
that Baroni should have sought Executive
Director Foye's approval. We disagree.
Other instructions in the District Judge's
thorough and comprehensive charge
foreclose the possibility the jury convicted
defendants for lawful but imprudent conduct,
e.g., because the jury thought the lane
reductions were "a bad idea." These include
the requirement that $5,000 worth of property
be stolen or misapplied and that the
misapplication be "for an unauthorized
purpose." The judge also told the jury that it
had to be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the purpose of the lane reductions
was not a legitimate traffic study and that
Defendants' good faith would be a complete
defense to the charges. Because the jury was
instructed that Defendants could not be
convicted if they believed in good faith that
the reductions were part of a legitimate traffic
study, a jury following its instructions could
not have convicted Defendants based on its
personal judgments about the wisdom and
execution of the traffic study.

B.
Defendants also challenge the District
Judge's refusal to instruct the jury it needed
to find Defendants intended to punish Mayor
Sokolich in order to convict. They contend
this error affects every count and
constructively amended the indictment,
"permit[ing] the jury to convict based on
conduct that was not unlawful." We disagree.
Defendants requested the object of the
conspiracy be defined throughout the jury
charge as one "to misuse Port Authority
property to facilitate and conceal the causing
of traffic problems in Fort Lee as punishment
of Mayor Sokolich." The trial court
disagreed, ruling "the purpose or the object of
the conspiracy being to punish Mayor
Sokolich goes to motive," which is "not an
element of the crime" and so "not an element
that has to be proven."

Moreover, we observe that this definition, or
even broader language, is contained in the
model jury instructions in several of our sister
circuits. It is included verbatim in the Section
666 pattern jury instructions from the Eighth

During deliberations, the jury sent a note
asking: "Can you be guilty of conspiracy
without the act being intentionally punative
[sic] toward Mayor Socholich [sic]." The
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judge responded: "Yes. Please consider this
along with all other instructions that have
been given to you."

required to prove they "knowingly devised a
scheme to defraud or to obtain money or
property by materially false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises," and
that they "acted with intent to defraud." This
describes the conduct proscribed by the
statute and the required mens rea. The intent
to punish Mayor Sokolich may explain
Defendants'
motive—why Defendants
intended to defraud the Port Authority in this
case—but it is distinct from mens rea and is
not a required element of any of the charged
offenses.

In their post-trial motions, Defendants argued
the punishment of Mayor Sokolich was "an
essential element of each of the charged
offenses," and that the failure to instruct the
jury on this point relieved the Government of
its burden of proof. The trial judge again
disagreed, explaining that "any punitive goal
Defendants may have had goes to their
motive for violating the charged statutes,
[but] is not an essential element of any of the
crimes charged." We agree.

Indeed, following the Third Circuit Model
Jury Instructions, the District Judge charged
the jury on this critical difference between
motive and intent:

Defendants argue the "intent to punish
Sokolich [is] an essential element of the mens
rea of the charged offenses." Once again,
Defendants conflate motive with mens
rea intent and conduct. As we recently
explained in Hassan v. City of New York:

Intent and motive are different
concepts. Motive is what prompts a
person to act. Intent refers only to the
state of mind with which the
particular act is done. Personal
advancement and financial gain, for
example, are motives for much of
human conduct. However, these
motives may prompt one person to
intentionally do something perfectly
acceptable, while prompting another
person to intentionally do an act that
is a crime. Motive is not an element
of the offense with which a defendant
is charged. Proof of bad motive is not
required to convict. Further, proof of
bad motive alone does not establish
that the defendant is guilty. And proof
of good motive alone does not
establish that the defendant is not
guilty. Evidence of the defendant's

[T]here's a difference between
"intent" and "motive." "[A] defendant
acts intentionally when he desires
a particular result, without reference
to the reason for such desire. Motive,
on the other hand, is the reason why
the defendant desires the result." In
other words, "intent" asks whether a
person acts "intentionally or
accidentally," while "motive" asks,
"If he did it intentionally, why did he
do it?" This fundamental "distinction
between motive and intent runs all
through the law."
The District Judge properly instructed the
jury, for example, that to find Defendants
guilty of wire fraud, the Government was
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motive may, however, help you to
determine his or her intent.

We now turn to the civil rights counts.

The judge specifically instructed the jury that
evidence of motive may be relevant to
establishing mens rea, thus allowing a juror
who found evidence of motive lacking to vote
for acquittal. Defendants were free to
argue—and did argue—that they were not
motivated by any desire to punish Mayor
Sokolich. The jury's guilty verdict
necessarily demonstrates no juror found
motive so lacking as to raise a reasonable
doubt
concerning
Defendants' guilt.
Moreover, as we have explained, the
comprehensive and thorough jury charge
created no risk that Defendants were
convicted on the basis of lawful conduct.

V.
Finally, Defendants challenge the sufficiency
of Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment. In those
counts, the grand jury charged Defendants
with conspiring to violate, and substantively
violating, the civil rights of Fort Lee
residents. It alleged "[t]he object of the
conspiracy was to interfere with the localized
travel rights of the residents of Fort Lee for
the illegitimate purpose of causing significant
traffic problems in Fort Lee to punish Mayor
Sokolich," and that Defendants "knowingly
and willfully deprived the residents of Fort
Lee of the rights, privileges, and immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, namely, the right to localized
travel on public roadways free from
restrictions
unrelated
to
legitimate
government objectives." Defendants argue
the substantive due process right the grand
jury identified—"the right to localized travel
on public roadways free from restrictions
unrelated
to
legitimate
government
objectives"—is not clearly established and
thus cannot form the basis of the civil rights
offenses charged in Counts 8 and 9.

And while the grand jury included language
describing Defendants' motive to punish the
mayor in the indictment, that language—
which did not describe an essential element
of the charged offense—was merely
surplusage. Because the jury instructions did
not modify the essential elements of the
offenses as charged in the indictment, there
was no constructive amendment.
Accordingly, we find no error in these
instructions or the District Judge's response
to the jury's question.

Defendants' attack on the sufficiency of
Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment is a legal
question over which our review is plenary.
"[W]hether the alleged violation of
substantive due process was clearly
established . . . is a question of law over
which our review is unrestricted."

***
Because Defendants' sufficiency challenges
to their wire fraud and Section 666 offenses
fail, and because we find any error in the jury
instructions was at worst harmless, we will
affirm Defendants' judgments of convictions
as to the wire fraud and Section 666 offenses.

Section 241 makes it a crime for "two or
more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress,
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threaten, or intimidate any person in any
State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession,
or District in the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States,"
and Section 242 makes it a crime for a person
"under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to willfully subject[]
any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States."

more times through certain overcrowded
streets during evening hours, we held there is
"[a] due process right of localized movement
on the public roadways," which we
alternately described as "the right to move
freely about one's neighborhood or town,
even by automobile." We further held no
other constitutional provision could provide
the source of the right. We nonetheless
upheld the ordinance because it was narrowly
tailored to meet the significant city objectives
of protecting public safety and reducing
intense traffic congestion.

"[I]n lieu of describing the specific conduct it
forbids, each statute's general terms
incorporate constitutional law by reference."
The statutes' scope is limited to "rights fairly
warned of, having been 'made specific' by the
time of the charged conduct." The Supreme
Court has held that "the object of the 'clearly
established' immunity standard is not
different from that of 'fair warning' as it
relates to law 'made specific' for the purpose
of validly applying" the criminal civil rights
statutes. Accordingly, we apply the same test
as in qualified immunity cases, asking
whether the right allegedly deprived was
clearly established.

Contrary to the District Court's holding,
however, and according to the Supreme
Court's
qualified
immunity
precedent, Lutz alone could not have put
Defendants on notice that they were violating
a constitutional right. "A Government
official's conduct violates clearly established
law when, at the time of the challenged
conduct, 'the contours of a right are
sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable
official would have understood that what he
is doing violates that right.'" "To determine
whether the right is clearly established, we
look at the state of the law when the [conduct]
occurred," here 2013. The Supreme Court
has suggested that a single binding case from
the defendant's jurisdiction is insufficient to
give notice that certain conduct could lead to
criminal punishment. Instead, "[w]e look first
to applicable Supreme Court precedent." A
relevant Supreme Court holding ends the
inquiry. "[I]f none exists, it may be possible
that a 'robust consensus of cases of persuasive
authority' in the Court[s] of Appeals could
clearly establish a right for purposes of
qualified immunity."

Before trial, Defendants moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that there is no
constitutional right to localized travel on
public roadways and that, even if such a right
did exist, it had not yet been clearly
established. As the District Court noted when
denying the motion, our Court recognized
a Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to intrastate travel nearly three decades ago.
Specifically, in reviewing a city ordinance
that prohibited cars from driving three or
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The Supreme Court has never recognized an
intrastate travel right. Far from a "robust
consensus" in the Courts of Appeals that the
right exists, the law across the circuits is
uncertain. And most often our sister circuits
have considered the matter in reviewing
challenges
to
municipal
residency
requirements, not government action
prohibiting free movement in public spaces,
undermining the notice those opinions might
have provided to Defendants as to the
criminal nature of their conduct.

Although Lutz is both clear and binding in
our jurisdiction, this area of law as a whole is
far from settled. Based on the Supreme
Court's qualified immunity precedent, we
hold the District Court erred in
concluding Lutz, standing alone, provided
fair warning that Defendants conduct was
illegal, especially in view of the state of the
law in our sister circuits. "[W]hether or not
the constitutional rule applied by the court
below was correct, it was not 'beyond
debate.'"

In addition to our opinion in Lutz, the First,
Second, and Sixth Circuits have recognized a
right to intrastate travel, though they have
described it at varying levels of generality.

Accordingly, we will reverse and vacate
Defendants' civil rights convictions and
remand with instructions to dismiss Counts 8
and 9 of the indictment under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(b). Because we
reverse and vacate Defendants' convictions,
we need not reach their arguments
concerning the jury instructions on the civil
rights
counts.

On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have treated the
question more skeptically, often hesitating to
recognize a due process intrastate travel right
and sometimes explicitly rejecting theories
rooted in other constitutional provisions.

VI.

The D.C. Circuit is internally conflicted but
has not yet set precedent. A plurality of the
Court sitting en banc suggested a due process
right to intrastate travel might exist but did
not reach the question. In separate opinions,
another plurality concluded a right to
intrastate travel exists and ought to be subject
to intermediate scrutiny.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm
Defendants' judgments of convictions as to
the wire fraud and Section 666 counts
(Counts 1 through 7), and we will reverse and
vacate only as to the civil rights counts
(Counts 8 and 9). Because we have reversed
and vacated two counts of the indictment, we
will vacate Defendants' sentences on the
remaining counts of convictions. We will
remand with instructions to dismiss only
Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment and to
resentence Defendants on the remaining
counts of conviction.

Simply put, although four circuits (including
our own) have found some form of a
constitutional right to intrastate travel, there
is hardly a "robust consensus" that the right
exists, let alone clarity as to its contours.
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“High Court Takes on ‘Bridgegate’ Appeal”
Law360
Bill Wichert
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Friday agreed to
hear an appeal in the so-called Bridgegate
case against two former associates of ex-New
Jersey Gov. Chris Christie who were
convicted of reducing local access lanes to
the George Washington Bridge in a political
revenge scheme.

Matthew Reilly, a spokesman for the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the District of New
Jersey, said Friday that the office declined to
comment.
The Third Circuit’s Nov. 27 precedential
decision upheld the bulk of the charges
against Kelly and Baroni, but tossed claims
they deprived residents of Fort Lee, New
Jersey, of their civil rights to travel freely.

The justices granted a petition from Bridget
Anne Kelly, a onetime aide to the governor,
to take a second look at a Third Circuit
opinion last fall that upheld most of the
convictions for her and former Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey executive
William E. Baroni Jr.

Besides those civil rights charges, they were
convicted at trial in November 2016 of
misusing the Port Authority’s resources and
committing wire fraud.
Following the circuit opinion, a New Jersey
federal judge in February resentenced Baroni
to an 18-month prison sentence instead of the
two-year term he originally received. In
April, the judge handed down a 13-month
prison sentence to Kelly, down from the 18
months she initially faced.

“I am grateful and encouraged that the
Supreme Court has decided to hear my case,
and hopeful that this process will provide
another opportunity for the truth to come out
— for my sake, and more importantly, for the
sake of my children. I am thankful to the
court for granting this opportunity,” Kelly
said Friday in a statement.

In fighting their convictions, Kelly and
Baroni have blasted the government’s theory
as improperly turning “routine” political
activity into criminal conduct. Kelly pointed
in her petition to “the nearly limitless array of
routine conduct that is criminal” under the
circuit opinion.

Baroni attorney Michael A. Levy of Sidley
Austin LLP told Law360 on Friday, “Bill
Baroni is grateful to the Supreme Court for
choosing to accept this case, and he is
confident that the court will conclude that
neither he nor Bridget Kelly committed any
crime.”
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“Under the decision below, any official
(federal, state, or local) who conceals or
misrepresents her subjective motive for
making an otherwise-lawful decision —
including by purporting to act for publicpolicy reasons without admitting to her
ulterior political goals, commonly known as
political ‘spin’ — has thereby defrauded the
government of property (her own labor if
nothing else),” according to the petition.

week in September 2013, causing extensive
traffic jams in Fort Lee, as retaliation against
borough Mayor Mark Sokolich for not
endorsing Christie’s 2013 reelection bid.
The three conspirators concocted a bogus
story that the lane reductions were for a
traffic study, prosecutors said. Baroni and
Kelly both testified during the trial that they
did not take part in the political payback
scheme, claiming that Wildstein duped them
into believing the lane closures were for a
legitimate traffic study.

Urging the high court to pass on the appeal,
the government said the fact that Kelly was
“politically motivated to carry out her
fraudulent scheme is irrelevant to her guilt,”
adding that she and Baroni fraudulently
obtained Port Authority employees’ labor
under the guise of conducting a traffic study.

Wildstein, who pled guilty and cooperated
with the government, was sentenced in July
2017 to three years of probation.
The government is represented by Jeffrey B.
Wall of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office,
and Brian A. Benczkowski and Andrew
Laing of the U.S. Department of Justice's
Criminal Division.

“Whether petitioner and Baroni were
motivated by political animus toward the
mayor of Fort Lee or by a desire for personal
gain, their criminal liability would be
unchanged, because their conduct constituted
a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses,’” according to
the government’s opposition brief.

Kelly is represented by Yaakov M. Roth,
Michael A. Carvin, Anthony J. Dick and
Vivek Suri of Jones Day and Michael D.
Critchley of Critchley Kinum & Denoia LLC.

Prosecutors have said that Kelly and Baroni
conspired with former Port Authority
executive David Wildstein to close two of
three local access lanes to the bridge during a

The case is Bridget Anne Kelly v. U.S., case
number 18-1059, in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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“Ex-Christie Aide Gets Supreme Court Hearing on Bridge Scandal”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether
two allies of former New Jersey Governor
Chris Christie were improperly convicted for
their roles in the George Washington Bridge
lane-closing scandal, accepting a case that
could make it harder to prosecute public
officials for fraud.

Ministry of Truth for every public official in
the nation,” she argued in her appeal.
‘Traffic Problems’
Kelly, who had been Christie’s deputy chief
of staff, gained notoriety because of an email
she sent about a month before the closing of
two access lanes to the bridge. “Time for
some traffic problems in Fort Lee,” Kelly
wrote.

The justices agreed to hear an appeal from
Bridget Anne Kelly, who has been scheduled
to start a 13-month prison term next month.
The case will also affect Bill Baroni, who was
convicted alongside Kelly and is serving an
18-month sentence.

Prosecutors said Kelly worked with Baroni,
then the deputy executive director of the Port
Authority, to close the lanes under the guise
of conducting a traffic study.

The
convictions
stem
from
the
2013 “Bridgegate” scheme, which created
crippling traffic jams to punish the mayor of
Fort Lee, New Jersey, for failing to endorse
Christie’s re-election bid that year. A federal
appeals court upheld Kelly’s and Baroni’s
fraud convictions while tossing out other
charges.

Christie, a Republican, denied knowledge of
the lane closings and wasn’t charged in the
plot, though it helped end his presidential
ambitions. His second term as governor
ended in 2018.
The Trump administration urged the
Supreme Court not to hear the appeal. In
court papers, the Justice Department said the
scheme met the requirements of the federal
fraud statutes because it forced the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey,
which runs the bridge, to pay thousands of
dollars of overtime wages.

Kelly contends that decision stretched the
law so far that public officials will now risk
prison time when they harbor secret personal
or political motives for a decision they make.
The ruling “is a playbook for how to
prosecute
political
adversaries,
and
transforms the federal judiciary into a

Kelly “does not dispute the trial evidence
showing that the Port Authority spent several
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thousands of dollars paying employees for
unnecessary work that served no legitimate
Port Authority function,” the government
argued.

set up meetings and take other informal
actions on behalf of a supporter.
The court will hear arguments and rule in the
nine-month term that starts in October.

The Supreme Court in recent years has
narrowed the reach of the federal fraud laws.
In 2016 the court tossed out the conviction of
former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell,
saying it wasn’t clear he had done more than

The case is Kelly v. United States, 18-1059.
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“Supreme Court to hear appeal in Bridgegate case”
Politico
Ryan Hutchins
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Friday said it will
review the case against a former aide to New
Jersey Gov. Chris Christie who was
convicted of helping to orchestrate
Bridgegate, keeping alive the years-long saga
surrounding the 2013 lane closures at the
George Washington Bridge.

determination that she ‘lied’ by purporting to
act in the public interest or by concealing her
‘political’ purposes,” attorneys Michael
Critchley and Yaakov M. Roth argued in
their brief to petition the court to hear the
case. “There is no end to the (bipartisan)
mischief such a regime would facilitate, or
the chilling effect it would carry.”

The court, its term ending, said it would hear
an appeal by Bridget Anne Kelly, a former
deputy chief of staff to Christie who
conspired with other allies of the governor to
create the massive traffic jam — now said to
be a bizarre act of political retribution.

Kelly and Baroni, who has also joined in the
Supreme Court appeal, had previously
exhausted all other legal avenues after having
some of their convictions tossed by an
appeals court, leading to slight reductions in
their sentences. In November, a panel of
judges sitting on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit upheld the seven wire
fraud and conspiracy counts, but dismissed
two civil rights-related convictions.

Kelly and Bill Baroni, a former Republican
state lawmaker who served as Christie’s
deputy executive director of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey,
were both convicted in 2016 for roles in the
scandal. Baroni is serving an 18-month
federal prison sentence, while Kelly is
scheduled to start serving a 13-month term on
July 10.
While the Supreme Court did not say what,
specifically, it will review, Kelly has argued
the case misapplied federal fraud statutes to
ordinary political conduct.

The duo worked with a third conspirator —
David Wildstein, who pleaded guilty and
testified against them — to orchestrate the
political retribution scheme, which Wildstein
said was designed to punish the Democratic
mayor of Fort Lee, N.J., for refusing to
endorse Christie's reelection campaign.
Wildstein received probation and is currently
operating a political news site in New Jersey.

“If there is one thing this country does not
need right now, it is a rule of law allowing a
public official to be locked up based on a jury

Over the course of several days in September
2013, the three closed off two local access
lanes to the George Washington Bridge
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during the morning commute, clogging roads
for hours in the densely-populated Bergen
County town. Kelly sent Wildstein the nowinfamous email stating that it was "time for
some traffic problems in Fort Lee," sparking
the lane closures.

Kelly was deputy chief of staff in charge of
the Christie administration's Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs — an organization
that, according to testimony from numerous
witnesses testimony and other information
that came out during the trial, worked as a
publicly-funded arm of Christie's reelection
campaign.

While Kelly has maintained she did not know
the true reason for lane closures, believing
them to be part of a traffic study, she testified
under oath that Christie knew about the plan
ahead of time — an allegation the former
governor had repeatedly denied.

Kelly and Baroni argued that prosecuting
them under that federal law would
criminalize normal political conduct. The
appeals court disagreed.

After being resentenced earlier this year in
U.S. District Court in New Jersey, Kelly
unleashed on Christie, who had served as the
head of President Donald Trump’s transition
and is now an attorney in private practice and
a political commentator for ABC News.

"To execute their scheme, they conscripted
fourteen Port Authority employees to do
sham work in pursuit of no legitimate Port
Authority aim. That Defendants were
politically motivated does not remove their
intentional conduct from the ambit of the
federal criminal law," Judge Anthony Scirica
wrote in the circuit court opinion.

Kelly called Christie a “bully” and said he
was able to “escape justice.”

In Kelly's request for a rehearing before the
full 3rd Circuit, which was denied, Critchley
and Roth argued the court's ruling could set a
set a "dangerous and untenable."

"The fact that I am on these steps in place of
others from the Christie administration —
including the governor himself — does not
prove my guilt," Kelly said outside the
federal courthouse in April. "It only proves
that justice is not blind. It has favorites. It
misses the mark. It misses the truth. And it
picks winners and losers that are sometimes
beyond anyone's control."

"Taken seriously, it would allow any federal,
state, or local official to be indicted based on
nothing more than the (ubiquitous) allegation
that she lied in claiming to act in the public
interest," the lawyers wrote, giving examples
of potential convictions. "These implications
are astounding — and grave. There is nothing
easier than accusing a public official of
harboring secret political motives for his
decisions."

The federal government's case against Kelly
and Baroni relied largely on a law barring
officials from misapplying property from an
organization receiving federal funds — in
this case the Port Authority, a bistate agency
that operates the bridge.
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“Why the ‘Bridgegate’ Scandal Could Backfire on Prosecutors”
The New York Times
Nick Corasaniti
July 3, 2019
Federal prosecutors have often relied on a
powerful criminal statute to bring highprofile
corruption
cases,
including
the college admissions scandal that ensnared
Hollywood celebrities and a string of bribery
investigations that targeted college basketball
programs.

“There has been this stream of cases coming
from the Supreme Court that has continued to
limit
prosecutorial
discretion
and
prosecutorial authority when it comes to
corruption cases,” said Jessica Tillipman, an
assistant dean at the George Washington
University Law School. “So the fact that they
took on another corruption case to me signals
that there’s a good chance that the statutes
will be further narrowed once again.”

But now, a key theory of that statute could be
gutted because of a challenge by two
defendants in another well-known case —
“Bridgegate,” the September 2013 closing of
access lanes to the George Washington
Bridge, which connects Manhattan and New
Jersey, to punish a mayor for refusing to offer
a campaign endorsement.

The bridge scheme drew national attention
and undermined the presidential ambitions of
the then-New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie. Ms.
Kelly and Mr. Baroni, top aides to Mr.
Christie, were charged with orchestrating the
closing of the lanes leading to the bridge.

The United States Supreme Court, in a
decision that surprised legal experts, last
week agreed to hear an appeal of the
defendants’ corruption convictions in a move
that could significantly weaken the ability of
prosecutors to go after what they determine
to be political malfeasance.

At issue in the case is a fraud theory used to
prosecute under the mail and wire fraud
statutes known as a “right to control.” It rests
on the idea that the owner of an asset is
defrauded when somebody uses that asset
and lies about what they are using it for. In
the college admissions scandal, for example,
prosecutors said offers of acceptance to
universities were misused.

The court’s decision to take on the appeal by
the defendants, Bridget Anne Kelly and Bill
Baroni, suggests that the justices are open to
overturning their convictions, legal experts
said, and follows other rulings that have
chipped away at federal corruption laws.

The court has already significantly raised the
bar when it comes to prosecuting politicians,
and what was once viewed as illegal is being
increasingly regarded as normal political
behavior, legal experts said.

225

One of the most significant decisions came in
2016, when the Supreme Court overturned
the corruption conviction of former Gov. Bob
McDonnell of Virginia, who had been
accused of accepting luxury items, loans and
vacations in exchange for helping a local
businessman.

on charges that the senator had provided
favors to a wealthy donor in exchange for
lavish gifts.
Federal prosecutors abandoned efforts to try
Mr. Menendez after the judge threw out
several counts of the charges, saying that the
prosecution had not proved a quid pro quo
under the definition laid out by the
McDonnell decision.

In its unanimous ruling, the court said the
gifts were permissible because in setting up
meetings and making introductions for the
businessman, Mr. McDonnell had not
betrayed his office or, as the law says, taken
an “official act.’’ To prove corruption, the
court said there had to be a clear official
government decision or act, essentially
creating a more stringent definition of the
law.

The appeal in the Bridgegate case is now
testing another aspect of federal corruption
law.
“What’s always marked this case from being
a little different than standard corruption
cases was that this wasn’t about personal
gain, or at least personal gain in a monetary
sense,” said Daniel C. Richman, a professor
at Columbia Law School and a former federal
prosecutor. “If money isn’t nakedly involved,
you end up having more complex and
contestable liability theories.”

The McDonnell decision upended several
high-profile federal prosecutions, including
cases involving Sheldon Silver, the once
powerful speaker of the New York
Assembly, Dean G. Skelos, the former
majority leader of the New York Senate, and
Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey. All
three had already been indicted at the time of
the decision.

The defense team for Ms. Kelly and Mr.
Baroni argue that even if they did hatch a
scheme to block the access lanes, which they
have denied, it would not constitute a crime
because there was no personal financial or
material gain, and the agency that operates
the bridge, the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, was never defrauded.

A federal appeals court overturned the
convictions of Mr. Silver and Mr. Skelos.
Still, appellate judges made clear that
sufficient evidence existed to prove the men
had acted corruptly.

In the end, the defense lawyers argued, the
affair was nothing more than the rough and
tumble of political gamesmanship, likening it
to a mayor directing his public works
department to plow the streets of his political
opponents last during a snowstorm.

Mr. Silver and Mr. Skelos were found guilty
at new trials after juries were presented a
more narrow definition of what constituted
corrupt behavior.
In Mr. Menendez’s case, a judge declared a
mistrial after jurors could not reach a verdict
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Zephyr Teachout, a law professor at Fordham
University and a former candidate for New
York attorney general, said it’s likely the
defense will argue that Bridgegate was just
politics. “And this court has been extremely
sympathetic to that kind of argument,” she
said.

many thought would be the final chapter in
the protracted scandal.
Now, following the Supreme Court’s
decision to take up the case, Mr. Baroni has
been released from prison on bail and Ms.
Kelly will not have to report to prison until
the Supreme Court renders its decision.

The hearing before the Supreme Court, likely
in December or January, will prolong a
political saga that has plagued Mr. Christie
and his allies for more than five years.

Michael Critchley, a lawyer for Ms. Kelly,
has steadfastly maintained that federal
prosecutors stretched the boundaries of the
law to make a case against his client.

Sparked by the now infamous “Time for
some traffic problems in Fort Lee” email sent
by Ms. Kelly, the scandal engulfed the
Christie
administration,
leading
to indictments for Mr. Baroni and Ms. Kelly
in 2015, and their conviction in November
2016.

“We’ve always said this was an indictment in
search of a crime,” he said. “You may
question political motives, but the Supreme
Court will say are political motives enough
for holding someone criminally liable for an
offense?”
The United States solicitor general’s office
had recommended that the Supreme Court
not take up the case, pointing to the
“approximately $1828.80 for the labor
necessary to carry out the phony traffic
study” as evidence that the Port Authority
was indeed defrauded of resources.

While the Christie administration said the
lane closings were ostensibly part of a traffic
study, an investigation revealed that they
were political retribution against the mayor
of Fort Lee, a town at the foot of the George
Washington Bridge, for not endorsing Mr.
Christie’s re-election. Mr. Christie has denied
any knowledge or involvement in the
scheme.

The solicitor general’s office also took
exception to the mayor and snowplow
analogy.

The closings led to days of massive traffic
jams near the world’s busiest bridge.

“Those examples, in contrast to the facts of
her case, involve officials who possess
unilateral authority over discretionary
resources, therefore do not need to lie to
allocate those resources,” the solicitor
general’s office wrote.

Both Ms. Kelly and Mr. Baroni appealed
their convictions and were able to get part of
their sentences reduced. In February, Mr.
Baroni was sentenced to 18 months in prison.
He reported to a federal corrections facility in
Pennsylvania in April. Ms. Kelly
was sentenced to 13 months and was to
report to prison later this summer, in what

But now that the court has agreed to hear
arguments, some legal experts say the case
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could again reframe what is acceptable
political conduct.
“One does wonder, implicitly, how the
Supreme Court got to this extraordinarily
cynical view of politics and public service
where this dodgy behavior is just part and
parcel of the political game,” said Dan
Weiner, a senior counsel at the Brennan
Center for Justice. “I would like to see the
courts grapple more earnestly with the
thinking that, whether these decisions are
correct or not, allowing conduct like this to
go unsanctioned and any suggestion that this
is just politics is just corrosive. And that has
done a lot of damage.”
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“Baroni sentenced to 2 years in prison for role in Bridgegate scandal; Kelly gets 18
months”
Politico
Ryan Hutchins
March 29, 2017
Two former allies of Gov. Chris Christie
were sentenced Wednesday to prison terms
for their roles in the George Washington
Bridge lane closures, a bizarre political stunt
that was designed to help the governor’s
career but ended up halting his rapid march
toward the White House.

into the hallway. Kelly wiped away tears as
she learned her future and dabbed her eyes
with a tissue as she left the courtroom.
Kelly and Baroni were convicted in
November after a dramatic, six-week trial in
which David Wildstein, a dark political
operative who admitted masterminding the
scheme, testified against them in hopes of
reducing his own yet-to-be-determined
punishment. A jury found Kelly and Baroni
guilty on multiple counts of conspiracy, fraud
and civil rights violations.

Bill Baroni, a former Republican state
senator who served as Christie’s top
appointee at the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, was sentenced to a 24
months of incarceration. Bridget Anne Kelly,
Baroni’s co-defendant and a former deputy
chief of staff to Christie, was sentenced in the
afternoon to 18 months in prison.

All three attempted to implicate Christie
when they took the witness stand last year,
but the governor maintains he knew nothing
about the plot, which was aimed at the
Democratic mayor of Fort Lee who refused
to endorse his 2013 re-election bid. The lane
closures caused days if gridlock in Fort Lee,
where the bridge is located.

Both will also serve one year of probation,
complete 500 hours of community service
and pay fines and restitution, U.S. District
Court Judge Susan Wigenton ruled.
“What occurred in September 2013 was an
outrageous abuse of power,” Wigenton told a
packed court room. “The fact there was no
financial gain underscores the significance of
power to create chaos at the drop of a hat.”

Both Baroni, 45, and Kelly, 44, continue to
maintain their own innocence and plan to
appeal their convictions, saying they thought
all along that the lane closures were part of a
legitimate traffic study, not the act of political
retribution the incident is now known to be.

She called it a “sad day for the state of New
Jersey.”

In court on Wednesday, Baroni apologized
for not stopping the plan and said he’d let

Baroni remained stoic as the judge read the
sentence, and was smiling when he walked
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everyone down — friends, family and the
people he was supposed to be serving in his
job at the bi-state agency.

brazen and vindictive abuse of power,” they
wrote in the memo — and should each
receive a “meaningful prison sentence.”

“I failed,” said Baroni, wearing a dark suit
and clutching his remarks in his hand. “I
made the wrong choices, took the wrong
guidance, listened to the wrong people.”

“Those are the actions out of the playbook of
some dictator in a banana republic,” assistant
U.S. Attorney Lee Cortes said in court. “It is
incomprehensible that such actions could
take place here in the United States.”

Kelly’s lead attorney, Michael Critchley, said
his client was reluctant to apologize for fear
of hurting her chance on appeal. He said the
balancing act felt “like schizophrenia.”

Defense attorneys for Baroni and Kelly
argued for probation, given the service both
have provided to their communities, as well
as the lack of prior criminal histories. Baroni,
his attorneys noted, has become a notable
figure in the gay-rights movement, overcame
obesity and was an informant for the FBI.

But Kelly, through tears, did say she was
remorseful.
“I do not take the allegation in this case
lightly,” Kelly said, her voice cracking as she
stood in court. “I realize how disruptive and
frustrating the lane realignment was for the
residents of Fort Lee. I never intended to
harm anyone. I am sorry if my actions in any
way caused any harm.”

And Kelly, her lawyer said, is a single mother
of four who’s engaged in civic and charitable
work and remains deeply tied to her
community. She’s “no monster,” her lawyers
wrote in their memo.
Critchley spoke at length about how he’d
come to care deeply about Kelly and her
family, which he said had suffered greatly.
He said Kelly’s daughter dropped her college
plans and her younger children were having
trouble at school.

Both defendants faced as much as 20 years in
prison under the most serious counts for
which they were convicted. Sentencing
guidelines call for much shorter terms, and
prosecutors initially recommended in a presentencing memorandum that each receive a
sentence at the bottom or below a 37- to 46month range.

“Your mother has been a poster child for the
past three years on every TV and every
newspaper in the region,” Critchley said.
“They see the gossip when they walk into a
store.”

The prosecutors were more specific on
Wednesday, suggesting a term of 24 months
to 30 months and also that Kelly receive a
slightly more lenient sentence.

The sentences, Wigenton said, took into
account many of the personal issues raised.
She said Baroni, who is a lawyer, received a
tougher sentence because of his position and
background in government and politics.

But the prosecutors said in court and in their
brief earlier in the week that Baroni and Kelly
committed serious crimes — “a stunningly
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Both defendants, the judge said, had betrayed
the public trust and did so for political
reason.

closures were part of a political revenge
scheme. One message, sent by Kelly to
Wildstein, came to symbolize the the whole
affair: “Time for some traffic problems in
Fort Lee.”

“The orchestrated misuse of the Port
Authority resources was for only one reason,
and that was to send a message,” Wigenton
said. “The situation could have been fatal.”

The two were accused of closing lanes to the
bridge in an effort to punish Mark Sokolich,
the Democratic mayor of the Fort Lee, after
he refused to back Christie’s re-election.

Wednesday's sentencings come just weeks
after David Samson, a longtime friend and
mentor to Christie, was sentenced in a
separate corruption case spawned out the
investigation into the lane closures.

The plan caused days of gridlock near the
bridge as the mayor’s pleas for help were
repeatedly ignored — at the Port Authority,
where Baroni was deputy executive director,
and in Trenton, where Kelly was in charge of
intergovernmental affairs.

Despite admitting he shook down United
Airlines so he could more easily reach his
South Carolina estate, Samson, a former Port
Authority chairman, was sentenced to spend
a year confined to that very same house,
known as “Rest Period.” Samson, 77, also a
former state attorney general, avoided any
prison time and was given four years’
probation, 3,600 hours of community service
and a $100,000 fine.

In an interview on Wednesday, Sokolich said
the whole ordeal remained to him a “mindboggling series of events.”
He said he thought the verdict was just.
“I have nothing but respect for the court and
Judge Wigenton,” Sokolich, who testified at
the trial, said after Baroni was sentenced. “I
am certainly not a person to question it. I
thought it was fair.”

Samson’s terms are sure to draw comparisons
this week to the sentences given to Baroni
and Kelly, neither of whom were accused of
doing anything for their own personal
benefit.

The trial also included testimony from some
of Christie’s closest aides and advisers. There
were numerous revelations about how the
governor’s office was used, from the earliest
days of his first term, to advance the
governor’s political interests.

The story of their undoing is one that
captivated the political world from the
moment it was revealed in early 2014,
months after Christie won re-election and just
his presidential ambitions were being given
serious attention.

Testimony and evidence showed in
remarkable detail how Christie’s Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs — what was, on
paper, a liaison unit for local officials — was
used as a political shop that dangled all sorts

That all evaporate when reporters were
leaked a series of emails and text messages
that revealed for the first time that the lane
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of “goodies” in front of mayors who were
considered targets for endorsing the
Republican’s re-election bid.

Numerous witnesses — including several
who are still in his good graces and were
never accused of any wrongdoing — said
Christie was told of the lane closures long
before he said he was. There was also the
assertion that Christie’s campaign manager,
Bill Stepien, now a top aide to President
Donald Trump, was aware of Wildstein’s
plans.

The office worked furiously to gain the trust
of politicians from both parties. Mayors in
some of the smallest of towns were meant to
feel special. They were offered tickets to NFL
games, breakfast with the governor, small
grants from the Port Authority, and even steel
recovered from the ashes of the World Trade
Center.

The governor, who appeared with the
president at the White House on Wednesday
for a discussion about opioid addiction, has
said none of that is true.

Those who stood in the way faced the
governor’s wrath, some testified.

Asked about the sentencing by "Today
Show" host Matt Lauer on Wednesday
morning, Christie declined to comment on
whether he thought the two deserve jail time.

“It was clear to me that the environment in
Trenton created a culture that you’re either
with us or you’re against us,” Wigenton said
at the sentencing.

“The judge will do what the judge believes is
appropriate, Matt, and it's not my role or
anybody else's role other than the judge in
that courtroom who has passed sentence on
people who have committed crimes,”
Christie said from the White House lawn.

Christie was mentioned at every turn during
the trial. There were claims he not only knew
about the lane closures but approved the plan,
believing it to be the traffic study Kelly and
Baroni had spoken about.
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“Bridgegate convictions for Baroni and Kelly mostly upheld”
Politico
Matt Friedman
November 27, 2018
Former Christie administration appointee
Bill Baroni and administration official
Bridget Anne Kelly will likely serve at least
some prison time, as a federal appeals panel
upheld most of their convictions over their
roles in the 2013 Bridgegate scandal.

anyone’s constitutional rights and his
sentence has now been vacated,” Michael A.
Levy, a Sidley Austin LLP partner, said in an
emailed statement. “What remains from this
unprecedented prosecution are convictions
only for the supposed misapplication of a few
thousand dollars of Port Authority resources
over less than one week. We disagree that any
resources were misapplied and are evaluating
further appellate options.”

In a decision issued Tuesday, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the seven
wire fraud and conspiracy counts Kelly and
Baroni were convicted of in 2016 over the
George Washington Bridge lane closures
three years earlier — an act of political
retribution against Fort Lee’s mayor, who
refused to endorse Gov. Chris Christie’s
reelection.

“While we are pleased that the Third Circuit
rejected the civil rights charges, we are
disappointed that the Court did not similarly
reject the government’s unprecedented
application of the wire fraud and
misapplication statutes,” Michael Critchley,
a lawyer representing Kelly, said in an email.
“We still believe that the remaining charges
are not legally sustainable and intend to
petition the United States Supreme Court to
review this case.”

The three-judge panel did dismiss two civil
rights-related convictions, meaning Baroni
and Kelly — who last year were sentenced to
24 and 18 months in prison, respectively —
will have to be re-sentenced.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office in New Jersey,
which prosecuted the case, said in a statement
that it’s “reviewing the opinion and is
grateful for the court’s consideration of all of
the issues raised in the appeal.”

With the help of a third conspirator, David
Wildstein, who pleaded guilty and testified
against them, Baroni and Kelly helped
orchestrate a scheme to close Fort Lee’s
access lanes to the busiest bridge in the
country, tying up traffic for hours in the
densely-populated Bergen County town.
Kelly sent Wildstein the infamous email
stating that it was “time for some traffic

Lawyers representing Baroni and Kelly said
they are evaluating further appeals.
“We are gratified that the Court of Appeals
concluded that Bill Baroni did not violate
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problems in Fort Lee,” sparking the lane
closures.

to plow the streets of a ward that supported
her before getting to a ward that supported
her opponent,” Judge Anthony Scirica wrote
for the panel, which also included Judges
Thomas Ambro and Eugene Siler, Jr.

Former Gov. Chris Christie was never
charged in the case, but testimony painted an
unflattering picture of his administration and
damaged his presidential aspirations. Some
testimony during the trial also contradicted
Christie’s previous statements about when he
was notified of the lane closures.

The argument didn’t get far with the appeals
court.
“To execute their scheme, they conscripted
fourteen Port Authority employees to do
sham work in pursuit of no legitimate Port
Authority aim. That Defendants were
politically motivated does not remove their
intentional conduct from the ambit of the
federal criminal law,” Scirica wrote. “We
hold that, at a minimum, the Government
offered a valid theory that Defendants
fraudulently obtained, knowingly converted,
or intentionally misapplied the labor of Port
Authority employees, and that it offered
evidence sufficient to sustain Defendants’
convictions.”

The federal government’s case relied largely
on a law barring officials from misapplying
property from an organization receiving
federal funds — in this case the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey,
where Baroni was deputy executive director,
New Jersey’s top staffer.
Kelly was deputy chief of staff in charge of
the Christie administration’s Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs — an organization
that, according to numerous witness’
testimony and other information that came
out during the Bridgegate trial — in many
ways worked as a publicly-funded arm of
Christie’s reelection campaign.

But the panel did agree with Baroni and Kelly
that they should not have been convicted for
violating drivers’ civil rights by denying
them intrastate travel between New York and
New Jersey.

Kelly and Baroni argued that prosecuting
them using that federal law would
criminalize normal political conduct.

“Simply put, although four circuits
(including our own) have found some form of
a constitutional right to intrastate travel, there
is hardly a ‘robust consensus’ that the right
exists, let alone clarity as to its contours,”
Scirica wrote.

“Offering an analogy, Kelly contends
Defendants’
conduct
is
‘materially
indistinguishable’ from that of a mayor who,
after a heavy snowfall, directs city employees
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Ramos v. Louisiana
Ruling Below: State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
Overview: Ramos was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on a 10 to 12 jury verdict.
He appealed his conviction in which he argued that his conviction by a non-unanimous jury
violated his federal constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether the 14th Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an
unanimous verdict.
STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
EVANGELISTO RAMOS, Defendant- Appellant
Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, State of Louisiana
Decided on November 2, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MCKAY, Chief Judge:
The defendant, Evangelisto Ramon, appeals
his conviction and sentence. Finding no error,
we affirm his conviction and sentence.

On June 20, 2016, the trial court once again
denied the defense motion to exclude the
statement. Trial was continued to June 21,
2016.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The defendant's case proceeded to trial by
jury on June 21, 2016 and concluded on June
22, 2016. The defendant was found guilty of
second-degree murder by a ten of twelve-jury
verdict.

On May 21, 2015, the defendant was indicted
on one count of second-degree murder. The
defendant appeared for arraignment on June
1, 2015 and entered a plea of not guilty. On
July 16, 2015, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the statement.

The defendant filed a motion for new trial and
a motion for post-verdict judgment of
acquittal on July 6, 2016. On July 12, 2016,
the defendant appeared for sentencing and his
motions for new trial and for post-verdict
judgment of acquittal were denied. The
defendant waived sentencing delays and was

On March 20, 2016, the trial court granted the
defendant's motion for a speedy trial. A pretrial conference was conducted by the trial
court on June 10, 2016. Trial was set for June
20, 2016.
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sentenced to life imprisonment at the
Louisiana Department of Corrections at hard
labor without benefit of parole, probation or
suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a
motion for appeal on July 12, 2016.

was sick. About thirty-minutes later, he saw
his aunt walking around the corner. He saw
two Spanish men he had never seen before
standing on the corner near his aunt. One of
the men rode off on a bicycle, and the other
remained on the corner. Jerome flashed his
truck's lights to let his aunt know he
was present and waved at her. She waved
back. His aunt then went back to talk to the
Spanish man and then went inside the house
on the corner with the man. Jerome remained
outside his cousin's house for approximately
30-40 minutes and then left. During that time,
he never saw his aunt come out of the corner
house.

STATEMENT OF FACT
On November 26, 2014, the dead body of a
woman, later identified as Trinece Fedison
(the "victim"), was found inside a trash can in
a wooded area behind 3308 Danneel Street in
New Orleans.
Robert Heim ("Mr. Heim"), a code
enforcement officer for the City of New
Orleans, testified that on the morning of
November 26, 2014 between 9:00 and 10:00
a.m., he was inspecting blighted property in
the wooded area behind the house located at
3308 Danneel Street. Mr. Heim noticed trash
and various discarded items in the overgrown
brush area. The woman who resided nearby
called his attention to a trash can in the rear
of the alley way and asked him to pull it out
to the street. The woman said the trash can
did not belong to her. When Mr. Heim
attempted to move the trash can, he found it
was very heavy. Because he was unable to
move the trash can, Mr. Heim lifted the lid
and discovered the dead body of a woman,
later identified as the victim. He immediately
called 911. Mr. Heim said it was apparent the
victim was a woman and was deceased.

On Thanksgiving morning, the morning his
aunt's body was found, Jerome looked down
the street and saw a man exiting the Spanish
man's house. Knowing that the Spanish man
was the last person he saw his aunt with,
Jerome approached the man in the street and
confronted him. Jerome told the man, "I
know what you did. You gonna [sic] feel me
partner, for real." The man stood silent for ten
minutes "like a damn ghost." Jerome
identified the defendant at trial as the Spanish
man he had last seen with his aunt.
New Orleans Police Homicide Detective
Nicholas Williams ("Detective Williams")
testified he assisted in the investigation of the
Trinece Fedison murder. He grew up with
Trinece and her family. Detective Williams
learned from the victim's family that Jerome
had information on a possible suspect. He
subsequently took a recorded statement from
Jerome, which he turned over to Detective
Bruce
Brueggeman
("Detective
Brueggeman"). In his statement, Jerome

Jerome Fedison ("Jerome"), the victim's
nephew, testified that on the afternoon before
his aunt's body was discovered, he stopped at
his cousin's house at about 3:30 p.m. While
waiting for a friend, Jerome called his aunt
(the victim) on the phone. She told him she
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furnished a description and address of the
suspected perpetrator.

arranged an interview. When questioned
relating to the defendant's previous
employment, Mr. Scheurmann stated the
defendant had been a butcher in New York.

Darryl Schuermann testified he was the
operations manager for Romeo Pappa Boats,
where the defendant worked as an AB
seaman. Romeo Pappa Boats' office was
located in Houma, and there was a mobile
home located on the property. The trailer was
used to lodge outgoing crewmen from out of
town for the night before a crew change so
that the crewmen did not have to travel in the
early morning hours. A retired Coast Guard
officer named Gene lived on the property and
looked after the property. Gene called Mr.
Scheurmann over the weekend and informed
him that the defendant had been staying in the
trailer for several days.

NOPD Homicide Detective Brueggeman
testified he was the lead detective assigned to
investigate the victim's murder. Upon
viewing the crime scene, Detective
Brueggeman suspected that a sexual assault
had occurred, so he requested that a sexual
assault kit be completed. He learned that the
trash can in which the body was found
belonged to a church located across the street
from the crime scene. He surmised that the
murder probably happened within the
immediate area because the trash would have
been too heavy to move with the body of a
large woman inside. Detective Brueggeman
interviewed a neighbor who lived in an
apartment complex next to the wooded lot,
who told him that while she was in bed in the
early morning hours, she heard a garbage can
being rolled across the street and over a curb.

When Mr. Scheurmann arrived at work on
the
Monday
morning
following
Thanksgiving, the defendant came into his
office and said he needed to talk to him. The
defendant told Mr. Scheurmann that he was
sexually involved with a prostitute, the
victim, and when she was leaving his house,
he heard a commotion. The defendant told
Mr. Scheurmann he saw a black SUV with
two black men, who were harassing her.

Detective Brueggeman interviewed the
victim's boyfriend, who stated that he was
with several family members at the time of
the murder. Because the alibi was confirmed
by his family members, the victim's
boyfriend was eliminated as a suspect.
Detective Williams furnished Detective
Brueggeman with the recorded statement he
had taken from the victim's nephew, Jerome.

The defendant stated that after the victim's
body was discovered, one of her family
members approached him on the street and
threatened to kill him, saying; "I know you
did it. I'm going to kill you." The defendant
explained that he had been staying in the
trailer that weekend because he feared for his
life. Mr. Scheurmann advised the defendant
to talk to the police. The defendant indicated
he was willing to talk to the police. Mr.
Scheurmann contacted the lead detective and

Detective Brueggeman received a phone call
from Darryl Schuermann. The detective
immediately drove to Houma to meet with
Mr. Scheurmann and the defendant. At that
time, Detective Brueggeman did not consider
the defendant a suspect in the victim's
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murder. The defendant told the detective that
he had had sex with the victim just prior to
her murder. Detective Brueggeman obtained
a buccal swab from the defendant.

that the defendant's account of the victim's
encounter with the men in the black vehicle
differed from the account he had given to
Darryl Schuermann in which he asserted the
men were harassing the victim. The
defendant was unable to describe the men in
the black car.

When Detective Brueggeman received the
results of the DNA testing, it revealed a
match between the defendant's DNA and the
DNA found in the victim's vagina. The
defendant's DNA was also found on the
handles of the trash can in which the victim's
body had been found. The DNA reports were
later introduced into evidence.

Suggesting that the defendant had been
profiled based on his ethnicity, Detective
Brueggeman was asked on cross examination
why someone had said, "[I]t was possibly
Hispanic due to a knife being involved?"
Detective Brueggeman replied: "Some of the
people we spoke to like Jerome, some of the
people in the black community, they feel as if
somebody is a victim of [a] stab wound
chances are it's probably from a Mexican.
Those aren't my words but they think its
Mexican or Hispanic because they like to use
knives."

After receiving the DNA results, Detective
Brueggeman obtained a warrant for the
defendant's arrest, and the defendant was
apprehended. Detective Brueggeman, after
providing the defendant with his rights in
accordance with Miranda, obtained a second
statement from the defendant. Detective
Brueggeman informed the defendant there
was some physical evidence. In response to
learning the police had physical evidence, the
defendant immediately told Detective
Brueggeman about his prints being on a
garbage can lid. The defendant stated that he
had touched the garbage can lid when he
placed a bag of garbage in the church garbage
can immediately after having sex with the
victim. After further questioning, the
defendant said the church was located across
the street from his house. The defendant told
the detective that the last time he saw the
victim was when she was leaving his
residence. The defendant stated, as the victim
was leaving, a black vehicle, possibly a
Buick, pulled up, and the men inside called
her name. The victim appeared to know the
men, immediately got into the vehicle, and
the vehicle drove off. The detective noticed

Detective Brueggeman stated he learned
during his investigation that the victim had a
drug problem; however, only the defendant
stated she was a prostitute. Detective
Brueggeman reviewed the victim's criminal
history and found nothing to lead him to
believe the victim was a prostitute. There
were no arrests for prostitution and nothing
to suggest the victim was a prostitute.
Dr. Erin O'Sullivan ("Dr. O'Sullivan"), a
forensic pathologist for the Orleans Parish
Coroner's Office, performed the autopsy on
the victim's body on November 28, 2014. Dr.
O'Sullivan stated the death was classified as
a homicide. Dr. O'Sullivan determined that
Trinece had sustained six stab wounds in the
abdomen and lower right side of the back.
Additionally, the victim sustained an "in
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size" [sic] wound on the interior of her neck,
cutting into her vertebrae. In other words, in
colloquial terms, her throat was slit. The
victim also had a contusion on her back and
her right eye, consistent with a struggle.

was also concluded that there were two
contributors to the contact DNA found on the
right handle of the garbage can. The
defendant could not be excluded as a minor
contributor, while the victim could not be
excluded as a major contributor. Assuming
one contributor, the probability of finding the
same profile from an unrelated random
individual other than the defendant would be
one in 18.4 quadrillion, which is two to three
times the earth's population. Testing of the
victim's fingernail clippings revealed the
DNA of the victim's own blood. Further
testing revealed the DNA mixture of at least
two male individuals, but no profiles could be
determined due to the low-level nature of the
data.

Dr. O'Sullivan performed a sexual activity
test on the victim at the request of the police.
Dr. O'Sullivan determined that the cause of
the victim's death were the stab wounds to the
abdomen and neck. Based on the rigor state
of the victim, Dr. O'Sullivan determined the
time of death to be between the night of
November 25, 2014 and the morning of
November 26, 2014. Dr. O'Sullivan took
fingernail clippings, which she preserved for
evidence. Dr. O'Sullivan stated the victim
had lost a lot of blood internally. Dr.
O'Sullivan explained the abdominal wounds
would not cause massive external bleeding
and the wound to the neck may have had
more external bleeding. Dr. O'Sullivan
explained the neck wound may not have had
much external bleeding if it was the last
wound inflicted.

ERRORS PATENT
A review for errors patent on the face of the
record reveals none.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1
In the first assignment of error, the defendant
(pro se) and counsel contend the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction.
The defendant asserts the evidence presented
at trial was circumstantial and failed to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.

Stacey Williams ("Ms. Williams"), a forensic
DNA analyst for the State Police Crime Lab,
was accepted as an expert in the field of
forensic DNA analysis. Ms. Williams
performed the DNA analysis with respect to
samples related to the victim murder
investigation. The testing revealed that the
defendant's DNA was found in the victim's
vagina and also on the handles of the trash
can in which her body was found. There were
three contributors of contact (touch) DNA on
the left handle of the garbage can. The
defendant could not be excluded as the major
contributor of the DNA, and the victim could
not be excluded as the minor contributor. It

The defendant was found guilty of seconddegree murder, a violation of La. R.S.
14:30.1, which provides in relevant part: "A.
Second degree murder is the killing of a
human being: (1) When the offender has a
specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm...."
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The standard for review of a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence was laid out by
the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia:

requires that 'all evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, must be sufficient to satisfy a
rational juror that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

...the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. This familiar standard gives full play
to the responsibility of the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty
of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as
weigher of the evidence is preserved through
a legal conclusion that upon judicial
review all of the evidence is to be considered
in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

In the case sub judice, some of the evidence
may be susceptible of innocent explanation.
However, “under the Jackson standard, if
rational triers of fact could disagree as to the
interpretation of evidence, the rational fact
finder's view of all of the evidence most
favorable to the prosecution must be
adopted." Therefore, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, a
rational juror could have found that the State
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant asserts that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to prove his
identity as the murderer of the victim. A
review of the evidence and testimony
presented at trial reflects Jerome saw the
victim at approximately 4 p.m. the day before
her body was discovered. Jerome had noticed
two men on the corner he had never seen
before. Jerome thought the two men were
Hispanic. Jerome opined the two men were
behaving suspiciously and were selling drugs
in front of the church. As Jerome saw the
victim coming around the corner, he flashed
his headlights and waved to her. One of the
men left on a bicycle. The victim waved to
Jerome but turned around and went back to
the man on to the corner. The victim and the
man spoke briefly and then went into the
corner house. Jerome waited outside the
house for thirty-five to forty minutes but
never saw the victim exit the house.
Jerome identified the defendant as the last
person with whom the victim was seen.

"Under the Jackson standard, the rational
credibility determinations of the trier of fact
are not to be second guessed by a reviewing
court." Further, "a factfinder's credibility
determination is entitled to great weight and
should not be disturbed unless it is contrary
to the evidence." But, where there is no direct
evidence presented proving one or more of
the elements of the offense, La. R.S.
15:438 governs circumstantial evidence and
provides "assuming every fact to be proved
that the evidence tends to prove, in order to
convict, it must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence." "Stated differently,
the reviewer as a matter of law, can affirm the
conviction only if the reasonable hypothesis
is the one favorable to the State and there is
no extant reasonable hypothesis of
innocence." "This test is not separate from
the Jackson standard; rather it simply
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DNA testing revealed a match between the
defendant's DNA and the DNA found in the
victim's vagina. The defendant's DNA was
also found on the handles of the trash can in
which the victim's body had been found. Ms.
Williams believed the high volume of the
defendant's DNA found on the handle of the
trash can was due to some form of the
defendant's sweat or other substance on the
handle.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2
The defendant and counsel contend the State
made improper comments during its opening
statement and closing arguments asserting
that he raped and/or sexually assaulted the
victim. The defendant asserts the comments
influenced the jury and contributed to the
verdict because it undermined his defense
that his sexual contact with the victim was
consensual.

Testimony was also given at trial that the
defendant left the area following the murder.
In addition, the defendant gave conflicting
stories regarding what transpired when the
victim left his residence. The defendant could
not identify the type of vehicle or give a
description of the men in the vehicle. An
unopened condom was found with the victim
and the defendant's seminal fluid was found
in her vagina. Detective Brueggeman
testified the condition of the victim when she
was found led him to believe a sexual assault
had occurred. Pictures of the crime scene,
including the body of the victim in the
condition in which she was found, were
introduced into evidence. The defendant told
Detective Brueggeman that he lifted the lid of
the trash can to deposit trash, however, the
defendant was the major contributor to the
DNA found on the handle of the trash can
suggesting he moved the trash can rather than
simply lift the lid to deposit garbage into it.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 774 relates to the scope of
argument and provides as follows:
The argument shall be confined to evidence
admitted, to the lack of evidence, to
conclusions of fact that the state or defendant
may draw therefrom, and to the law
applicable to the case. The argument shall not
appeal to prejudice.
The State's rebuttal shall be confined to
answering the argument of the defendant.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Reed summarized the law relevant to alleged
improper remarks during argument as
follows:
... Louisiana jurisprudence on prosecutorial
misconduct allows prosecutors considerable
latitude in choosing closing argument
tactics. The trial judge has wide discretion in
controlling the scope of closing argument.
Even if the prosecutor exceeds these bounds,
a reviewing court will not reverse a
conviction due to an improper remark during
closing argument unless the court is
thoroughly convinced
the argument
influenced the jury and contributed to the
verdict, "as much credit should be accorded

The evidence presented by the State
including the testimony of the witnesses
provided sufficient evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, to
support the jury's verdict of guilty. This claim
is
without
merit.
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the good sense and fair mindedness of jurors
who have seen the evidence and heard the
arguments, and have been instructed
repeatedly by the trial judge that arguments
of counsel are not evidence."

contact was not consensual and was a sexual
assault. The trial court cautioned the State to
avoid the use of the word "rape" when
referring to the sexual assault.
This Court will not reverse a conviction for
alleged improper opening, closing, or rebuttal
arguments unless it is "thoroughly
convinced" that the argument influenced the
jury and contributed to the verdict. The jury
in the case sub judice was presented with
evidence consisting of photographs of the
victim as she was found in the trash can. The
victim's clothing was partially removed, the
defendant's seminal fluid was found in her
vagina, and she had been stabbed multiple
times. From this evidence, the jury
reasonably could have found the victim had
been sexually assaulted prior to her murder.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the use of the term "rape" or
"sexual assault" by the State in its opening,
closing, or rebuttal arguments did not
influence the jury or contribute to the verdict.
This claim is without merit.

The defendant asserts he was prejudiced by
the following statement made by the
prosecutor during opening statements:
When they take her out of the trash can you
are going to learn that immediately the initial
officers say she was raped. She was half
naked. Her underwear shoved down to her
knees. Her pants shoved down beside her
ankles, a bra shoved up over her breasts, she
had two socks on, no shoes and no shirt. And
the initial detectives know right away that
this woman had been raped and murdered.
The defendant contends he was prejudiced by
the State's reference to sexual assault or rape
during opening, closing, and rebuttal
arguments. However, the defendant admitted
sexual contact with the victim during his
initial
conversation
with
Detective
Brueggeman but asserted it was consensual.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
NUMBER 3

The trial court informed the jury, prior to
opening statements, that opening statements
were not evidence. Following the defendant's
objection to the State's assertion that the
victim was raped prior to her murder, the trial
court, outside the presence of the jury, heard
argument from the State as well as the
defense. The State contended that the sexual
assault of the victim was part of a continuing
act which resulted in her murder. The trial
court ruled that while the defense was entitled
to assert the sexual contact was consensual,
the State was entitled to argue that the sexual

The defendant asserts his conviction was
based solely on racial profiling. The
defendant asserts that because the victim's
nephew, Jerome, stated during testimony that
when he found out his aunt was stabbed, he
thought the crime had been committed by a
"Spanish guy." However, Jerome stated: "A
Spanish guy had to do it. If [sic] not really
that, I really went straight to the last person I
saw her with...."
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Detective Brueggeman, the lead detective
investigating the murder, testified that the
defendant was not considered a suspect in the
murder at their first meeting. Detective
Brueggeman stated the fact that the
defendant's DNA was found on the trash can
handles in which the victim was found lead
him to suspect the defendant. Detective
Brueggeman confirmed that some of the
people he spoke to during the investigation of
the murder suspected it was committed by a
Spanish individual because they believed
when someone was stabbed it was probably
by a Mexican. Detective Brueggeman stated
those were not his words but were the
suspicions of some members of the black
community. Detective Brueggeman detailed
the evidence which lead him to suspect the
defendant had committed the murder.
Detective Brueggeman concluded the murder
was committed by someone who lived nearby
because of where the trash can was hidden. It
was also determined that the trash can would
have been difficult to move due to the weight
of the victim's body inside it. In addition, it
was determined that the trash can was
originally stored next to a church which was
across the street from the defendant's
residence.

In his final assignment of error, the defendant
contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to require a unanimous jury verdict.
The defendant contends that Louisiana's
statutory scheme which permits nonunanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony
cases should be declared unconstitutional. In
particular, he claims that La. Const. Art. I,
Sec. 17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782 violate
the equal protection Clause.
La. Const. Art. I, Section 17(A) provides
that a case "in which the punishment is
necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be
tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of
whom must concur to render a verdict."
Additionally, La.
C.Cr.P.
art.
782(A) provides in part that "[c]ases in which
punishment is necessarily confinement at
hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed
of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to
render a verdict."
In Apodaca v. Oregon, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he purpose of trial by jury is to prevent
oppression by the Government by providing
a 'safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the
complaint, biased, or eccentric judge.' 'Given
this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between
the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen
...' A requirement of unanimity, however,
does not materially contribute to the exercise
of this commonsense judgment. As we said
in Williams, a jury will come to such a
judgment as long as it consists of a group of
laymen representative of a cross section of

A review of the record demonstrates that
there was substantial evidence linking the
defendant to the murder. The defendant has
not established that he was investigated based
on racial profiling as he asserts. This claim is
without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
NUMBER 4

243

the community who have the duty and the
opportunity to deliberate, free from outside
attempts at intimidation, on the question of a
defendant's guilt. In terms of this function we
perceive no difference between juries
required to act unanimously and those
permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10
to two or 11 to one. Requiring unanimity
would obviously produce hung juries in some
situations where non-unanimous juries will
convict or acquit. But in either case, the
interest of the defendant in having the
judgment of his peers interposed between
himself and the officers of the State who
prosecute and judge him is equally well
served.

that Article 782 violated the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to
that ruling, it should go without saying that a
trial judge is not at liberty to ignore the
controlling jurisprudence of superior courts.
This
Court
cited
and
relied
on Bertrand in State v. Hickman, to reject the
argument that the trial court had erred in
denying the defendant's motion to declare La.
C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) unconstitutional as
violative of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Bertrand, under current jurisprudence
from the U.S. Supreme Court, nonunanimous twelve-person jury verdicts are
constitutional, and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) is
constitutional. Accordingly, there is no merit
in this assignment of error.

In State v. Bertrand, the trial court found
that La. C.Cr.P. art. 782 (A) violated
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, relative to
the number of jurors needed to concur to
render a verdict in cases in which punishment
is necessarily confinement at hard labor, the
same issue raised by the defendant in the
instant case. On direct appeal by the State, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, stating in
its conclusion:

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, we affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED

Due to this Court's prior determinations
that Article 782 withstands constitutional
scrutiny, and because we are not
presumptuous enough to suppose, upon mere
speculation, that the United States Supreme
Court's still valid determination that nonunanimous 12 person jury verdicts are
constitutional may someday be overturned,
we find that the trial court erred in ruling
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“Supreme Court to Examine Whether Unanimous Juries are Required for Criminal
Convictions”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
March 18, 2019
The Supreme Court on Monday accepted two
important criminal justice cases for next term
but turned down a Georgia death-row inmate
who said a juror in his case used racist
language and a bed-and-breakfast owner who
declined to offer a room to a lesbian couple.

The Louisiana case was brought by
Evangelisto Ramos, convicted of seconddegree murder in 2016 on a 10-to-2 jury vote
and sentenced to life in prison. His attorneys
said Louisiana’s law was a Jim Crow attempt
to diminish the impact of African Americans
serving on juries.

As they began shaping their docket for the
term that starts in October, the justices
accepted a case from Louisiana that asks
whether the Constitution requires unanimous
jury verdicts for serious criminal convictions.

The state’s voters in 2018 passed a
referendum requiring unanimous verdicts in
felony trials. But it was prospective to 2019
and would not affect Ramos.

Louisiana and Oregon do not require
unanimity for major crimes, and attorneys
representing defendants convicted in those
states for years have urged the Supreme
Court to revisit the question.

Louisiana opposed Ramos’s request.
“Thousands of final convictions in these two
states could be upset if such a new rule were
later declared retroactive,” wrote the state’s
attorney general, Jeff Landry (R).

In rulings in 1972, the court said the
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, which
recognizes the right to a “speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury,” does not mean
states must require a unanimous jury. At the
same time, the court has required unanimity
in federal trials.

The case is Ramos v. Louisiana.
In Kahler v. Kansas, attorneys for James
Kraig Kahler ask the court to decide whether
a state may abolish the insanity defense.
Kahler was convicted and sentenced to death
for killing his wife, Karen, his daughters
Lauren and Emily, and Karen’s grandmother
in 2009.

The question is similar to one the court
faced earlier this term, when it ruled the
Eighth Amendment ban on excessive fines
applies to state and local governments, not
just the federal government.

Kahler’s attorneys argued he was so mentally
ill he did not understand his actions.
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But, “in Kansas, along with four other states,
it is not a defense to criminal liability that
mental illness prevented the defendant from
knowing his actions were wrong,”
Washington lawyer Jeffrey T. Green told the
Supreme Court.

are shielding from
Sotomayor wrote.

judicial

review,”

The court also turned away without comment
a petition from the owner of a Hawaii bedand-breakfast who turned away a lesbian
couple. Phyllis Young said her Christian
beliefs required her to refuse to rent a room
in 2007 to a same-sex couple.

“So long as he knowingly killed a human
being — even if he did it because he believed
the devil told him to, or because a delusion
convinced him that his victim was trying to
kill him, or because he lacked the ability to
control his actions — he is guilty,” Green
said.

A state court said Hawaii’s publicaccommodation law prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Supreme Court is still considering a
petition from an Oregon bakery that refused
to make a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple.

Green said the other states are Alaska, Idaho,
Montana and Utah.
The court also turned down a petition from
Keith Tharpe, who is on Georgia’s death row.
Tharpe was convicted in 1991 of killing his
sister-in-law and raping his estranged wife.

Last term, the court ruled for a Colorado
baker who made a similar rejection. But the
court found alternative grounds for that
ruling and did not address the question of
whether business owners can claim religious
exemptions from public-accommodations
laws.

Seven years later, he discovered that a juror
in the case harbored racist sentiments. The
juror, Barney Gattie, believed there are “two
types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2.
N-----s,” according to an affidavit.
The court did not provide an explanation for
turning down Tharpe’s petition. But Justice
Sonia Sotomayor wrote separately to say his
plea turned not on the juror’s remarks but
rather on procedural grounds that it appeared
a lower court got right.
“As this may be the end of the road for
Tharpe’s juror-bias claim, however, we
should not look away from the magnitude of
the potential injustice that procedural barriers
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“Jury Unanimity Bid Gets High Court Look”
Bloomberg Law
Jordan S. Rubin
March 18, 2019
Unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases
could soon become the law of the land after
the U.S. Supreme Court March 18 granted
review on the issue for next term.

“We are hopeful the Court took the case to
restore the full protections of the Constitution
to the State of Louisiana,” said Ramos’
attorney, G. Ben Cohen.

If the justices decide that the federal Sixth
Amendment unanimity right applies in state
court, it will be the latest such instance of
“incorporating” federal provisions to the
states, an aspect of constitutional law brought
to light recently this term with the high
court’s closely watched decision in Timbs v.
Indiana.

Ramos was convicted of murder at a
Louisiana state court trial in 2016. Ten of his
12 jurors voted for guilt.
The case is Ramos v. Louisiana, U.S., 185924, review granted 3/18/19.

Eighth
Amendment
excessive
fines
protections apply to the states, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote for the court in Timbs,
while noting in her opinion that the right to
unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases is
still an outlier that only applies federally.
Nearly all courtrooms around the country
already require unanimous convictions,
except for Oregon and, until recently,
Louisiana, which voted last November to
outlaw the practice going forward.
But the Louisiana ballot measure, which
doesn’t apply retroactively, won’t save
Evangelisto Ramos, whose appeal the
Supreme Court just granted.
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“Are Unanimous Juries Required in State Criminal Cases? SCOTUS Will
Consider Overruling Precedent”
ABA Journal
Debra Cassens Weiss
March 18, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to consider whether to overrule a 1972 case
that allowed nonunanimous verdicts in state
criminal trials.

federal criminal trials, but not in state
criminal trials. Ramos is asking the court to
rule that the same Sixth Amendment right
applies to the states through the incorporation
doctrine.

The court agreed to decide whether the Sixth
Amendment requires unanimity in the case of
Louisiana inmate Evangelisto Ramos, who
was sentenced to life in prison after being
convicted of second-degree murder in a 10-2
jury vote.

When Ramos was convicted in 2016, only
Oregon
and
Louisiana
allowed
nonunanimous verdicts in criminal trials. The
states still required unanimity in cases of
first-degree
murder,
the Associated
Press reports.

The case was based on circumstantial
evidence, according to Ramos’ cert petition.
He acknowledged having sex with the victim
the night before her slaying, but said she was
alive when he left her home. Ramos said she
had gotten into a car with two other men as
he left.

Louisiana voters amended the state
constitution to bar nonunanimous verdicts in
criminal cases four months ago, according to
the Associated Press. The change took effect
in January, but it does not apply retroactively.

Ramos had first raised the jury issue in a
supplemental brief he filed himself in
Louisiana state court.

The ABA House of Delegates adopted a
resolution in August 2018 urging states to
require unanimity. In 2011, the ABA filed an
amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to
reconsider the 1972 Apodaca ruling.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the 1972
decision, Apodaca v. Oregon, that the Sixth
Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in

The new case is Ramos v. Louisiana.
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Mathena v. Malvo
Ruling Below: Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018).
Overview: Malvo was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without parole. SCOTUS
issued a series of decisions holding that juvenile defendants could not be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole. SCOTUS held that the new sentencing rules were retroactive. Malvo
filed applications for writs of habeas corpus relief.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in concluding—in direct conflict
with Virginia’s highest court and other courts – that a decision of the Supreme Court, Montgomery
v. Louisiana, addressing whether a new constitutional rule announced in an earlier decision, Miller
v. Alabama, applies retroactively on collateral review may properly be interpreted as modifying
and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.
Lee Boyd MALVO., Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
Randall MATHENA, Chief Warden, Red Onion State Prison, Defendant- Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on June 21, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In Virginia in 2004, a defendant convicted of
capital murder, who was at least 16 years old
at the time of his crime, would be punished
by either death or life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, unless the judge
suspended his sentence. After a Virginia jury
convicted Lee Boyd Malvo of two counts of
capital murder based on homicides that he
committed in 2002 when he was 17 years old,
it declined to recommend the death penalty,
and he was instead sentenced in 2004 to
two terms of life imprisonment without
parole, in accordance with Virginia law.

Thereafter, Malvo, again seeking to avoid the
death penalty, pleaded guilty in another
Virginia jurisdiction to one count of capital
murder and one count of attempted capital
murder — both of which he also committed
when 17 years old — and received two
additional terms of life imprisonment without
parole.
After Malvo was sentenced in those
cases, the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions relating to the sentencing of
defendants who committed serious crimes
when under the age of 18. It held that such
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defendants cannot be sentenced to death; that
they cannot be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole unless they
committed a homicide offense that reflected
their permanent incorrigibility; and that these
rules relating to juvenile sentencing are to be
applied retroactively, meaning that sentences
that were legal when imposed must be
vacated if they were imposed in violation of
the Court's new rules.

Snipers" — murdered 12 individuals,
inflicted grievous injuries on 6 others, and
terrorized the entire Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area, instilling an all-consuming
fear into the community.
The violence began on September 5, 2002,
when Malvo — who was at the time 17 years
old — ran up to a man's car in Clinton,
Maryland, shot him six times with a .22
caliber handgun, and stole his laptop and
$3,500 in cash. Ten days later, again in
Clinton, Maryland, Malvo approached a man
who was in the process of closing a liquor
store and shot him in the abdomen at close
range with the handgun.

In these habeas cases filed under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, we conclude that even though
Malvo's life-without-parole sentences were
fully legal when imposed, they must now be
vacated because the retroactive constitutional
rules for sentencing juveniles adopted
subsequent to Malvo's sentencings were not
satisfied
during
his
sentencings.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
order vacating Malvo's four terms of life
imprisonment without parole and remanding
for resentencing to determine (1) whether
Malvo qualifies as one of the rare juvenile
offenders who may, consistent with
the Eighth Amendment, be sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole because his
"crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility" or
(2) whether those crimes instead "reflect the
transient immaturity of youth," in which case
he must receive a sentence short of life
imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.

Muhammad and Malvo then went south for a
short period. On September 21, Muhammad
used a high-powered, long-range Bushmaster
assault rifle to shoot two women who had just
closed a liquor store in Montgomery,
Alabama. Malvo was seen approaching the
women as the shots were being fired and then
rummaging through their purses. One of the
women died from her wounds. Two days
after that, a woman in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, was fatally shot in the head with a
Bushmaster rifle after closing the store where
she worked. Again, Malvo was seen fleeing
the scene with her purse.
Shortly thereafter, Muhammad and Malvo
returned to the Washington, D.C. area and,
from October 2 until their capture on October
24, embarked on a series of indiscriminate
sniper shootings with the Bushmaster rifle
that left 10 more people dead, 3 seriously
wounded, and the entire region "gripped by a
paroxysm of fear," convinced that "every
man, woman, and child was a likely

I
A
Over the course of almost seven weeks in the
fall of 2002, Lee Malvo and John
Muhammad — better known as the "D.C.
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target." On October 2, shortly after 6 p.m.,
they shot and killed a man while he was in a
grocery store parking lot in Montgomery
County, Maryland. The next day, they
murdered five people — four in the morning
at different locations in Montgomery County,
and a fifth that evening in Washington,
D.C. The following day, they shot and
seriously wounded a woman in Spotsylvania
County, Virginia, while she was loading
goods into her car. On October 7, they shot
and gravely injured a 13-year-old boy in
Prince George's County, Maryland, while he
was on his way to school; two days later, they
shot and killed a man at a gas station in Prince
William County, Virginia; two days after
that, they shot and killed another man at a gas
station in Spotsylvania County, Virginia; and
three days after that, they shot and killed a
woman outside a Home Depot store in
Fairfax County, Virginia. On October 19,
they shot and seriously wounded a man while
he was leaving a restaurant in Ashland,
Virginia, and on October 22, they shot and
killed a bus driver in Montgomery County,
Maryland, the last of their sniper shootings.

an effort to extort ten million dollars from the
'media and the government'" and that he had
been the triggerman in 10 of the shootings.
Later, however, when testifying as a witness
at Muhammed's first-degree murder trial in
Montgomery County, Maryland, Malvo
stated that "he had been the actual shooter of
[the 13-year old boy] in Prince George's
County and of [the bus driver] in
Montgomery County" and that "Muhammad
had been the actual triggerman on all other
occasions."
In January 2003, a grand jury in Fairfax
County, Virginia, returned an indictment
charging Malvo as an adult with (1) capital
murder in the commission of an act of
terrorism, in violation of Va. Code Ann. §
18.2-31(13); (2) capital murder for killing
more than one person within a three-year
period, in violation of § 18.2-31(8); and (3)
using a firearm in the commission of a felony,
in violation of § 18.2-53.1. The prosecutor in
that case sought the death penalty. Malvo
pleaded not guilty to the charges, and, to
ensure an impartial jury pool, the case was
transferred to the Circuit Court for the City of
Chesapeake, Virginia.

Malvo and Muhammad were apprehended in
the early hours of October 24 at a rest area in
Frederick County, Maryland, while sleeping
in a blue Chevrolet Caprice. A loaded .223
caliber Bushmaster rifle was found in the car,
and a hole had been "cut into the lid of the
trunk, just above the license plate, through
which a rifle barrel could be projected."
Modifications had also been made to the car's
rear seat to allow access to the trunk area
from the car's passenger compartment. After
his arrest, Malvo told authorities in Virginia
that "he and his 'father,' John Allen
Muhammad, had acted as a sniper team . . . in

At the trial, which took place during
November and December 2003, Malvo
acknowledged his involvement in the killings
but asserted an insanity defense based on the
theory that he had been indoctrinated by
Muhammad during his adolescence and was
operating under Muhammad's control. To
that end, defense counsel presented
testimony from more than 40 witnesses who
collectively described how Malvo was
physically abused and largely abandoned as a
child growing up in Jamaica and Antigua;
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how, when he was 15 years old, he befriended
John Muhammad, an American veteran who
had taken his three children to live in Antigua
without their mother's knowledge; how
Muhammad became a surrogate father for
Malvo and brought him illegally to the
United States in May 2001; how Malvo
briefly reunited with his mother in the United
States but then moved across the country in
October 2001 to rejoin Muhammad, who had
recently lost custody of his children; and how
Muhammad then intensively trained Malvo
in military tactics for nearly a year, telling
Malvo that he had a plan to get his children
back and force America to reckon with its
social injustices. The jury rejected Malvo's
insanity defense and convicted him of all
charges, including the two capital murder
charges.

punishment at imprisonment for life" for each
of his two capital murder convictions.
After the jury was excused and a presentence
report was prepared, the court conducted a
final sentencing hearing on March 10, 2004,
sentencing Malvo to two terms of life
imprisonment, as required by Virginia
law. Under Virginia law, a defendant
sentenced to life imprisonment for a capital
murder offense committed on or after
January 1, 1995, is ineligible for any form of
parole. The court also sentenced Malvo to
three years' imprisonment for the firearm
conviction.
Following his conviction and sentencing in
the Chesapeake City Circuit Court, Malvo
entered an "Alford plea" pursuant to a plea
agreement in the Circuit Court for the County
of Spotsylvania, Virginia, pleading guilty to
one count of capital murder, one count of
attempted capital murder, and two counts of
using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
The plea agreement indicated that Malvo's
attorney had advised Malvo that he faced
death or imprisonment for a term of life for
the capital murder charge and a sentence of
20 years to life imprisonment for the
attempted capital murder charge. In the
agreement, Malvo waived his "right to an
appeal"
and
admitted
that
"the
Commonwealth ha[d] sufficient evidence to
convict [him]." The Commonwealth in turn
agreed to dismiss two pending charges and
agreed that sentencing Malvo to two terms of
life imprisonment without parole, as well as
eight years' imprisonment for the firearm
offenses, was the "appropriate disposition in
this case."

At the sentencing phase of trial, the jury was
instructed to choose between the death
penalty and life imprisonment without
parole. During this phase, Malvo's counsel
presented additional evidence on Malvo's
background and history, and he stressed
Malvo's youth and immaturity in arguing that
Malvo should be spared the death penalty.
The jury returned its verdict on December 23,
2003, finding "unanimously and beyond a
reasonable doubt after consideration of
[Malvo's] history and background that there
[was] a probability that he would commit
criminal acts of violence that constitute a
continuing serious threat to society" and also
"that his conduct in committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved depravity of
mind." Nonetheless, the jury, "having
considered all of the evidence in aggravation
and mitigation of the offense," "fix[ed] his
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The Spotsylvania County Circuit Court held
a plea and sentencing hearing on October 26,
2004, at which it confirmed that Malvo
understood "that by pleading guilty [he was]
giving up constitutional rights" —
specifically, his "right to a trial by jury" and
his "right to confront and cross examine [his
accusers]" — and that he was also "probably
giving up [his] right to appeal any decisions
made by this Court." After ensuring that
Malvo understood the nature of the charges
against him and had concluded, after
consulting
with
his lawyers,
that
his Alford plea was "in [his] best interests,"
the court accepted Malvo's guilty pleas,
finding that they "were freely, voluntarily,
and intelligently made." It also "accepted and
approved" the plea agreement itself. The
court then sentenced Malvo to two terms of
life imprisonment without parole for his
capital murder and attempted capital murder
convictions, plus eight years' imprisonment
for
the
firearm
convictions.

Chesapeake City Circuit Court and the other
addressing the same sentences from the
Spotsylvania County Circuit Court.
The district court denied and dismissed with
prejudice both applications, concluding
that Miller was not "retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review," 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(C), and that Malvo's habeas
applications therefore were time-barred
under § 2244(d)'s 1-year period of limitation.
After Malvo appealed, his case was placed in
abeyance while this court and the Supreme
Court addressed whether Miller was to be
applied retroactively. On January 25, 2016,
the Supreme Court held that "Miller
announced a substantive rule that is
retroactive in cases on collateral review."
Accordingly, we remanded Malvo's case
comprising his two habeas applications to the
district court for further consideration in light
of Montgomery.
By memorandum and order dated May 26,
2017, the district court granted both of
Malvo's habeas applications, vacating his
four sentences of life imprisonment without
parole and remanding to the Chesapeake City
Circuit Court and the Spotsylvania County
Circuit Court for resentencing in accordance
with Miller and Montgomery. In entering
that order, the district court rejected the
Warden's argument that because the trial
courts retained discretion under Virginia law
to suspend Malvo's life sentences in whole or
in part, those sentences were not mandatory
and therefore were not covered by
the Miller rule. The court explained that the
constitutional rule announced in Miller and
restated in Montgomery provided relief not
only
from mandatory life-without-parole

B
Nearly eight years after the conclusion of
Malvo's Virginia prosecutions, the Supreme
Court
held
that
the Eighth
Amendment prohibits juvenile homicide
offenders from receiving "mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences" and that, before
sentencing such an offender to life without
parole, the sentencing court must first
consider the "offender's youth and attendant
characteristics." In light of Miller, Malvo
filed two applications for writs of habeas
corpus in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, one challenging the lifewithout-parole sentences imposed by the
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sentences
but
also
potentially
from discretionary life-without-parole
sentences. The district court also rejected the
Warden's argument that in sentencing Malvo,
the Chesapeake City Circuit Court had
actually considered whether Malvo was one
of those rare juvenile offenders whose crimes
reflected irreparable corruption, as required
by Miller. And finally, the court rejected the
Warden's argument that Malvo, in entering
the Alford plea in Spotsylvania County
Circuit
Court,
waived
the Eighth
Amendment rights announced in Miller. In
conclusion, the district court recognized that
it was "completely possible that any
resentencing conducted in accordance
with Miller and Montgomery[might] result[]
in the same sentences,", but it concluded that
Malvo was entitled to the procedure
described
in
those
cases
before
being sentenced to life without parole.

attributes of youth, juveniles are not as
morally culpable as adults when engaging in
similar conduct. In light of these
characteristics, the Court recognizes that
juveniles as a class are less deserving of the
most severe punishments. But it also
recognizes that a rare few juveniles may
nonetheless be found to be permanently
incorrigible.

II

Giving effect to these observations, the
Supreme Court has developed a juvenilesentencing jurisprudence beginning with its
2005 decision in Roper, where it held that the
death penalty cannot be imposed on juvenile
offenders. That decision was followed
by Graham, where the Court held that "[t]he
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life
without parole sentence on a juvenile
offender
who
did
not
commit
homicide." The Graham Court explained
that "[a] State is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender
convicted of a nonhomicide crime," but it
must give such defendants "some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."

In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court recognizes that persons under
the age of 18 as a class are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of
sentencing. Juveniles inherently lack
maturity; they do not have a fully formed
character and a fully developed sense of
responsibility; and they are both more
susceptible to external influences and less
able to control their environment than are
adults. Juveniles are also more capable of
change than adults and therefore more
capable of being reformed. Because of these

Two years later in Miller, the Court held that
a juvenile offender convicted of homicide
cannot receive a mandatory sentence of life
without
parole. It
explained,
"Such
mandatory penalties, by their nature,
preclude a sentencer from taking account of
an offender's age and the wealth of
characteristics and circumstances attendant
to it." The Court stated, moreover, that not
only must "a judge or jury . . . have the
opportunity
to
consider
mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest
possible penalty for juveniles,", but also the

From the district court's May 26, 2017 order,
the Warden filed this appeal.
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sentencer must actually "take into
account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison," The
Court did not, however, adopt "a categorical
bar on life without parole for juveniles,"
instead reserving the possibility that such a
severe sentence could be appropriately
imposed on "the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption,"

corruption, it rendered life without parole an
unconstitutional penalty for a class of
defendants because of their status — that is,
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth. As a result,
Miller announced a substantive rule of
constitutional law. Like other substantive
rules, Miller is retroactive because it
necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a
defendant — here, the vast majority of
juvenile offenders — faces a punishment that
the law cannot impose upon him.

Finally,
in
2016, the
Court
decided Montgomery,
holding
that Miller announced a new "substantive
rule" of constitutional law that applies
retroactively "to juvenile offenders whose
convictions and sentences were final
when Miller was decided." Articulating
the Miller rule, the Montgomery Court stated
that "Miller requires that before sentencing a
juvenile to life without parole, the sentencing
judge [must] take into account 'how children
are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them
to a lifetime in prison.'" It then stated:

The
Court
explained
further
that Miller contained both a substantive rule
and a procedural component: "Miller's
substantive holding" was that "life without
parole is an excessive sentence for children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity,"
and its procedural component implementing
the substantive rule requires "[a] hearing
where youth and its attendant circumstances
are considered as sentencing factors" in order
to "separate those juveniles who may be
sentenced to life without parole from those
who may not."

Miller . . . did more than require a sentencer
to consider a juvenile offender's youth before
imposing life without parole; it established
that the penological justifications for life
without parole collapse in light of the
distinctive attributes of youth. Even if a court
considers a child's age before sentencing him
or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence
still violates the Eighth Amendment for a
child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient
immaturity. Because Miller determined that
sentencing a child to life without parole is
excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender
whose
crime
reflects
irreparable

III
In this appeal, the Warden contends that
notwithstanding this new Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence governing the sentencing of
juveniles, the district court erred in awarding
habeas corpus relief to Malvo, giving three
reasons in support of his contention. First, he
argues that "Malvo has no entitlement to
relief under Miller" because "Miller's new
rule explicitly applies to mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences," whereas "the
Virginia Supreme Court has conclusively
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held that Virginia does not impose mandatory
sentences for any homicide offense" because
judges retain the discretionary right to
suspend sentences; second, that "Malvo
received all that Miller would entitle him to
during his trial in Chesapeake [City]" and
therefore is not entitled to resentencing in that
jurisdiction; and finally, that "Malvo's
voluntary decision to enter into a plea
agreement with stipulated sentences in
Spotsylvania to eliminate the possibility of
[the death penalty] waive[d] any claim he
would have had under Miller" as to the two
life-without-parole sentences he received in
that jurisdiction. We consider these
arguments in turn.

district court violated the rule established
in Teague "by crafting a new rule of
constitutional law based on Montgomery's
discussion of Miller and applying that new
rule retroactively." In other words, as the
Warden argues, "the principles of finality
discussed in Teague prohibit federal courts
from expanding new rules of constitutional
law beyond their holdings," and "the correct
approach is to recognize that . . . Miller's new
rule
is
defined
by Miller itself,
not Montgomery."
In response, Malvo contends that he did
indeed receive mandatory life-without-parole
sentences
within
the
meaning
of Miller because Virginia law provided then
and still provides that when a jury declines to
recommend the death penalty for a defendant
convicted of capital murder, the defendant
must be sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole. He asserts further that
Virginia trial courts were not aware at the
time of his sentencings in 2004 that they were
empowered to suspend capital murder
sentences. Finally, he argues that, in any
event, the Miller rule is not limited
to mandatory life-without-parole sentences
but also applies, as noted in Montgomery,
to all life-without-parole sentences where the
sentencing court did not resolve whether the
juvenile offender was "irretrievably corrupt"
or whether his crimes reflected his "transient
immaturity."

A
First, the Warden contends that because
the Miller rule
is
limited
to mandatory sentences of life imprisonment
without parole, it does not implicate Malvo's
sentences, which were, under Virginia law,
subject to the sentencing court's discretion to
suspend the sentence in whole or in part. He
argues
that
because
Malvo
had
the opportunity under Virginia law to request
that his life sentences be suspended, he did
not receive mandatory life-without-parole
sentences and therefore is not entitled to any
relief under Miller. Responding to the district
court's conclusion that Montgomery clarified
that the rule in Miller applies more broadly
than only to mandatory life-without-parole
sentences,
the
Warden
contends
that Miller itself did not sweep so broadly
and that only the Miller rule applying to
mandatory sentences was made retroactive
in Montgomery. Indeed, he argues that the

As the Warden asserts, the Virginia Supreme
Court has now twice recognized that Virginia
trial courts have long had the authority to
suspend life sentences in whole or in part
even following a capital murder conviction
— an interpretation of Virginia law that is, of
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course, binding here. But also, as Malvo
asserts, it is far from clear that anyone
involved in Malvo's prosecutions actually
understood at the time that Virginia trial
courts retained their ordinary suspension
authority following a conviction for capital
murder. We need not, however, resolve
whether any of Malvo's sentences were
mandatory because Montgomery has now
made clear that Miller's rule has applicability
beyond those situations in which a juvenile
homicide offender received a mandatory lifewithout-parole sentence.

cases
on
collateral
review.
And
because Montgomery explicitly articulated
the rule in Miller that it was retroactively
applying, the district court could not have
violated Teague in applying that rule. The
Warden may well critique the Supreme
Court's ruling in Montgomery — as did
Justice Scalia in dissent— but we are
nonetheless
bound
by Montgomery's
statement of the Miller rule.
At bottom, we reject the Warden's argument
that Malvo "has no entitlement to relief
under Miller"
on
the
ground
that Miller applies only to mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences and instead
conclude that Miller's holding potentially
applies to any case where a juvenile homicide
offender was sentenced to life imprisonment
without
the possibility of parole.

To be sure, all the penalty schemes before the
Supreme
Court
in
both Miller and Montgomery were
mandatory. Yet the Montgomery Court
confirmed that, even though imposing a lifewithout-parole sentence on a juvenile
homicide offender pursuant to a mandatory
penalty
scheme necessarily violates
the Eighth
Amendment as
construed
in Miller,
a
sentencing
judge also violates Miller's rule any time it
imposes a discretionary life-without-parole
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender
without first concluding that the offender's
"crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility," as
distinct from "the transient immaturity of
youth." And we are not free to conclude, as
the Warden argues, that Montgomery's
articulation of the Miller rule was mere
dictum. To the contrary, Montgomery stated
clearly that, under Miller, the Eighth
Amendment bars
life-without-parole
sentences for all but those rare juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility. Indeed, this scope was the
basis for its holding that Miller announced a
substantive rule that applies retroactively to

B
The Warden next contends thateven
if Miller applies to discretionary lifewithout-parole sentences, "Malvo received
all that Miller would entitle him to during his
trial in Chesapeake," and thus the two lifewithout-parole sentences that he received in
that proceeding must be permitted to stand. In
advancing this argument, the Warden notes
that "[o]ver the course of six weeks, the jury
heard an enormous amount of mitigation
evidence that was nearly all focused on
[Malvo's]
youth,
upbringing,
and
impressionability," and that it also "heard
from multiple expert witnesses who testified
specifically about how Malvo's age and
upbringing affected his competency." He
argues further that "the trial court and the jury
actually considered [Malvo's mitigation]
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evidence in imposing the sentences in this
case" and that "the jury's finding of future
dangerousness and vileness shows that
Malvo is the 'rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflect[ed] irreparable corruption.'"
Moreover, according to the Warden, the fact
"[t]hat Malvo chose not to use the evidence
he introduced to argue for a sentence less than
life without parole does not change the fact
that he had the opportunity to present the
relevant evidence and argue for leniency,
which
is
all
that
the Eighth
Amendment requires."

Court did not satisfy the requirements of
the Eighth
Amendment as
articulated
in Miller and Montgomery.

C
Finally, the Warden contends that "Malvo's
voluntary decision to enter into a plea
agreement with stipulated [life-withoutparole] sentences in Spotsylvania . . .
waive[d] any claim he would have had
under Miller" as to those two sentences. The
Warden notes that "Malvo received a
substantial benefit" in "avoid[ing] a second
trial at which he could have been sentenced
to death" and contends that Malvo must
therefore "be held to the terms of his
bargain." He cites Brady v. United States, ,
and Dingle v. Stevenson,, to argue that both
the "Supreme Court and this Court have made
clear that guilty pleas are not open to revision
when future changes in the law alter the
calculus that caused the defendant to enter his
plea."

The problem with the Warden's argument,
however, is that, as a matter of Virginia law,
the jury was not allowed to give a sentence
less than life without parole. It was charged
with deciding between the death penalty and
life without parole, and it selected the more
lenient of the two. Thus, even though the jury
did find future dangerousness and vileness, as
the Warden notes, it also considered Malvo's
mitigation evidence and found that he
deserved the lighter of the two sentences that
it could give — life without parole.

At the outset, we conclude that the resolution
of
this
issue
is
not
governed
by Brady or Dingle. In Brady, the defendant
pleaded guilty to a crime that carried the
possibility of the death penalty in order to
avoid that penalty, receiving instead a 50year sentence of imprisonment (later reduced
to 30 years). When the Supreme Court later
held that the death-penalty provision
involved
in
Brady's
case
was
unconstitutional, Brady sought to set aside
his
plea
agreement
as
invalid. The Brady Court rejected Brady's
argument, noting that "even if we assume that
Brady would not have pleaded guilty except

Moreover, the Chesapeake City jury was
never charged with finding whether Malvo's
crimes reflected irreparable corruption or
permanent incorrigibility, a determination
that is now a prerequisite to imposing a lifewithout-parole sentence on a juvenile
homicide offender. Nor were Malvo's "youth
and attendant circumstances" considered by
either the jury or the judge to determine
whether to sentence him to life without parole
or some lesser sentence.
We thus conclude that Malvo's sentencing
proceedings in the Chesapeake City Circuit
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for the death penalty provision . . ., this
assumption merely identifies the penalty
provision as a 'but for' cause of his plea," but
it "does not necessarily prove that the plea
was coerced and invalid as an involuntary
act." Rather, "a plea of guilty is not invalid
merely because entered to avoid the
possibility of a death penalty," even one
subsequently invalidated.

in Brady and Dingle sought to use new
sentencing law as a sword to attack the
validity of their guilty pleas, here the Warden
seeks to use Malvo's lawful guilty plea as a
shield to insulate his allegedly unlawful lifewithout-parole sentences from judicial
review. We conclude that Brady and Dingle
do not provide him with that shield.
Nonetheless, that brings us to the more
formidable question of whether Malvo
waived his constitutional challenge to his
sentences by signing the plea agreement.

In Dingle, we applied Brady to similar
circumstances,
concluding
that
a
plea agreement could not be set aside as
involuntary and invalid because it was
entered into by Dingle to avoid the death
penalty when that penalty was later
determined to be unconstitutional in the
circumstances. We noted in Dingle that the
Supreme Court had "not suggested that a
substantive rule would stretch beyond the
proscribed sentence to reopen guilty pleas
with a different sentence."

In that agreement, Malvo agreed that
Virginia's summary of the facts could be
proven in the case were it to go to trial,
accepting that summary "in lieu of
presentation of any evidence by the
Commonwealth." And, after expressly
waiving his rights to a speedy and public trial
by jury, to compel the production of evidence
and attendance of witnesses, to have a
lawyer, to not testify against himself, and to
be confronted by his accusers, he entered
an Alford guilty plea and waived his right to
an appeal. With respect to punishment, he
stated in his plea agreement, "I understand
that the Commonwealth's Attorney has
agreed that the following specific punishment
is the appropriate disposition in this case":
"life in prison without parole" for the
offenses of capital murder and attempted
capital murder and a term of years for the
other offenses. Finally, he acknowledged that
"the Court [could] accept or reject this plea
agreement." It is noteworthy, however, that in
the plea agreement, Malvo did not himself
agree that life-without-parole sentences were
appropriate punishments for his crimes. That
is not to say, of course, that Malvo did not

Thus, in both Brady and Dingle, the
defendants sought to use new sentencing case
law to attack their convictions — their guilty
pleas — without any claim that the sentences
they actually received were unlawful. The
question in both cases was thus whether to set
aside
the
guilty-plea convictions when
the penalties that induced the pleas were
later found to be unconstitutional. In both
cases that relief was denied, and the
legality vel nonof the avoided sentences was
thus held not to cast doubt on the validity of
the guilty plea. In this case, by distinction,
Malvo seeks to challenge his sentences, not
his guilty-plea convictions, on the ground
that they were retroactively made
unconstitutional under the rule announced
in Miller. Thus, whereas the defendants
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expect that he was avoiding the death penalty
by receiving life sentences without parole.

IV
To be clear, the crimes committed by Malvo
and John Muhammad were the most heinous,
random acts of premeditated violence
conceivable, destroying lives and families
and terrorizing the entire Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area for over six weeks,
instilling mortal fear daily in the citizens of
that community. The Commonwealth of
Virginia understandably sought the harshest
penalties then available under the law, and
the Warden now understandably seeks to
sustain the penalties that were then legally
imposed with arguments that are not without
substantial force.

To begin, it is far from clear that a broad
waiver of a substantive constitutional right,
as the Warden maintains happened here,
would even be enforceable.
But, in any event, the plea agreement in this
case does not provide any form
of express waiver of Malvo's right to
challenge the constitutionality of his sentence
in a collateral proceeding in light of future
Supreme Court holdings, nor was he advised
during his plea colloquy that his Alford plea
would have that effect. He did expressly
waive constitutional rights relating to trial
and his right to direct appeal, but nothing
with respect to the right to pursue future
habeas relief from his punishment.
Consequently, the Warden's waiver argument
must
rest
on
some
form
of inherent or implied waiver of his right to
challenge his sentences as unconstitutional.

But Malvo was 17 years old when he
committed the murders, and he now has the
retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules
that treat juveniles differently for sentencing.
Because we are bound to apply those
constitutional rules, we affirm the district
court's grant of habeas relief awarding Malvo
new sentencings. We make this ruling not
with any satisfaction but to sustain the law.
As for Malvo, who knows but God how he
will bear the future.

In the circumstances, we decline to hold that
Malvo implicitly waived his right to argue,
based on intervening Supreme Court
holdings, that his sentences were ones that
the State could not constitutionally impose on
him. We thus conclude that, while Malvo's
convictions remain valid, nothing in his plea
agreement precludes him from obtaining
habeas relief under the new rule in Miller.
Accordingly, we reject the Warden's
argument that Malvo waived his right to
challenge his sentences.

AFFIRMED
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“Supreme Court Will Hear Case of Lee Malvo, the D.C. Sniper”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
March 18, 2019
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
decide whether Lee Malvo, the younger of
the two men who terrorized the Washington
region with sniper shootings in the fall of
2002, may challenge his sentences of life in
prison without the possibility of parole.

Richmond, Va., ruled that Mr. Malvo was
entitled to new sentencing hearings.
“To
be
clear,” Judge
Paul
V.
Niemeyer wrote for the panel, “the crimes
committed by Malvo and John Muhammad
were the most heinous, random acts of
premeditated
violence
conceivable,
destroying lives and families and terrorizing
the entire Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area for over six weeks, instilling mortal fear
daily in the citizens of that community.”

The court also agreed to hear constitutional
challenges to state laws allowing nonunanimous juries and barring the insanity
defense.
Mr. Malvo, now 34, was 17 when he and John
Allen Muhammad killed 10 people in sniper
attacks in Virginia, Maryland and the District
of Columbia. Mr. Muhammad was sentenced
to death, and he was executed in 2009.

“But Malvo was 17 years old when he
committed the murders, and he now has the
retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules
that treat juveniles differently for
sentencing,” Judge Niemeyer wrote.

Mr. Malvo was sentenced to life in prison by
judges in both Virginia and Maryland. He
challenged
his
Virginia
sentences
under Supreme Court decisions that limited
life sentences for juvenile offenders.

“We make this ruling not with any
satisfaction but to sustain the law,” the judge
concluded. “As for Malvo, who knows but
God how he will bear the future.”

The central legal issues in the case the
Supreme Court agreed to hear, Mathena v.
Malvo, No. 18-217, was whether Mr. Malvo
had been sentenced under a law that made a
life sentence mandatory and whether the
Supreme
Court
decisions
applied
retroactively to Mr. Malvo.

Virginia officials asked the Supreme Court to
review that ruling, noting that the state’s
Supreme Court had come to the opposite
conclusion on the legal question in the case.
The United States Supreme Court also agreed
to decide whether the Constitution allows
non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases.

In June, a unanimous three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals, in
261

The case, Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924,
concerns Evangelisto Ramos, a Louisiana
man who was convicted in 2016 for killing a
woman in New Orleans. The jury’s vote was
10 to 2, which was enough under the state’s
law at the time. Louisiana has since amended
its state Constitution to bar non-unanimous
verdicts, but the move came too late to help
Mr. Ramos.

review in the case, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 186135, lawyers for Mr. Kahler wrote that the
state’s approach “defies a fundamental,
centuries-old precept of our legal system:
People cannot be punished for crimes for
which they are not morally culpable.”
The Kansas law, they wrote, violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.

Oregon is the last remaining state that allows
non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases.

Lawyers for Kansas responded that the state
had refined but not eliminated the insanity
defense, allowing defendants to argue instead
that “as a result of mental disease” they
“lacked the mental state required” to be
convicted.

In a pair of decisions in 1972, one each
from Oregon and Louisiana, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Constitution does not
require states to insist on unanimity. Critics
say the decisions ignored the historical record
and made assumptions about jury behavior
that have been called into question by more
recent research.
The court also agreed to decide whether
states may abolish the dominant version of
the insanity defense. The case concerns
James Kahler, who was sentenced to death
for killing four family members. His lawyers
said he suffered “from depression so severe
that he experienced extreme emotional
disturbance, dissociating him from reality.”
“Although he knew that he was shooting
human beings,” Mr. Kahler’s lawyers said of
their client, “his mental state was so disturbed
at the time that he was unable to control his
actions.”
Kansas is one of five states in which
defendants cannot avoid criminal punishment
by showing that their mental illness
prevented them from knowing their actions
were wrong. In their petition seeking
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“Supreme Court to Consider Whether Beltway Sniper Lee Boyd Malvo Deserves
New Sentencing”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
March 18, 2019
The Supreme Court on Monday said it will
consider whether Lee Boyd Malvo, the
teenage half of the Beltway snipers who
terrorized the Washington region 16 years
ago, may challenge his sentence of life in
prison without parole.

imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.
Since
then,
the
Supreme
Court’s
jurisprudence on juvenile murderers has
changed. It said the death penalty was offlimits for juveniles, and in 2012 said that
mandatory life sentences without the
possibility of parole were unconstitutional for
those under 18.

Malvo, 34, was a 17-year-old when he and
John Allen Muhammad committed what
Virginia officials called “one of the most
notorious strings of terrorist acts in modern
American history.” Between Sept. 5 and Oct.
22, 2002, Muhammad and Malvo killed 10
people and wounded others in sniper attacks
in Virginia, Maryland and the District of
Columbia.

A divided court found that sentencing a child
to life without parole is excessive for all but
“the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.” In sentencing
defendants 17 and younger, judges must now
consider whether a juvenile’s crime reflects
“irreparable corruption” or simply “the
transient immaturity of youth.”

Muhammad was executed in 2009, but Malvo
received sentences of life without parole in
Virginia and Maryland.

The court has also said the rulings are
retroactive.

The Supreme Court’s actions announced
Monday involve the Virginia sentences and
will be heard in the term that starts in
October.

Some courts have interpreted the rulings to
mean that mandatory life without parole laws
are unconstitutional, but that those that offer
a judge discretion are not. The Virginia
Supreme Court ruled against Malvo.

After a 2003 trial in which Malvo was
convicted of shooting FBI analyst Linda
Franklin outside a Fairfax County Home
Depot store, a jury decided against the death
penalty. Instead, it recommended life

But a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit in Richmond said it was clear
Malvo deserved a new sentencing: No judge

263

ever considered whether Malvo’s crime
represented “irreparable corruption.”
The unanimous panel said that the Beltway
shootings “were the most heinous, random
acts of premeditated violence conceivable,
destroying lives and families and terrorizing
the entire Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area for over six weeks, instilling mortal fear
daily in the citizens of that community.”
But, “Malvo was 17 years old when he
committed the murders, and he now has the
retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules
that treat juveniles differently for
sentencing,” the judges concluded.
The Virginia Supreme Court had found the
commonwealth’s laws were not incompatible
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings
because “Virginia law does not preclude a
sentencing court from considering mitigating
circumstances, whether they be age or
anything else.”
There are similar splits around the country
Malvo’s Maryland sentences were upheld in
2017. A state court judge said that the
sentencing judge had specifically taken into
account Malvo’s age and other mitigating
factors — Malvo was brought illegally into
the country by Muhammad, who was 25
years his senior and masterminded the attacks
— in deciding he deserved life imprisonment.
That decision is on appeal to Maryland’s
highest court. In addition, Malvo has
challenged his sentences in federal court in
Maryland.
The Supreme Court case is Mathena v.
Malvo.
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“Supreme Court to Consider Life-Without-Parole For Teen DC Sniper”
ABA Journal
Debra Cassens Weiss
March 18, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide
whether its decision banning mandatory
sentences of life without parole for juveniles
can be used to upend discretionary lifewithout-parole sentences imposed on teens
before the Supreme Court acted.

\sentencing judge didn’t consider whether his
crime reflected “irreparable corruption,” the
only type of crime for which juvenile life
sentences are allowed under the two
precedents.
The other convicted D.C. sniper, John Allen
Muhammad, was executed in 2009.

The Supreme Court agreed to consider the
question in the case of Lee Boyd Malvo, who
was a teen when he and an older man killed
10 people in a series of sniper slayings in the
Washington,
D.C.,
area
in
2002,
the Washington Post reports. Malvo was
sentenced to life without parole in Virginia
and Maryland; the Supreme Court will
review the Virginia cases.

The case is Mathena v. Malvo.
SCOTUSblog case page is here.

The Supreme Court banned sentences of life
without parole for juveniles in the 2012
case, Miller v. Alabama. In 2016, the
Supreme Court ruled in Montgomery v.
Alabama that its ban on teen life-withoutparole sentences applies retroactively.
The Richmond, Virginia-based 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Malvo’s
case that the retroactivity decision allows
reconsideration of discretionary life
sentences as well as mandatory sentences,
according to the state’s cert petition.
An opposition brief filed for Malvo says the
4th Circuit had ruled for Malvo because the
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The

“U.S. appeals court calls D.C. sniper’s life sentences illegal”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
June 21, 2018
A federal appeals court on Thursday said a
sniper serving life in prison without parole
over deadly shootings that traumatized the
Washington, D.C. area in 2002 must be
resentenced in Virginia because he was only
17 at the time of his crimes.

shooting spree. He was executed in 2009 at
age 48 in a Virginia state prison.

The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals denied
an appeal by prosecutors who said Lee Boyd
Malvo need not be resentenced over his role
in the D.C. sniper case, which left 10 people
dead over three weeks in Washington,
Maryland and Virginia.

Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring had
argued that Malvo’s sentences in that state
were acceptable because the trial judge had
discretion to impose lesser punishment.

Niemeyer called Malvo’s and Muhammad’s
crimes “the most heinous, random acts of
premeditated violence conceivable.”

Charlotte Gomer, a spokeswoman for
Herring, said that office may appeal to the
entire 4th Circuit or the Supreme Court.

It cited recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that mandatory life sentences without parole
for juveniles were unconstitutional, and that
this rule applied retroactively.

“We are going to review the decision closely
and decide how best to proceed in a way that
ensures this convicted mass murderer faces
justice for his heinous crimes,” she said.

“We make this ruling not with any
satisfaction, but to sustain the law,” Circuit
Judge Paul Niemeyer wrote for a three-judge
panel of the Richmond, Virginia-based
appeals court. “As for Malvo, who knows but
God how he will bear the future.”

Craig Cooley, a lawyer for Malvo, said he
was pleased with the decision.
“In Lee’s case, the sheer number of
convictions means he will still serve at least
a very substantial portion of his life in
prison,” he added.

Malvo, 33, had received four life sentences in
Virginia, after being convicted of two
murders and later entering a separate guilty
plea to avoid the death penalty. He also
received life without parole in Maryland.

The appeals court said Malvo could be
resentenced to life without parole if his
crimes reflected “permanent incorrigibility,”
or a lesser punishment if his crimes reflected

John Allen Muhammad, Malvo’s older
accomplice, was also convicted over the
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the “transient immaturity” associated with
being 17.

Malvo and Muhammad were arrested after
police found them sleeping at a Maryland rest
area in a Chevrolet Caprice.

Thursday’s decision affirmed a May 2017
ruling by U.S. District Judge Raymond
Jackson in Norfolk, Virginia.

The case is Malvo v Mathena, 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 17-6746.
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